U.S. Military History

Integrate the Basic Knowledge of Military History into Your Education as a Future Officer

U.S. Military History

Terminal Learning Objective:

- **Action:** Apply knowledge of U.S. military history to the education of officers.

- **Conditions:** Given the textbook, a book and a computer simulation each on the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg and the 1944-1945 Battle of the Bulge, student handouts, and personal notes taken during this lesson.

U.S. Military History

Terminal Learning Objective:

- **Standard:**

* Demonstrates mastery of U.S. military history sufficient to pass the test with a score of eighty percent.

* Develops a critical analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the Book Review and Analysis Evaluation Checklist.

U.S. Military History

- **Standard:**

* Conducts a computer simulation and develops a critical analysis of a portion of the Battle of Gettysburg that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the PC-Based Military History Simulation Evaluation Checklist.

* Develops a critical analysis of the Battle of the Bulge that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the Book Review and Analysis Evaluation Checklist.

U.S. Military History

Standard:

* Conducts a computer simulation and develops a critical analysis of a portion of the Battle of the Bulge that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the PC-Based Military History Simulation Evaluation Checklist.

* Identifies the purpose for visiting a military museum.

Language of the Military Profession


War is. . .

a conflict among well organized and led masses, with unknown resolve, each seeking to impose its will on the other.

Military History is . . .

the record of all activities of all armed forces (including armies, navies, and air forces) in war and peace.

Threads of Continuity



The Threads of Continuity

Levels of Military Operations

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

Strategic/Strategy

Strategy is the level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives.

Operational/Operations

Operations involve the planning, conduct, and sustainment of campaigns designed to accomplish strategic goals within a specific theater of war.

Tactical/Tactics

Tactics are the specific techniques that smaller units use to win battles and engagements.

Military Operations (MOP)

Strategy=War

Operations=Campaign

Tactics=Battl

Combined Operation

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

(i.e., “international”)

Joint Task Force

A force of assigned or attached elements of two or more services and constituted by appropriate authority for a specific or limited purpose or missions of short duration.

(i.e., “interservice”)

National Military Strategy

Strategy of Attrition/Exhaustion: A strategy which seeks the gradual erosion of the combat power of the enemy's armed forces and/or the enemy's will or non-military means to resist. **(i.e., purpose)**

National Military Strategy

Strategy of Annihilation/Incapacitation: A strategy which seeks the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy's armed forces. **(i.e., purpose)**

Principles of War

1. **OBJECTIVE**
2. **OFFENSIVE**
3. **MASS**
4. **ECONOMY OF FORCE**
5. **MANEUVER**
6. **UNITY OF COMMAND**
7. **SECURITY**
8. **SURPRISE**
9. **SIMPLICITY**

"Friction" as 10th Principle of War

Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**.

“Friction” as Chance or Uncertainty?

Friction in "On War"

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."

"Friction is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."

"Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.

Offense/Offensive

"The offensive is the decisive form of war."

"The fight is taken to the enemy in such a way as to achieve decisive victory at least cost."

"The main purpose of the offensive is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force."

Defense/Defensive

"The immediate purpose of defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack."

"The greater intent of the defensive is to force the attack to culminate, to gain the initiative for friendly forces, and to create the opportunity to shift to the offensive."

Retrograde

"A retrograde operation is a maneuver to the rear or away from the enemy."

"It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy."

"Commanders use retrograde operations to harass, exhaust, resist, delay, or damage an enemy."

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

"...military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."

"...attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations."

"...hostilities to secure strategic objectives."

Logistics

"Logistics is the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military operations."


"Logistics cannot win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can cause defeat."

Force Projection


"…the movement of military forces from the Continental US or a theater in response to requirements of war or MOOTW."

"Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment. . .to redeployment. . .to demobilization."


Standard Terminology




Interior & Convergent Lines




Concentration On Battlefield




Concentration Before Battlefield




Distribution of Forces




Strategic & Tactical Flanks


LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL FLANK
ENEMY RIGHT FLANK
3
3
3
FRIENDLY RIGHT FLANK
2
NOTE: (1) Also exposed or assailable flank.
(2) Designated by facing toward enemy.
(3) The limits of the area occupied by the force in position or formation.


Strategic & Tactical Flanks




Envelopment




Double Envelopment




Turning Movement




Flanking Position




Oblique Order



Penetration



Check on Learning



Language of the Military Profession

Anglo-American Warfare, 1607-1763: The Emergence of the People in Arms

Conquering a Wilderness: British Experience in North America

- Ca. 150 years of struggle and war till 1763.
  - vs. continental wilderness and Native Americans.
  - Also vs. French, Spanish, Dutch, etc.
- Weapons, fighting, & war were constants.

Anglo-Indian Warfare

- No-holds-barred struggle for survival and conquest.
  - Strong contrast to contemporary Eur. warfare.
- Colonists used strategies of attrition & exhaustion and annihilation & incapacitation.
  - “Feed fights” and captives.

Virginia

- Need for land and farmers for staple crops (e.g., tobacco) triggered conflicts.
  - Isolated farmsteads invited attack.
- For two decades after Massacre of 1622, Virginians secured frontier.
  - Militia obligation extended.

Massachusetts

- Focus on oceanic commerce delayed Indian wars.
- Land and population became trigger.
- King Philip's War, 1675-1678
  - Loose confederation of MA, RI, & CT.
  - Severe losses to all.
  - Broke back of Indians of SE New

Colonial Wars

- Principal rivals were French to north and Spanish to south.
  - Conflict as early as 1620s with French.
- English numerous, aggressive, and land hungry.
  - English farmers vs. French fur trappers.
- Wars often combined new & old

Colonial Wars

- Frequent wars from 1689 on & often merged with Indian conflicts.
  - King William's War (1689-1697), Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), & King George's War (1739-1748) most well known.
- King George's War:
  - Growing Anglo-Amer. animosity.
  - Return of Louisbourg.

French & Indian War

- Developed from British & French dispute over trans-Appalachian fur trapping.
- Also Br. Protestantism vs. Fr. Catholicism.
- Began with VA LTC George Washington's defeat at Ft. Necessity in SW PA in 1754.

French & Indian War

- Br. forces intervened in 1755 primarily to protect colonists.
- Army under Gen. Edward Braddock toward Ft. Duquesne.
  - Ambushed by combined Fr. & Ind. force.
  - Forced Br. to rethink operations in wilderness.

Britain in Control

- Br. reverses continued in 1756-1757.
  - Loss of Ft. William Henry on Lake George in 1757.
  - Fr. power at height.
- William Pitt as Br. PM late in 1756.
  - Adopted largely conventional Eur. military methods.
  - Also adopted colonial interest in conquest of New France.

Britain in Control

- Pitt appointed Lord Jeffrey Amherst & Sir James Wolfe as principal land force commanders.
- Campaigns of 1758:
  - Amherst and Wolfe captured Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island by siege.
  - Marquis de Montcalm held Ft. Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain against Br. attack.

Louisbourg

- Amherst largely committed to conventions of Eur. limited war.
- Conducted siege with 13,000 Br. Regulars & 40 warships.
  - Exploited growing Br. command of the sea.
- Ticonderoga halted progress.

Ticonderoga

- 1758: Br. force of 20,000 regulars, militia, & Ind. under incompetent Gen. James Abercromby.
  - Fr. force only 4,000 but defended good ground with earthworks, etc.
  - Lord George Howe killed early.
  - Abercromby launched unsupported frontal infantry assault.

Ticonderoga

- 1759:Amherst to Ticonderoga & replaced Abercromby.
  - Led 13,000 regulars and provincials.
  - Fr. destroyed & abandoned Ft. Ticonderoga and withdrew down Lake Champlain.
  - Amherst thwarted.

Quebec, 1759

- Wolfe was atypical Br. officer, aggressive and devoted to battle.
  - Led 9,000 regulars, 22 warships, & 150 transports up treacherous St. Lawrence.
- Montcalm skillfully deployed about 14,000 militia, Ind., and regulars.
  - Used terrain, dispersion, & fortifications.

The Montmorency, Jul 1759

- Wolfe brought Quebec under ineffective long-range bombardment.
- Br. burned local farms, but Montcalm remained in fortifications.
- Wolfe finally attacked across Montmorency in July.
  - Br. lost heavily but to no avail.

Plains of Abraham, Sep 1759

- Wolfe ascended St. Lawrence with 3,600 troops aboard transports.
  - Demonstrated against Fr. flanks.
- Br. surprised Fr., landed Sep 13 at Anse au Foulon bluffs, & within two miles of Quebec.
- Wolfe ready for battle or siege.

Plains of Abraham, Sep 1759

- Br. began to dig siege works.
- Montcalm came out for open-field fight.
- Disciplined Br. Regulars held ground, fired well, & dispersed Fr.
  - Fr. morale broken.
- Both commanders mortally wounded & Quebec surrendered Sep 18.

Conquest of Canada


- Br. completed conquest in 1760.
  - Accomplished with large force of Anglo-American Regulars and provincials.
- Possession of New France brought new security problems for Br. empire.
- Br. gov't heavily in debt.
- Colonists & Br. mutually

Results

- Warfare in N. Amer. largely unlike that in Eur.
- Colonists continued tradition of decisive wilderness warfare.
- Br. adjusted tactics & war aims to wilderness (e.g., light infantry).
- Fr. aching for revenge after

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Anglo-American Warfare,1607-1763:

The Emergence of the People in Arms

The War for American Independence, 1775-1783: The People at War

Revolutionary War Characterized:

- Complex, widespread, destructive, & global.
  - Second deadliest U.S. war per capita.
- Varied from contemporary Eur. wars.
  - Both sides used militia, partisans, & simplified tactics.
  - Amer. integrated militia with regulars & commanded by

Militia War: To Bunker Hill

- After 1763, colonists resisted Br. taxation policy.
- Br decided to use force in MA in 1775.
  - Amer. militia skirmished with Br. force at Lexington & Concord.
- 15,000 New Eng. militia flocked to Boston vs. 6,500 Br. Regulars.
  - Militia occupied & improved Charlestown neck across from Boston.

Militia War: To Bunker Hill

- Br. Gen. Gage decided in Jun 1775 to drive rebels from Breed's/Bunker's hill mass.
- Br. task force tried to avoid frontal assault by attacking Amer. left.
  - Even used light infantry & oblique order.
- Br. assault practically frontal anyway.
  - Redcoats lost 44% of 2,400 engaged!

After Bunker Hill

- All quiet for nine months & Br.withdrew to Halifax, NS, in Mar 1776.
- Cont. Cong. began support & control of militia at Boston.
- Washington appointed to command Continental Army in Jul 1776.
  - Relocated army south to vital port of New York.

Campaign of 1776

- New Br. CINCs, the brothers Howe, planned to combine capturing places with negotiating. (i.e., carrot & stick)
  - Enjoyed command of the sea.
  - Assembled army of inf. & light field guns and planned to rely on firepower, shock, & foot speed. (no cav.)
  - Target was deep-water New York port.

Battle of Long Island

- Gen. William Howe outgeneraled Wash. at Long Island in Aug 1776.
  - Br. turned open Amer. tactical left flank.
  - Object was psychological victory & possible negotiated peace.
- Limited Br. intent allowed Wash. to escape eventually to New Jersey.

Manhattan to Trenton/Princeton

- Wash. discouraged by performance of Cont. Army.
  - 1776 enlistments about to expire.
- Howe maneuvered Wash. into PA & went into winter quarters.
- Wash. surprised Hessians on Dec 26 at Trenton and later Br. at Princeton.
  - Reinvigorated Amer. cause and foiled Br. hope for negotiated restoration.

Saratorga Campaign

- Effects of Trenton & Princeton:
  - Howe & Br. preoccupied with PA & rebel capital at Philadelphia.
  - Howe had latitude to attack Phil. in 1777.
  - Amer. state & local gov’ts adopted conscription to fill ranks.
  - Wash. goaded by Cong. into action, defeated, & abandoned capital.

Burgoyne toward the Hudson

- Gen. John Burgoyne, with 9,000 regulars, Canadians, & Indians, was to:
  - Advance 350 miles from Quebec through wilderness to Albany.
  - Cooperate with Howe & other forces to isolate seat of rebellion in New Eng.
- Burgoyne started late in June & was encumbered; Howe left for

Freeman's Farm

- Burgoyne with only 5,500 arrived on Hudson in late Sep.
- Amer. under Gen. Horatio Gates occupied Bemis Heights & blocked Hudson.
  - Position chosen & fortifications directed by Pol. mil. eng. Thaddeus Kosciuszko.

Freeman's Farm

- Br. advanced in three columns on Sep 19 to turn Amer. left.
  - Fought in linear formations.
- Gates preferred fortifications; Benedict Arnold favored the woods in front.
- Amer. met Br. in open fields of Freeman’s Farm & fought well.
  - Br. held farm but progress stopped.

Bemis Heights

- Both sides spent about three weeks fortifying positions.
- Burgoyne conducted recon. in force against Amer. left on Oct 7.
- Amer. defeated recon. & Arnold led assault on Br. redoubts.
  - Stopped at Balcarres Redoubt but captured critical Breymann Redoubt.

Burgoyne Surrenders

- Burgoyne withdrew to Saratoga; Gates surrounded him with 11,000 mostly militia.
- Burgoyne surrendered on Oct 17.
- Br. overextension; Gates's prudent strategic/operational defensive; & Arnold's tactical aggressiveness brought greatest victory of Amer. Rev. to date.

Consequences of Saratoga

- Fr. recognized U.S. and moved to provide direct military aid.
- Br. changed policies for waging war:
  - Sir Henry Clinton replaced Howe.
  - Turned to combined force of Loyalists & Br. Regulars to suppress rebellion.
  - Royal Navy to conduct raids along coast.
  - Br. also now turned to "people in arms"

Valley Forge

- After Philadelphia, Wash. withdrew to Valley Forge for winter.
- Prussian Baron Frederich von Steuben:
  - Brought organization & instruction up to Eur. standards.
  - Concentrated on disciplined musket fire & effective bayonet attack.

Monmouth & Stalemate

- At Monmouth CH in Jun 1778, Cont. Army fought Br. to draw.
  - Last major engagement in north during war.
- Br. turned to southern colonies.
  - Combination of Loyalists, Br. Regulars, & Royal Navy to restore the Crown's authority.
  - Br. strategy for remainder of war.

Charleston to King's Mtn.

- Br. intent was to tap into expected Loyalist wellspring of goodwill.
  - Loyalism proved elusive objective.
- Clinton captured port of Charleston & garrison in May 1780.
- Lord, Charles Cornwallis soundly defeated Gates at Camden in Aug.

Charleston to King's Mtn.

- Br. licentiousness hurt “hearts & minds” strategy.
  - Esp. true of Banastre Tarleton & his Tory Legion.
- Combination of Br. Regulars & Loyalists engaged in conventional & unconventional ops.
  - In keeping with new Br. policy/strategy.

Charleston to King's Mtn.

- Cornwallis extended ops. into NC.
  - Left wing defeated at King's Mtn. by "over-mountain" men in Oct 1780.
  - "civil war" raged in Carolina backcountry.
- Clinton provided Cornwallis no support.
- Wash. bolstered by Fr. naval & ground forces.
  - Gen., Comte de Rochambeau in RI.

Cowpens to Guilford CH

- MG Nathanael Greene replaced Gates in Dec 1780.
  - Decided to disperse & divide army.
  - Tempt Br. into defeat in detail & attrition.
- Cowpens, Jan 1781:
  - Morgan lured Tarleton into fight.
  - Militia fired twice & withdrew.
  - Cont. Line defeated & nearly captured Tarleton.

Cowpens to Guilford CH

- Cornwallis determined to pursue & destroy Greene.
  - Greene to VA & Cornwallis withdrew.
- Greene back to NC & offered battle.
  - Guilford followed Cowpens pattern.
  - Br. won technical victory in Mar 1781.
- Greene back to dispersion & division.

Yorktown: Conventional End

- Greene recovered Carolina interior & Br. concentrated in Chesapeake area.
  - Tarleton ravaged VA countryside.
- Wash. & Rochambeau decided to exploit situation.
  - Feinted toward NY.
  - Elaborate concentration of land & sea forces in VA.

Yorktown: Conventional End

- Fr. fleet closed Chesapeake in Sep 1781 Battle of the Capes.
  - Cornwallis trapped; Clinton in NY.
- Cornwallis dug in at Yorktown.
  - Abandoned outer works.
- Franco-Amer. army began conventional siege ops.
  - Rochambeau master of the art.

Yorktown: Conventional End


- Siege of Yorktown:
  - Allied first parallel ca. 600 yds.
  - Allied second parallel ca. 300 yds.
  - Fight for Br. Redoubts 9 & 10.
  - Cornwallis outnumbered & outgunned.
- Cornwallis surrendered Oct 19, 1781; Clinton sailed from NY same day.

Results

- Both sides used unconventional, more modern methods.
  - Mobile ops., simpler methods of fighting, etc.
  - People in arms/at war anticipated Fr. Rev.
- Still took Fr. Regulars & Navy, Cont. forces, & siegecraft to win decisive victory

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The War for American Independence, 1775-1783: The People at War

American Military Policy, 1783-1860: The Beginnings of Professionalism

Arming the New Nation

- U.S. attitude toward military was relaxed during this period.
  - Neglected regulars & esp. militia.
  - Altogether ramshackle mil. establishment.
- Army officer corps esp. established identity & outlook by Civil War.

Permanent Mil. Forces

- Confed. Cong. turned to permanent peacetime mil. establishment, 1783.
  - Police land & maritime frontiers.
  - Defend against invasion.
  - Help maintain internal order.

Permanent Mil. Forces

- Wash. provided input to Cong. in "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," 1783.
  - Small regular army.
  - Well-regulated militia.
  - Nationally produced weapons & eqpmnt.
  - Military academies.

Permanent Mil. Forces

- Problem of pol. control of mil. provided for at Const. Conv. in Phil., 1787.
  - Divided between Pres. & Cong.
  - Pres. to serve as civilian CinC.
  - Cong. to appropriate money, devise regs., & declare war.

Permanent Mil. Forces

- Federalists supported development of national army & navy.
  - International troubles supported idea.
- Cong. est. USMA (1802) [USNA (1845)].
- By early 19th cen. U.S. possessed land force along lines

Old World Frictions

- Fr. Rev. provided backdrop of war.
- Divided Amer. along party lines.
  - Nationalistic Fed. favored Br.
  - Regionalistic Rep. favored Fr.
- U.S. officially neutral!
- First Br., then Fr., seized U.S. ships.
  - Br. & Fr. vying for command of sea.

Old World Frictions

- Sparked 1798-1800 “Quasi-War” with Fr.
  - Fed. more belligerent toward Fr.
- War’s end also brought Jefferson & Rep. to power.
  - Did not dismantle Fed. mil. establishment but greatly reduced it.

War of 1812

- Eur. war flared up again in 1805.
  - Br. & Fr. seized U.S. ships again.
- Pres. James Madison torn between embargo & lesser econ. coercion.
- Madison reluctantly asked Cong. for declaration of war in

War of 1812

- U.S. woefully unprepared.
  - Army of 7,000 scattered in garrisons.
  - Navy of 16 ships augmented by Jefferson adm.'s gunboats.
  - No national strategy for employment of forces.

War of 1812

- Madison interested in invading Canada.
  - Only way to get Br. to stop seizing ships.
- Westerners eager for fight.
  - Interested in land, expansion of slavery, & subduing Indians.
- Br. too focused on Eur. to attack U.S. in force.

War of 1812

- Royal Navy est. blockade of U.S. coast.
  - Omitted disgruntled New Eng. at first.
  - Still reduced U.S. oceanic commerce drastically.
- Blockade not leak-proof.
  - U.S. warships put to sea easily, wreaked havoc among Br. merchantmen, & effective in single-

War of 1812

- Napoleon defeated at Leipzig in 1813.
  - Br. concentrated on war with U.S.
- Three Br. offensives in 1814.
  - Traditional route along Hudson defeated at Lake Champlain naval battle.
  - Thwarted at Baltimore but burned Wash.
  - Stopped on Mississippi River short of New Orleans.

War of 1812

- Treaty of Ghent, 1815.
  - Negotiated settlement based on *status quo ante bellum*.
- MG Harrison's 1813 Battle of the Thames & MG Jackson's 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Bend.
  - Effectively ended eastern Ind. resistance.
- Essential weakness of U.S. mil. system underscored by War of 1812.

Early Professionalization

- U.S. military as “frontier constabulary.”
  - Assist western settlement.
  - Enforce federal authority.
  - Protect maritime commerce.
- 1st line of defense: Navy.
- 2nd line of defense: Coastal forts.

Early Professionalization

- Reforms of SecWar John C. Calhoun:
  - "Expansible army": Cadre + militia.
  - Prof. officer corps & regulars: Sylvanus Thayer's 1820s USMA reforms & "schools of practice."
- Fear & amateurism persisted.
- Defense favored by geog. isolation.

Mexican War: Origins

- U.S. foreign policy was expansionist.
- 1836-1845: Tex. Rev.--U.S. annex.
- 1846: Border tension high.
  - Polk sent troops into disputed area between Nueces & Rio Grande Rivers.

Mexican War: Preparations

- U.S. better prepared in 1846 than in 1812.
  - Junior officer corps, esp. Army regulars, well trained.
- Two-part strategic dilemma:
  - Fight for & occupy desired lands.
  - Defeat Mexico & impose peace.

Taylor in Nor. Mex., 1846

- Gen. Zach. Taylor & 4,000 regulars from Tex. 125 miles into Nor. Mex.
  - Won at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, & Buena Vista.
  - Nor. Mex. too inhospitable for further campaigning & stalemate resulted.
- Gen. W. Scott reinforced from

Scott to Mex. City, 1847

- Decisive campaign led by U.S. Army GIC Winfield Scott.
  - Masterpiece throughout.
- USN “projected” Army to Vera Cruz.
- U.S. ops. ashore followed pattern:
  - Flank/march/engage vice battles.
  - Frontal assaults vs. smoothbores misleading.

Scott to Mex. City, 1847

- Scott entered Mex. City Sep 14 largely by maneuver.
- Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
  - 1/4 of old Mex. to be free or slave?
- War limited in scale/scope/intent.
  - USN & West Pointers performed well.

New Technologies

- Steam engine: steamboat/ship.
- Modern warship design emerging:
  - 1837, efficient steam engine.
  - 1843, screw-propeller-driven *USS Princeton*.
  - 1850s, Cmdr. Dahlgren's shell gun.

New Technologies

- Steam engine: railroad.
  - Heavy loads, high speeds, flexible construction.
- Most officers understood potential of RR.
- Despite all, sails & rigging and wagons & mules not displaced.

Smooth-bore to Rifled-musket

- Percussion cap & new ignition system.
  - U.S. Army adopted in 1850s.
- 1840s, cylindro-conoidal “minie’ ball.”
  - Effective range now ca. 500 yds!
  - Also adopted by U.S. Army in 1850s.
- Most expected only modification

American Mil. Thought?


- USMA Prof. Dennis H. Mahan & "active defense."
  - i.e., "offensive-defensive."
  - Similar ideas influential in 1970s-1980s U.S. Army.
- Continued amateurism.
  - Strategy as applied common sense.
- Several Army officers observed abroad.

U.S. Mil. Overall

- Modestly professional by 1860.
- Officers informed on technical advances.
- Regular officer corps increasingly professional.
- Amateurism persisted, esp. in militia.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



American Military Policy, 1783-1860: The Beginnings of Professionalism

The Civil War,

1861-1862:

The Lethal Face of Battle

Perception vs. Reality

- Most expected short, relatively bloodless war.
- Instead got four-year revolutionary conflict.
- Eventually became “total war.”
  - Marshalling entire resources & employing full destructive energies.

Roots of War

- Question of slavery in Mexican Cession exacerbated longstanding national debate over chattel slavery.
  - South had earlier threatened secession.
- Lincoln's 1860 election provided immediate cause for secession crisis.

Strategic Overview: South

- Confed. strategic aim was to avoid defeat.
  - Overconfidence & conviction.
- Pres. Davis settled on “cordon defense” for political reasons.
- Davis preferred active defense or “offensive-defensive.”
  - Best implemented later by R.E. Lee.

Strategic Overview: South

- Fighting on interior lines.
- Fighting for homeland.
- Small population but potentially three million slaves to keep economy running.
  - Allowed fuller mobilization of Southern male population.

Strategic Overview: North

- North had larger population; more industry, railroads, & shipping; and more money.
  - Advantages at first more potential than real.
- Lincoln adm. had to reunify country by war but not alienate South in process.
  - Nearly insoluble political conundrum.

Mobilization

- Identical military heritage led to similar mobilization North & South.
- Fed. mobilization different on two important points:
  - Lincoln in time appointed strong SecWar Edwin M. Stanton.
  - Numerous GICs, ending with unflappable U.S. Grant.

Mobilization

- Quickly became largest U.S. expression to date of “people in arms.”
  - Lincoln called for 75,000 one-year volunteers after Ft. Sumter.
  - Soon had several hundred thousand.
- 1861-1865 total under arms:
  - North--ca. 2 million.
  - South--ca. 1 million.

Borderland War

- Both sides positioned forces to protect respective capitals.
- Fed. seized MD by force of arms & est. mil. gov't and occupied western VA.
  - Together secured strategic B&O RR.
- KY declared "neutrality."
  - Confed. forces entered & Fed. forces quickly seized most of state.

Borderland War

- Fed. forces to disarm secessionist militia in MO.
- Confed. won Battle of Wilson's Creek in Aug 1861 & controlled half of MO.
- Fed. ejected Confed. from MO early in 1862.
  - Confirmed by Fed. victory at Pea Ridge, AR, in Mar 1862.
- Lincoln adm. now held all Borderland.

First Bull Run

- Fed. grand strategy:
  - Proposed by aging Gen. Scott.
  - 1st--Blockade Confed. harbors.
  - 2nd--Seize Mississippi River.
  - 3rd--Wait!
  - Press dubbed “Anaconda Plan.”

First Bull Run

- Lincoln sent Gen. McDowell's 36,000-man army out of Wash. Jul 16, 1861.
- Gen. Beauregard's 25,000-man Confed. army astride Manassas Junc.
  - Reinforced by Gen. J.E. Johnston's 16,000-man army from Shenandoah.
- Armies arrayed & ready to fight

First Bull Run

- Confed. fought mostly on defensive.
- Fed. attack eventually broke catastrophically.
- Confed. overconfident as result & Fed. resolved to fight hard to win.
- Use of RR was most imp. mil. aspect.

Cracking Confed. Coast

- 3,000-mile Confed. coastline was major liability.
- Fed. seapower seized Outer Banks, NC, & Port Royal, SC, by early 1862.
  - Provided anchorages for blockade.
- Greatest Fed. naval victory was Apr 1862 seizure of New Orleans.
  - Put cork in lower Mississippi River.

Cracking Confed. Interior

- Early 1862 Fed. joint Army-Navy force to penetrate Confed. along Tennessee-Cumberland Rivers.
  - Total Fed. land force ca. 90,000.
- Confed. Gen. A.S. Johnston est. 300-mile cordon from Appl. to Miss. River.
  - Only 43,000 troops to hold line.

Cracking Confed. Interior

- Gen. Grant seized & held initiative.
  - Ignored Fed. disunity of command.
  - Ascended Tenn. River with 15,000 troops aboard transports.
  - Aided by FO Foote & gunboats.
- Flooding rains forced surrender of Confed. Ft. Henry on the

Cracking Confed. Interior

- Grant turned next to Ft. Donelson on Cumberland River.
  - Grant, reinforced, invested it Feb 1862.
  - Confed. garrison also reinforced.
- Still, Ft. Donelson commander asked for surrender terms.
- Grant: "…no terms except unconditional & immediate surrender."

Cracking Confed. Interior

- Donelson was first major Fed. land victory of Civil War.
- Confed. western cordon defense collapsed.
- Grant moved up the Tennessee to Pittsburg Landing.
- Johnston, reinforced to 40,000, concentrated at Corinth, MS.

Cracking Confed. Interior

- At stake was critical Mobile & Ohio RR and Memphis & Charleston RR junction at Corinth.
  - Second only to Confed. capital at Richmond in geographic importance.
- Johnston advanced toward Pittsburg Landing on Apr 3.
- Roads bad & troops

Shiloh

- Terrain undulating & heavily wooded.
- Confed. approached under cover & concealment.
- Fed. lax on security & taken by surprise.
- Confed. pushed Fed. back toward Tennessee River.

Shiloh

- Grant reached battlefield at 0830.
  - All was apparently lost but Grant was unflappable.
  - Critical task was to hold river's edge & summon reinforcements from Gen. Buell.
- Fed. center at Hornet's Nest held till evening.
- Confed. attack reached culminating point, short of victory,

Shiloh

- Grant to Sherman overnight: “Lick’em in the morning, though.”
- Grant reinforced to 28,000 & artillery arrayed 1/4 mile from river.
- Confed. had no reinforcements.
- Fed. drove Confed. back on Apr 7.
  - Gen. Johnston mortally wounded.
  - Confed. retreated to Corinth.

Shiloh


- Butcher's bill was worst in U.S. history to date.
  - Ca. 24,000 total k/w/m.
  - More than all previous U.S. wars **combined!**
- Grant heavily criticized but Shiloh "victory" confirmed capture of Fts. Henry & Donelson.

Results

- Civil War fast eclipsing all previous U.S. wars in scale, scope, & lethality.
- Butcher's bill steadily growing.
- Fed. made excellent progress up to spring 1862.
- Now remained for Gen. McClellan to deliver decisive blow in VA.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Civil War, 1861-1862: The Lethal Face of Battle

The Civil War,

1862:

Ending the Limited War

"Single Grand Campaign"

- By spring 1862 war seemed near end.
- Reversals of that summer led to collapse of limited war.
- Afterwards, Civil War armies marched & fought in Napoleonic style.

Genesis of Pen. Camp.

- Fed. Gen. McClellan arrived in Wash. Jul 1861
  - By Sep had fairly well trained & organized 100,000-man army.
- Confed. Gen. Johnston had only 40,000.
  - Redeployed from Manassas to south bank of Rappahannock River in Mar.

Genesis of Pen. Camp.

- Foiled McClellan's "Urbanna plan."
  - Descend Chesapeake Bay to Urbanna & overland to Richmond.
- McClellan's "slows" led Lincoln to remove him as GIC.
  - Only worsened McClellan's dislike for Lincoln, the "original Gorilla."

Yorktown to Seven Pines

- Mar 8-9, 1862 duel between *USS Monitor* & *CSS Virginia*.
  - Beginning of end for wood & sail navies.
  - Shaped first half of Peninsula Camp.
- McClellan's Army of the Potomac (AOP) to Pen. beginning Mar 17.
  - 120,000 troops and 200 cannon.

Yorktown to Seven Pines

- Fed. advance inland began Apr 4.
  - Halted by Confed. Yorktown-Warwick River Line.
- Lincoln. adm. held back 40,000-man corps.
- Johnston arrived at Yorktown in May & promptly withdrew toward Richmond.
  - Caused near collapse of Confed. defenses & scuttling of *CSS Virginia*.

Yorktown to Seven Pines

- Confed. defense stiffened at Richmond & McClellan prepared for siege.
- Johnston counterattacked May 31 at Seven Pines.
  - Johnston wounded & Gen. Robert E. Lee to command.
- Lee was Pres. Davis's military advisor.
  - Seemed defensive minded up to

Jackson in Valley

- Lee actually offensive minded.
  - First offensive-defensive in Shen. Valley.
  - Valley under Confed Gen. Jackson.
- Jackson attacked & failed at Winchester in Mar 1862.
  - Caused Fed. to tie up 60,000 troops in part to defend Wash.

Jackson in Valley

- Fed tried & failed to trap & destroy Jackson in Valley.
- Jackson exploited interior lines & maneuver and defeated Fed. in detail often.
- Valley Camp. regarded as classic & owed much to Lee's initiative.

The Seven Days

- Jackson to Richmond by late Jun 1862.
- Lee decided to attack Fed. before siege could get started.
  - Focused on one Fed. corps north of rain-swollen Chickahominy River.
- Jackson had vital task of crushing isolated Fed. corps.

The Seven Days

- Battles of Mechanicsville & Gaines's Mill indecisive.
  - Bad Confed. staff work & faulty generalship by Jackson.
- Still, McClellan went over to defensive.
  - Fed. began transfer of supply base from Pamunkey River to James River.

The Seven Days

- Battles of Savage Station, Frayser's Farm & Malvern Hill saved Richmond.
  - Fed. army punished but not destroyed.
- Lee's offensive very costly: 24% Confed. casualties.
  - "Limited war" clearly passing from

End of Conciliation

- Lincoln appointed Gen. Pope to command Fed. Army of Virginia.
  - Pope announced intent to live off countryside.
  - Signaled harsher Fed. policy.
- McClellan wedded to old conciliatory policy.
  - Lectured Lincoln to that effect in Harrison's Landing letter.

Toward Emancipation

- Slavery most major casualty to failure of limited war.
  - Cong. codified trend in Aug 1861 & Jul 1862 Confiscation Acts.
- Fed. military pursuing similar policy.
  - Gen. Benjamin Butler's "contraband of war" at Ft. Monroe, VA, etc.

Toward Emancipation

- Jul 22, 1862 meeting between Lincoln & cabinet.
  - Presented preliminary draft of Emancipation Proclamation.
  - Needed military victory to issue.
- Seemed Gen. Pope might supply that victory.

Second Manassas

- Lee turned north to deal with Pope.
  - McClellan still near Richmond.
- Lee turned Pope's Rapp. River line.
  - Jackson cut Pope's LOC to Wash.
- Lee & Jackson joined near Manassas.
  - Aug 29-30 Lee mauled Pope, who retreated to Wash.
- Lee had reversed tide of war in

Antietam

- Confed. to carry war into North.
  - Lee's Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) down to 50,000 troops.
- ANV crossed Potomac River Sep 4-7.
  - Fed. occupied Harpers Ferry astride ANV's LOC.
  - Harpers Ferry to be captured by siege.

Antietam

- Lee divided ANV for multiple missions.
- Fed. found Lee's OPLAN.
  - Famous "Lost Order" (S.O. #191).
- McClellan back in command of AOP.
  - Fed suddenly "aggressive."
- Lee in position behind Antietam

Antietam

- AOP launched three uncoordinated assaults on ANV on Sep 17.
  - 26,000 total casualties remains single bloodiest day in U.S. history.
- Antietam enough of victory for Lincoln to issue prelim. Eman. Proclamation.
  - Changed nature of the war.
  - Now a struggle to the death

Bragg's Kentucky Raid

- Confed. Gen. Braxton Bragg new commander in west.
  - Confed. forces renamed Army of TN (ATN).
- Fed. Gen. Halleck dispersed forces after Shiloh.
- Bragg launched KY “raid” in Jul 1862.

Bragg's Kentucky Raid

- Pro-Confed. gov't briefly in KY.
- Culminated on Oct 8 in Battle of Perryville.
  - Confed. held field but could go no farther north.
  - South's last major foray north of TN.
- MD & KY raids were Confed. military high tide! [not Gettysburg]

Fredericksburg

- Lincoln relieved McClellan in Nov 1862.
  - Gen. Ambrose Burnside new AOP cmndr.
  - Successful in 1862 NC amphib. ops.
- Burnside started next “On to Richmond” camp. also in Nov 1862.
  - Key was crossing Rapp. River quickly.
  - Delay in receiving pontoon bridges.

Grant toward Vicksburg (I)

- Grant tried overland route with new Army of the TN.
  - Marched down east bank of Miss. River beginning Nov 1862.
  - Withdrew when Confed. cut LOC.
- Sherman tried river route from Memphis, TN.
  - Defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs in Dec.

Stone's River

- Fed. Gen. Rosecrans replaced Buell in central TN.
- Attacked by ATN under Bragg at end of Dec 1862.
  - Battle culminated Jan 2, 1863 when Fed. artillery tore ATN apart.
- Bragg withdrew to Tullahoma, TN.
  - Rosecrans did not pursue.


Results

- 1862 ended in military stalemate.
- Geography:
  - VA river-choked & highly defensible.
  - Western distances exposed LOCs.
- Fighting power of both sides enormous.
  - Battle crippled attacker and defender.
  - Battle not achieving decision

Results

- Southern resistance unexpectedly strong.
- Pen. Camp. was turning point in North.
  - Limited war had failed.
  - Eman. Proc. signaled Lincoln's "remorseless revolutionary struggle."
  - Civil War becoming total war.

Check on Learning



The Civil War, 1862: Ending the Limited War

The Civil War,

1863:

Moving Democracies Toward

Total War

Toward Total War

- Total war evolution continued in 1863:
  - Both sides adopted conscription, the Confed. first in 1862.
  - Fed. began to destroy public & private resources in South.
- North adopted total war after battle alone proved indecisive & costly.

Quest for Decisive Battle

- Many Civil War commanders fixated on slashing offensive style of Napoleon.
- Most fell short of objective:
  - Increased range & firepower of rifled weapons, esp. shoulder arms.
  - Defense also augmented by field entrenchments.
  - Limits of citizen-soldier officers.

Quest for Decisive Battle

- Civil War commanders' quest for decisive battle was pursuit of mirage.
- Also called "Austerlitz Chimera."
  - Reference to Napoleon's 1805 tactical masterpiece over Austro-Russian coalition.
  - Victory changed political face of Europe.

Chancellorsville

- Lincoln replaced Burnside with Gen. Joseph Hooker in Jan 1863.
- Hooker reformed AOP & formulated OPLAN based on dream of Napoleonic victory:
  - Operational turning movement supplemented by cavalry attack on Lee's LOC.
  - Crush ANV between pincers.

Chancellorsville

- Hooker had ca. 100,000 troops & began march in late Apr 1863.
- Lee had 60,000 & used cavalry to recon. AOP's movements.
- Lee decided to concentrate against Hooker's main body at Chancellorsville.
- Lee's cavalry reported Fed. right "in the air."

Chancellorsville

- Hooker massed at Chancellorsville & surrendered initiative.
- Lee and Gen. “Stonewall” Jackson decided to envelope Fed. right.
- Jackson conducted march & began assault ca. 1700, May 2.
- Fed. resistance stiffened & Confed. assault lost momentum.

Chancellorsville

- Jackson mortally wounded in twilight reconnaissance.
- Fighting of May 3-5 was inconclusive.
  - Fed. attack on Lee's rear failed.
- Lee massed for frontal assault on May 6.
- Hooker withdrew on May 6 to safety across Rappahannock River.

Chancellorsville

- Hooker & Lee attempted Austerlitz-like battlefield victory.
  - Both failed & produced only bloody stalemate.
- Chancellorsville left strategic situation in VA unchanged.
  - Only measurable effect was killing & wounding thousands of soldiers.

Two Societies at War

- American Civil War often called first “total war.”
  - By definition involved near-complete application of violence against enemy.
  - Included violence against military and civilians!
- French Rev. & Nap. wars entailed less complete application of violence.

Move to Conscription

- Confed. used first general conscription in U.S. history beginning 1862.
  - Fed. followed suit in 1863.
- Conscription unpopular everywhere.
  - Furnished only ca. 8% of total military manpower for both sides.
  - Engendered resistance North &

War Economies

- North managed economy better than South.
  - North had larger population & resource base.
  - Fiscal management better in North.
- Southern economy much more centralized by end of war.
  - Partly the result of resource shortages.

Wartime Resentments

- Patriotic outpouring gave way to dissent North & South.
- Northern opposition esp. from Peace Democrats.
- Southern dissent from large internal minorities.
  - Slave population also restive & potential source for internal rebellion.

Destructive War

- Eman. Proc. marked end of Fed. conciliatory policy.
  - North to attack South's economic base in program of outright economic warfare.
- Large-scale foraging & supply denial expanded to all theaters of operation.
  - Included destroying farms, factories, railroads, etc.

Vicksburg

- Grant's 1862 overland campaign failed.
- Grant returned to Vicksburg area in 1863.
  - Spent Jan-Apr in four failed attempts to approach Vicksburg.
  - Attempts kept Fed. troops busy during winter.

Vicksburg

- Grant had derived OPLAN by Apr.
  - Confirmed his reputation as a great commander.
- Adm. David Porter's riverine flotilla ran Vicksburg guns on Apr 16.
- Grant's troops overland 50 miles to Bruinsburg & crossed Miss. R. Apr 30.
  - Porter's flotilla conducted crossing.

Vicksburg

- Grant had to march east & then west to trap Confed. in Vicksburg.
  - Confed. could interdict Grant's LOC.
  - Grant decided to cut own LOC & live off the land.
- Grant started march in May.
  - Followed south bank of Big Black R.
  - Used river to cover left flank.

Vicksburg

- Grant defeated Confed. Gen. J. Johnston at Jackson, MS.
  - Fed. burned city's factories & then headed west for Vicksburg.
- Grant trapped Confed. under Gen. Pemberton in Vicksburg.
  - Two assaults in mid-May failed & siege ensued.

Vicksburg

- Vicksburg surrendered Jul 4, 1863 after ca. 7-week siege.
- Capture of Vicksburg:
  - Reopened Miss. River to farms & industries of Old Northwest.
  - Severed trans-Mississippi west from & denied its agricultural products to Confed.

Gettysburg

- Vicksburg crisis prompted Confed. high command to meet in Richmond.
- Lee's scheme prevailed:
  - No direct reinforcement of west.
  - Only indirect support through raid into PA to produce decisive victory on Fed. soil, foreign recognition, & negotiated peace

Gettysburg

- By end of Jun 1863, Lee's ANV through Shenandoah Valley & into PA.
- Lincoln replaced Hooker with Gen. George Meade.
  - Meade marched AOP into MD by Jun 28.
  - Meade kept AOP between Wash. & ANV.

Gettysburg

- Confed. cavalry conducting raid.
  - As result Lee blinded for recon.
- AOP & ANV in “meeting engagement” on Jul 1.
  - 2/3 of Lee’s corps commanders new.
  - Lee had ordered no gen. engagement!

Gettysburg

- Lee arrived & “counseled” one new corps commander to seize key terrain “if practicable.”
  - Corps commander decided not to.
- Both sides reinforced overnight.
- Stage set for set-piece, Napoleonic battle of attrition.

Gettysburg

- Confed. Gen. Longstreet's corps to conduct main attack on Jul 2 against Fed. left.
  - Attack began late at 1630 & w/o recon.
  - Consisted of massed artillery followed by massed infantry.
  - Severe fighting on Little Round Top.
  - Attack unsuccessful but to be renewed next day.

Gettysburg

- Longstreet opposed attack renewal & urged turning movement.
  - Lee ordered attack nonetheless.
- Result was Jul 3 “Pickett’s Charge.”
  - More than just Pickett’s Confed. div.
  - Inelegant massed artillery & massed infantry frontal assault.
  - Proved anew the lethality of

Gettysburg

- ANV lost 20,000 or 1/3 of strength!
- AOP also badly shot up.
- AOP pursuit of ANV to Potomac River was ineffective.
  - Lincoln disappointed; wanted destruction of ANV.
- ANV's offensive capability blunted for rest of war.

Vicksburg & Gettysburg

- Defeat at Vicksburg & Gettysburg cost Confed. ca. 50,000-60,000 casualties.
  - More manpower loss than Confed. could sustain.
- Gettysburg was/is largest and costliest battle in North America.
  - Three-days of fighting cost both sides ca. 50,000.

Prologue to Chickamauga

- Third Fed. 1863 camp. was for capture of Chattanooga, TN.
  - Strategic RR junction more imp. than Vicksburg.
  - Gateway to Atlanta & Lower South.
  - Starting point for the most fatal blows to Confed.

Prologue to Chickamauga

- Bragg & Confed. ATN too weak to assume offensive.
- Gen. William Rosecrans new commander of Fed. Army of the Cumberland (AOC).
  - Without major fighting, Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg from central TN to Chattanooga.
  - One of war's most skillful campaigns.

Prologue to Chickamauga

- Bragg abandoned Chattanooga early Sep 1863.
  - Crisis compelled Lee to reinforce Bragg with 2 divs. & Gen. Longstreet.
- Rosecrans overconfident:
  - Divided command to enter mountainous N. GA through gaps.

Chickamauga

- Bragg attacked on Sep 19.
  - Tried but failed to defeat AOC in detail.
- Armies concentrated overnight.
- Attack of Sep 20 pitted two evenly matched armies.
  - Confed. 66,000 & Fed. 56,000.
  - Rare occasion of larger Confed. army.

Chickamauga

- Terrain covered with thick second-growth timber & small farm fields.
- Confed. began Sep 20 fighting at 0930 with oblique attacks from their right.
- Fed. command miscues created hole near center of line.
  - 20,000 Confed. poured into hole.
  - Fed. broke, retreated to Chattanooga & besieged there by Confed.

Missionary Ridge

- Lincoln:
  - Put Grant in command of all western theater troops.
  - Replaced Rosecrans with Gen. George Thomas.
  - Sent 20,000 AOP troops by rail to Grant.
- Grant to Chattanooga Oct 1863 to break siege.

Missionary Ridge


- Grant:
  - Opened “Cracker Line” supply route to Chattanooga.
  - Broke siege with Nov 24-25 Battles of Lookout Mtn. & Missionary Ridge.
- Confed. defenses on Missionary Ridge poorly emplaced and quickly overrun.
- Gateway to Lower South in Fed. hands.

Results

- 1863 defeats were beginning of end for Confederacy.
- Much fighting still to be done and 1864 promised to bring yet more total war.
- Fed. had recruited, trained, & used African-American troops in battle.
  - Would compose 10% of Fed. strength or 200,000 by war's end.

U.S. Military History

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The Civil War, 1863: Moving Democracies Toward Total War

U.S. Military History

The Civil War,

1864-1865:

Total War

Total War Blooms

- Fed. materially & psychologically destroying South.
- Confed. pinned hopes on Election of 1864.
- Lincoln wanted no stalemate that year.
  - Grant promoted to LTG, brought east, made GIC, given direction of land war.

Virginia Campaign

- Grant's overall campaign plan for 1864:
  - Simultaneous advance everywhere.
  - Destroy main Confed. forces.
  - Erode supporting Confed. forces.
  - Destroy Southern war resources.
- Grant to "control land war

Virginia Campaign

- Grant determined to “press” the Confed. on all sides in May 1864:
  - Gen. Meade overland in the East.
  - Gen. Sigel up the Shenandoah Valley.
  - Gen. Butler up the James River.
  - Gen. Sherman overland to Atlanta, GA.
  - Gen. Banks toward Mobile, AL.

To Spotsylvania

- AOP outnumbered ANV ca. 2 to 1 (119,000 to 64,000).
- Lee preferred to fight in Wilderness:
  - Close confines would rob AOP of maneuverability & superb artillery.
- Grant unflappable throughout fighting that cost 27,000 total casualties!

To Spotsylvania

- After Wilderness, AOP moved forward for first time.
  - Helped cure inferiority complex.
- Grant aimed for critical crossroads of Spotsylvania CH.
  - Intent was to interpose AOP between ANV & Richmond.

Spotsylvania

- At Spotsylvania, Grant took offensive.
  - Attacked Lee in place behind earthworks.
- Action of May 10 most significant:
  - Fed. COL Emory Upton (USMA, 1861).
  - Broke Confed. line using new tactical scheme.

To the James River

- All Fed. advances in VA stalled by mid-May.
- Grant started 6-week march to Petersburg.
  - Armies seldom broke contact.
  - Campaign and battle merged.
  - No clear decision emerged.

To the James River

- Losses were staggering.
  - 75,000 total k/w/c/m for both Fed. & Confed. armies.
  - Value of field fortifications & strength of defense revalidated.
  - 7,000 Fed. casualties in 30 minutes at Jun 3 Battle of Cold Harbor most chilling.

Siege of Petersburg

- Way to Richmond blocked so Grant on the march again.
- Intent was to cross James River & capture Petersburg.
  - City was logistical hub feeding Richmond.
- Petersburg not captured.
  - 10-month “siege” developed.
  - Landscape became trench-scarred.

Siege of Petersburg

- Petersburg operation became meat grinder for Lee's ANV.
- Meantime, Sherman savaged Southern heartland.
- Stalemate in VA & GA threatened Lincoln's bid for reelection.
  - Northern morale at nadir by Aug 1864.

To Atlanta

- Sherman opposed in N. GA by Confed. Gen. J. Johnston.
  - Sherman commanded “army group” of ca. 100,000.
  - Johnston directed ATN with 50,000.
- Johnston fortified N. GA mtns. at Rocky Face Ridge.
- Sherman used turning movements, not battles, to pry Johnston loose.

To Atlanta

- Johnston used “Fabian tactics.”
  - Named for Roman dictator & same as strategy of survival/evasion.
  - Intent was to draw Sherman into enemy territory & then attack.
- Sherman depended on RR for supply.
  - As LOC lengthened, army decreased.

To Atlanta

- Weather halted Fed. at Kennesaw Mtn.
  - Confed. line appeared weak in center.
  - Sherman concerned lest flanking become his only method.
- Frontal assaults of Jun 27 failed.
  - 2,000 Fed. casualties to 450 Confed.
- Sherman resumed flanking to outskirts of Atlanta.

Battles for Atlanta

- Davis adm. finally sacked the Fabian Johnston.
  - Replaced him with Gen. John B. Hood, a fighter with little discretion.
- Hood attacked Jul 20, 22, & 28.
  - Battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, & Ezra Ch. all failed & only bled ATN in process.

Battles for Atlanta

- Hood withdrew into Atlanta's fortifications.
- After short siege, Sherman used turning movement to cut remaining RR into besieged Atlanta.
- Hood evacuated Atlanta & city surrendered to Fed. on Sep 2.

Battles for Atlanta

- Fall of Atlanta sealed fate of Confederacy.
  - No hope of victory thereafter.
- Fall of Atlanta boosted Northern morale.
  - Assured reelection of Lincoln.
  - Inspired will to continue war to end.

Union Raids

- Gen. Philip Sheridan was new Fed. Commander in Shenandoah Valley.
  - Lay waste to Confed. breadbasket.
  - Sheridan to Grant: “the people here are getting sick of the war.”
- Civil War well along from war against slave aristocracy to war against Southern people.

Union Raids

- Grant, Sherman, & Sheridan were proponents of “hard war” policy.
  - Sherman: “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.”
- Sherman decided to “make Georgia [and portions of Lower South] howl.”
  - Destructive marches from Atlanta to Savannah to Carolinas, 1864-65.

Naval War, 1862-65

- USN up to 1861 was peripheral to U.S. wars.
  - Largely commerce raiding, single-ship duels, and squadron-sized actions.
  - Exception “projecting” Scott in 1847.
- USN improvised to meet new task.
- Confed. navy never was serious threat.

Naval War, 1862-65

- Navy's unprecedented & manifold Civil War task:
  - Control open sea.
  - Blockade Confed. shore.
  - Transport Fed. combat power.
  - Fight for command of inland Confed. waters.
- Navy from 90 to 700 ships during war.

The Blockade

- Functions of blockade itself:
  - Cut South off from outside markets.
  - Demonstrate Northern resolve.
  - Give European diplomats pause.
- Blockade reduced prewar Southern exports by 2/3.
- Blockade itself still not decisive.

Joint Ops. & Riverine Warfare

- Army-bluewater Navy ops. limited.
  - Most sustained joint op. was siege of Charleston, SC.
- Army-brownwater Navy ops. extensive.
  - Fts. Henry & Donelson, Vicksburg, etc.
- Most innovative tech. was ironclad.

Commerce Raiders

- Confed. resorted to *guerre de course*.
  - Handful of raiders terrorized Northern merchant marine.
- Most famous was *C.S.S. Alabama*.
  - Sunk Jun 1864 by *U.S.S. Kearsarge*.
- Commerce raiding underpinned U.S. naval strategy till 1890s.

Culminating Naval War

- Culmination occurred at Ft. Fisher, NC, in Jan-Feb 1865.
  - Joint op. concluded four-year campaign to isolate South.
  - Wilmington, NC, last major port closed.
- Confed. navy only nuisance to USN.
  - Navy not decisive alone but still pivotal to victory.

War Ends

- Fed. unleashed full fury of strategy of annihilation during war's last 6 months.
  - Ravaged South.
  - Destroyed anything of military value.
  - Convinced Southerners that defeat was inevitable.
- Davis adm. still believed in

Franklin & Nashville

- Fall 1864, Confed. Gen. Hood was to:
  - Raid into middle TN.
  - Cut Sherman off from North.
  - Boost sagging Confed. morale.
- Hood's force too weak to carry out mission but prompted Fed. response.

Franklin & Nashville

- Hood attacked Fed. at Franklin, TN, Nov 30.
  - 1/2 Confed. casualties in large frontal assault.
- Fed. Gen. Thomas attacked Hood Dec 15 at Nashville, TN.
  - Textbook envelopment of Confed. left.
  - Fed. pursuit put ATN out of existence.

Confederate Collapse

- Fed. cavalry raids throughout South conquered hearts & minds.
- Grant still trying to cut RRs leading into Petersburg.
  - Sheridan broke Lee's line Apr 1, and Lee abandoned Petersburg.
  - Richmond fell Apr 3.

Confederate Collapse

- Lee wanted to link up with J. Johnston in NC.
- Grant pursued him, defeated his rearguard, cut him off, and forced his surrender at Appomattox on Apr 9.
  - Davis captured in SW GA in early May.
- Last Confed. land forces surrendered late May.

War's Legacy

- Pivotal episode in U.S. history.
- Confirmed perpetuity of the Union.
- Emancipated 3.5M African-Americans.
  - Outcome of Lincoln's "remorseless revolutionary struggle."
- Established industrial North as American mainstream.

War's Legacy

- Significance to history of warfare:
  - Displayed ascendancy of the defense.
  - Demonstrated indecisiveness of battle.
  - Suggested viability of strategy of attrition/exhaustion over strategy of

War's Legacy


- Socio-political factors:
  - Total war involved mass armies, conscription, complete mobilization.
- Technological factors:
  - Such new technologies as RRs, rifled arms, telegraph, & ironclads with turrets.
- Great marches of destruction were first appearance of total war

War's Legacy

- Spawned new cycle of military reform.
  - Linear battlefield yielded slowly to field fortifications & open-order formations and tactics.
- Army COL Emory Upton led drive for increased professional education & standards.

U.S. Military History

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The Civil War, 1864-1865: Total War

Military History

and the

Conduct of Battle

Military History & the Conduct of Battle

What is Book Review and Analysis?

Book Review and Analysis Steps

The Operational Art and the Army's Leadership Performance Indicators


Historical Context for Gettysburg

Actions of the Union and Confederate Armies and Leaders at Gettysburg

Historical Results of Gettysburg

Gettysburg, the Operational Art, and the Army's Leadership Performance Indicators

Check on Learning



Military History and the Conduct of Battle

Military History and PC-Based Simulations

Military History & PC-Based Simulations

What is PC-Based Military History Simulation?

- Historical mindedness
  - *Case Study*
- Decision-making
  - *Chain of Command*
- Terrain-sense
  - *Time-distance and Spatial*

PC-Based Military History Simulation Steps

- Review ways and rules.
- Digital Simulation Methodology:
  - *Preliminary Study Phase.*
  - *Simulation Study Phase.*

Military History & PC-Based Simulations

Selecting and Running a Gettysburg Scenario


- Move
- Shoot
- Communicate

Comparing Simulated and Historical Results

The Operational Art and Analyzing the Simulation Scenario

U.S. Military History

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Military History and PC-Based Simulations

Making War More Lethal,

1871-1914

Era of Change

- To many, peace seemed at hand.
- Against backdrop of revolution in military affairs:
  - Quantum leap in lethality & effectiveness of weaponry for armies and navies from 1815-1914.
- Regional wars expanded Western influence & tested military methods.

New Technologies

- Technological developments increasing scale & lethality of warfare.
  - Possibility of endless cycle of attrition.
- Smokeless powder:
  - Perfection of smokeless powder.
  - With steel & weapon design, opened door to many technical

New Technologies

- Artillery:
  - Perfection of recoil system allowed French to build & adopt 75mm field gun in 1890s.
  - Germans developed heavier, longer-ranged artillery.
  - German had advantage in artillery by 1914.

New Technologies

- Machine guns:
  - Machine guns now to provide short-range, direct-fire support to infantry.
  - Gave soldier or “fire team” ability to kill thousands.
  - By 1914 had been incorporated in large numbers into most Western armies.

New Technologies

- Rifles:
  - By 1914 incorporation of smokeless powder, magazines, & metallic cartridges.
  - In 1893 U.S. Army adopted 5-shot, bolt-action, .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen as first general-issue magazine rifle.
  - Krag replaced by 1903 Springfield.
- Despite technical innovations, massed frontal assaults still

New Institutions

- Prussian system:
  - Western social & political changes increased scale, scope, & intent of war.
  - Immediate cause was Prussian victories of 1866 & 1871.
  - Unlike Eur., U.S. reluctant to adopt German model of general staff & mass army.

New Institutions

- Few U.S. military reforms:
  - Following Span.-Am. War through SecWar Elihu Root, 1899-1904.
  - Gen. Sherman and School of Application for Inf & Cav, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1881.
  - By 1914, officer corps more professional.
- Still, most officers favored

New Ideas

- New “Navalism”:
  - Commercial interests & global ambitions gave rise to New Navalism of 1880-90s.
  - Fostered huge growth in navies worldwide.
  - US “bluewater” navy included.
  - Steel & steam battleship core of fleet.

New Ideas

- Naval theorists:
  - *Guerre de course* (commerce raiding) fading as idea, even in U.S.
  - USN Capt. A.T. Mahan was principal naval theorist.
  - Mahan focused on command of sea lanes by concentrated battle fleet to insure commercial greatness & global influence.

New Ideas

- Mahan more influential in Br., Fr., & Ger. than U.S.
- Counterpoint to Mahan was Br. Sir. Julian Corbett's maritime strategy:
  - i.e., "power projection" of sea-borne expeditionary forces.
- Most naval officers favored Mahan's battle-fleet ideas.

Small Wars Before 1914

- Expanding Western commercial & territorial interests often called "new imperialism."
  - Produced "small wars" in conquering & policing colonial possessions.
- Small wars taught few soldiers or armies much about trends in warfare.

Span.-Am. War

- Spanish presence & activities in Cuba disturbing to U.S.
  - Frequent guerrilla uprisings on island.
- U.S. sent *U.S.S. Maine* to Havana to "show the flag."
  - Battleship blew up Feb 1898.
  - Outcry led to declaration of war in Apr.

Span.-Am. War

- USN well prepared.
  - Steel & steam navy under development for ca. 20 yrs. & 5 battleships in hand.
- Army not well prepared--again!
  - Still functioning as frontier constabulary.
- No war plans save possible naval actions in Cuba & Philippines.

Span.-Am. War

- Mobilization going haphazardly.
  - Regular army augmented by volunteers & National Guard to strength of 270,000.
- USN scored early successes:
  - Commodore George Dewey destroyed Spanish fleet at Manila on May 1.
  - Squadrons under Adms. Sampson & Schley blockaded Spanish fleet at Santiago, May-Jun.

Span.-Am. War

- Army to lend Navy a hand in Cuba.
  - Corps under Gen. Shafter to Cuba for overland campaign to force Spanish fleet to sea.
  - Amphib. landings in Jun; assaults on San Juan & Kettle Hills in Jul; & surrender of Santiago also in Jul.
- Spanish fleet destroyed in sortie from Santiago in Jul.

Span.-Am. War

- Desperate action of Spanish fleet saved American commanders from their own bumbling.
- Cuba and Puerto Rico soon in American hands.
- Attention turned to Philippines.

Span.-Am. War

- Another Army corps under Gen. Merritt to Philippines in May 1898.
  - Fought briefly in Manila area.
- After armistice, U.S. took possession of Philippines.
  - Filipino insurgents rose in rebellion against U.S. as new colonial power.
  - Insurgency from 1899-1902.

Span.-Am. War

- Postwar outcry in U.S. over unpreparedness & conduct of war.
- Controversy led to several military reforms.
  - Principal reform was creation of War Dept. general staff.
- War again demonstrated strength of defense.

Boer War

- Conflict in South Africa between Br. & Boers after discovery of diamonds in area.
- Boer initial success caused Br. to change some tactics, esp. artillery.
- Br. eventually defeated Boer main force, but Boers converted to guerrilla ops.

Boer War

- Br. learned little from the war:
  - Boer skill in employment of rifle fire impressed Br. officers.
  - Br. also learned of difficulty in crossing open areas covered by machine-gun & small arms fire.
  - Still, Br. concluded that war in Europe would be different & more decisive.

Russo-Japanese War

- Clashing Russian & Japanese ambitions in area of southern Manchuria, Liaotung Pen., & Korea.
- Russians had large army & fleet but Japanese much closer to area of conflict.

Russo-Japanese War

- Japanese began war with surprise attack on Russians at Port Arthur in Feb 1904.
- Japanese quickly landed troops on Korean peninsula.
  - Marched overland & lay siege to Port Arthur.
  - Port surrendered Jan 1905 after great loss of life.

Russo-Japanese War

- Battle of Mukden:
  - Russian & Japanese forces concentrated along 40 mile line.
  - Japanese won 3-week battle but exhausted in process.
  - Mukden provided evidence of increasing scale & scope of operations.

Russo-Japanese War

- Final blow was Japanese naval victory at Tsushima Strait in May 1905.
  - Russians also facing rebellion at home.
- Russians sued for peace.
  - Sep 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth ended conflict.
  - Japanese got territorial concessions & privileges in area of conflict.

Russo-Japanese War


- War demonstrated:
  - Difficulties in using mass armies.
  - Lethality of new mechanized weapons against frontal mass infantry assaults.
  - Rise of Japan as military power & contender with Western powers for influence and territory in East Asia.

Results

- Period suggested profound change in warfare.
- New weapons & techniques and small wars made total war of unparalleled lethality now a possibility.
  - New arty. & machine-guns already compelled armies to disperse & fortify.
  - Many Europeans wrongly believed future wars would be short, glorious,

U.S. Military History

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Making War More Lethal, 1871-1914

The Great War:

An Indecisive Beginning

The Context

- Mobilizing mass armies now possible.
  - 50 million personnel; millions more, men & women, in support.
- Expectations were for a short war.
  - Reality was another total war.
  - 8.5 million killed & 20 million wounded.
- Yet more new weapons.
  - Airplane, submarine, tank

German War Plans

- 1906 German plan originated by Count Alfred von Schlieffen when CofS.
  - "Hammer & anvil" analogy.
  - Through Low Countries and Paris.
  - Destroy Fr. will in process
  - Altogether a *Kesselschlacht*, or battle of encirclement.

German War Plans

- Essentially, right wing "hammer" with 5 armies and left wing "anvil" with 2 armies.
- New CofS in 1906, Gen. Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger):
  - Weakened right & strengthened left.
  - Kept rest of operation the same.

German War Plans

- Revised Schlieffen Plan fallacies:
  - Assumed quick victory in east.
  - Ignored two-front war against numerically superior coalition.
  - Ignored Clausewitz's "friction."
  - Deprived German leadership of flexibility.

Other War Plans

- France:
  - French focused on *offensive a outrance* & Napoleonic climactic battle.
  - Plan XVII called for headlong assault into Lorraine.
- Great Britain:
  - Concentrate fleet in North Sea vs. Ger.
  - Send BEF to support left of Fr.

Other War Plans

- Russia:
  - Act in concert with France & force two-front war on Ger. & Austria-Hungary.
- Austria-Hungary:
  - Large war vs. Italy or Russia & small war vs. Balkans.
- Most war plans favored offensive.

Western Front, 1914

- Assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand escalated to war beginning Jun 1914.
- Alliances & military plans expanded quickly to vast war.
- Central Powers (Ger. & Aus.-Hung.) vs. Allies (Fr., Br., & Russia).

Opening Battles in West

- Gigantic offensives threw millions of soldiers into strategic maneuvers.
- Germans attacked into Belgium.
  - Used combined arms task force & audacity to capture central Liege fortress.
  - By mid-August moving toward last Belgian fort.

French Offensive

- Plan XVII forced Fr. into unsubtle frontal assaults in Lorraine.
  - Two axes of advance north & south of Verdun-Toul Line.
  - Germans stopped both advances by late Aug.
  - French attacks not coordinated between arms (e.g. inf. & arty.) and did not employ suppressive fire.

Battle of Mons

- According to pre-war plans, BEF to France by mid-Aug.
  - BEF surprised German right flank.
- German assaults pushed BEF back along Mons-Condé canal.
- BEF withdrew southward after retreat of supporting Fr. forces.

German Advance

- German “hammer” weakening as advance lengthened.
  - Risk of operating on exterior lines.
- Fr. fortifications in Lorraine held against Ger. attacks.
  - Allowed Fr. Gen. Joseph Joffre to shift forces from right flank to left flank.
  - Advantage of operating on interior lines.

French Response

- Joffre improved Fr. tactical performance.
  - Arty. prep before inf. attacks & no mass assaults.
- Fr. Sixth Army detrained at Amiens & found Ger. First Army.
- BEF withdrawing beyond Paris.
- Paris threatened by capture!

Miracle on the Marne

- French counterattack halted Ger. Second Army.
- Gen. Alexander Von Kluck's Ger. First Army outpaced Second Army.
  - Gap opened between the two armies.
- Fr. & Br. forces free now to withdraw toward Paris.

Miracle on the Marne

- Kluck veered Ger. First Army east of Paris.
  - Schlieffen Plan called for encirclement of Paris from the west.
- Fr. gov't fled & left defense of Paris to Gen. Joseph Gallieni.
  - Aircraft intel. data indicated that Ger. extreme right flank weak.

Miracle on the Marne

- Beginning Sep 5:
  - Fr. Sixth Army counterattacked against Ger. right flank.
  - Fr. Fifth Army & BEF counterattacked into gap between Ger. First & Second Armies.
- Ger. withdrew, Paris saved, & opening campaign in west ended in stalemate.

Race to the Sea

- Kaiser replaced Moltke with Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn in mid-Sep.
- Falkenhayn massed forces & tried to turn Allied left.
- Result was leapfrogging action that became a “race to the sea.”
  - BEF moved closer to Channel to shorten LOC.

Race to the Sea

- By early fall, lines ran in backwards “L” from Swiss border to English Channel.
- Trenches from Colmar north to Verdun and east to Noyon.
- Failed war of maneuver yielded to stalemated war of attrition.

Eastern Front, 1914

- Eastern front was enormous theater of operations.
  - 1,000 miles from Baltic to Romania.
  - War of grand maneuvers never disappeared.
- Chief belligerent was eventually 12 million-man Russian army.
  - Often poorly led & trained, esp. for inf.-arty. combined arms ops.

Tannenberg

- First imp. action around Masurian Lakes region of East Prussia.
- Ger. plan was to hold in place & Russian plan was to attack westward.
- Ger. counterattacked & halted Rus. First Army north of lakes.

Tannenberg

- Ger. high command replaced cmndr. with Gens. Paul von Hindenburg & Erich Ludendorff.
  - Highly competent duo till end of war.
  - Adopted previous commander's plan to use lateral LOC to concentrate Ger. Eighth Army & defeat Rus. Second Army near Tannenberg.

Tannenberg

- Starting Aug 26, Ger. conducted classic double envelopment of Rus. Second Army, which began surrendering Aug 29.
- Ger. turned north toward Rus. First Army to repeat process.
  - Russians withdrew across border Sep 13.

Galicia & Poland


- Russians advanced into Galicia.
  - Austrians counterattacked but failed.
  - No chance for Central Powers to exploit Tannenberg victory.
  - Hungary directly threatened by Russians.
- Russians attacked through Polish salient again.
  - Germans halted advance.

Results

- Despite extensive pre-1914 plans, no one achieved quick victory.
- Central Powers esp. failed in their bid for short, victorious war.
- All sides faced prospect of long, bloody war.
- Total war reemerging as armies required complete economic mobilization to sustain conflict.

U.S. Military History

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The Great War: An Indecisive Beginning

Attempting to End the Stalemate,

1914-1916

Context

- 1914-1916 conflict became total and global!
  - Included new tactics & technologies.
- Germans changed strategy to defeat Russia first, then the Allies.
- Allies debated “peripheral” vs. “central” strategy and “supply-denial” to Central Powers.

Search for Alternatives

- After 1914, WWI became war of position & attrition.
- Br. est. blockade of Ger. in Aug 1914.
- Battles of attrition in 1916 caused resource shortages in Ger. & Fr.
  - Eur. economies became more & more centralized.
  - Pol. & mil. leaders evermore at odds over resources.

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- Consuming vision was to penetrate trenches and fight decisive maneuver battle in open terrain.
- Effort compromised by increasing reliance by all sides on massive arty. prep.
  - Further complicated inf.-arty. coord.

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- "Massacre of the Innocents," Nov 1914.
  - Ger. forces released after siege of Antwerp & concentrated against Allied left.
  - Ger. used massive arty. prep. & attacked Allies at Ypres.
  - Ger. inf. slaughtered.
- No one deterred by Ypres

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- Neuve Chapelle, Mar 1915.
  - First Br. attempt to break Ger. trenches.
  - Br. used light field batteries, aerial recon. data, & short arty. prep.
  - Br. advance slowed by Ger. reinforcements & poor inf.-arty. coord.
  - From failure, Br. concluded that arty. prep. should be longer &

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- Ypres, Apr 1915.
  - Asphyxiating gasses prohibited by 1899 Hague Conference.
  - Still, Ger. used chlorine gas & followed discharge into Fr. and Canadian trenches.
  - Ger. gained ground but succumbed to own chlorine gas & Allied resistance.

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- Gas provided no decisive edge.
  - Used throughout war but never again so well.
  - Vagaries of wind & fear of reprisal limited use.
  - Simulated gas used extensively as battlefield obscurant.

Tactical & Strategic Alternatives

- 1915 yielded no decision.
- Massive arty. barrages chewed up ground & made attack even more difficult.
- Br. & Fr. in particular groping toward coordinating operations, strategy, & command.

The Trenches

- Trenches became symbol of new type of warfare along Western Front.
  - Separation from enemy varied from a few to as many as hundreds of yards.
  - Zig-zag trenches connected friendly lines & provided communication.
  - "No-man's land" in between filled

The Trenches

- Continuous lines of trenches evolved into lines of strong points.
  - Change necessitated by effects of firepower.
  - First step toward flexible or elastic defense.
- Trench life for all was grisly.

Peripheral Ops.

- WWI spread well beyond the Western & Eastern Fronts.
- Br. esp. frustrated over deadlock in Fr.
- Entry of Ottoman Emp. into Central Powers also worrisome.
- Conditions ripe for ops. on periphery of Eur. & into Middle East.

Peripheral Ops.

- Example of strategy of the indirect approach.
- Middle East, 1915-1918.
  - Turks attempted invasion of Egypt in Jan 1915.
  - Over next 3 yrs. fighting moved north into Palestine.
  - Most significant campaign was Gallipoli.

Peripheral Ops.

- Gallipoli, 1915.
  - Object of Allied amphib. landing on Gallipoli peninsula was to open LOC through straits of Dardanelles to Russia.
  - Br., Fr., & ANZAC troops landed in Apr at Cape Helles but soon bogged down.
  - Br. attempted to “turn” Turks with landing north at Suvla Bay in Aug but

Peripheral Ops.

- Allies failed at Gallipoli on many levels.
  - Inexperience in amphib. ops., water shortages, poor fire support, misused commo., & confused cmndrs.
- No peripheral operation anywhere proved decisive.
  - Became very expensive sideshows.

Eastern Front

- After failure of Schlieffen Plan, Ger. high command undecided on strategy.
  - Focus on Western or Eastern Front?
- Rus. Apr 1915 offensive threatened heart of Austria-Hungary.
  - Ger. compelled to focus on Eastern Front, assist Austrians, & cripple Rus. offensive capability.

Gorlice-Tarnow Breakthrough

- Ger. created Eleventh Army.
  - Reassigned some Western Front soldiers to it.
  - Included Col. von Seeckt, who had experience in better inf.-arty. coord.
- Rus. Third Army in Gorlice-Tarnow area unprepared for May onslaught.

Gorlice-Tarnow Breakthrough

- Rus. high command finally allowed Third Army to withdraw to San River.
  - Ger. broke San line as well.
- Ger. & Aus. debated & agreed to continue offensive into Russia itself.
  - Changed axis of advance from E to NE.
  - Rus. withdrew to Bug River &

Gorlice-Tarnow Breakthrough

- Eastern Front remained relatively static for rest of war.
- Rus. sustained >2 million casualties!
- Central Powers' advantages included advanced inf.-arty. coord., better overall command, & more supplies.
- Ger. began shifting forces westward to counter Allied

1916 Battles of Attrition

- Allies had no common strategy for defeating Central Powers.
  - Met in Dec 1915 for first & only time but reached no agreements.
  - Br. & Fr. had limited cooperation.
- War of attrition now clearly in view.

Battle of Verdun

- Ger. Gen. von Falkenhayn chose battle of attrition for 1916.
  - Object was to attack & weaken Fr. and force them to breaking point.
  - A kind of Ger. *offensive a outrance.*
- Double-edged sword of attrition consumed hundreds of thousands of lives.

Battle of Verdun

- Ger. Feb 21 twelve-hour arty. prep. consumed 1.2 million rounds!
- Ger. attack easily captured critical Ft. Douaumont through confusion in Fr. command.
  - Cost Fr. thousands of lives to regain it.
- Joffre now placed Gen. Henri Pétain in command of Verdun.

Battle of Verdun

- Pétain reorganized defenses & reoccupied and rearmed Fr. forts.
- Ger. expanded & renewed offensive in Apr but Fr. still held them back.
- Ger. replaced Falkenhayn with Hindenburg in Aug but to no avail.

Battle of Verdun

- Fr. launched attacks with limited objectives & regained some lost ground.
  - Fr. learning lessons about scale & scope of ops.
- By end of Nov 1916, front lines at Verdun had barely moved, fighting was brutal, & combined losses >700,000!

Battle of the Somme

- Roughly concurrent with Verdun.
  - Involved massed Br. & Fr. inf. breakthrough of Ger. lines along Somme River.
  - To be followed by cav. exploitation toward Cambrai.
  - Still dreaming of Napoleonic decisive battle!

Battle of the Somme

- Br. arty. prep. consumed 1.5 million rounds!
- First day--Jul 1--was Br. disaster.
  - Inf. lost 30,000 in first hour & >57,000 on first day!
  - Highest casualty rate ever for Br. army.

Battle of the Somme

- Somme ops. ended in Nov 1916 with all forces physically exhausted.
- Attrition in 1916:
  - Caused resource shortages for all belligerents.
  - Virtually ended possibility of "purely military" victory for Germany.

Brusilov Offensive

- Rus. to launch late summer 1916 offensive to support similar Allied efforts.
  - Tsar Nicholas II personally assumed command of entire front.
  - Tsar also placed Gen. Aleksei Brusilov in command of Rus. Southwest Front.
  - Brusilov focused on inf.-arty. coord.

Brusilov Offensive

- Massive Jun-Sep offensive gained some ground but not decisive.
  - Rus. casualties for op. ca. 1 million!
- Greatest victory of the war, <u>but</u>:
  - Rus. losing offensive capability.
  - Rus. people disillusioned & near

Tactical Innovations

- Greatest offensive tactical innovation was artillery "rolling barrage," but still provided no decisive edge.
- Greatest Fr. defensive tactical innovation was "flexible defense" learned at Verdun.
- Greatest Ger. defensive tactical innovation was "elastic defense," which they used most in 1917.

Technological Innovations

- The airplane:
  - Most widespread use was in recon. and counter-recon.
  - Br. were most original and focused on strategic bombing of civilian population, industries, & LOCs, all deemed enemy “vital centers.”
  - Br. strategic bombing ideas became core of postwar air power ethos.


Technological Innovations

- The tank:
  - Developed by both Br. & Fr.
  - Designed to cross devastated battlefield.
  - Fr. esp. wanted to mass tanks for grand assault.
  - Br. used a few at Somme in 1916 & achieved little.
  - Greatest WWI use of tanks in 1917.

Results

- 1914-1916 witnessed multiple innovations in tactics, technology, & strategy.
- Millions of casualties yielded no tolerable decision.
  - "True war" yielding to "real war."
- All belligerents deeply scarred by losses thus far.

Check on Learning



Attempting to End the Stalemate,

1914-1916

1917: The Year of Desperation and Anticipation

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Germans decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.
  - Germans took calculated risk & lost!
- Effect was to bring U.S. into war & ensure that Allies would not lose.

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Background:
  - Resulted from long Ger. debate over relationship between land & naval ops.
  - By 1915 Br. blockade of Germany was total, including materiel & foodstuffs.
  - Ger. declared Br. waters a "war zone."
  - May 1915 sinking of *Lusitania* cost >100 U.S. lives, but Ger. claimed

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Background (cont.):
  - Sep 1915 sinking of *Arabic* cost more U.S. lives & Ger. backed off unrestricted sub warfare.
  - Late 1915, Ger. navy & army pressured gov't to resume unrestricted sub warfare.
  - Br. Grand Fleet bottled up Ger. High Seas Fleet from start of the war.

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Background (cont.):
  - May 1916 Battle of Jutland perpetuated naval stalemate.
  - Kaiser agreed to resume unrestricted sub warfare.
  - Ger. navy promised to defeat Br. in six months!

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Jan 1917, Ger. notified U.S. of resumption of unrestricted sub warfare.
- Pres. Woodrow Wilson soon broke off diplomatic relations with Ger.
  - Wilson shaping circumstances leading to near certain U.S. entry into the war.

Unrestricted Sub Warfare

- Wilson also ordered arming of U.S. merchantmen.
  - Based in 1792 law not requiring Cong. approval.
- Br. released damaging "Zimmerman Telegram."
- Ger. sank U.S. ships in Feb & Mar 1917 and Wilson obtained Cong. declaration of war Apr 6, 1917.

Allied 1917 Offensives

- Allies still devoted to winning war with offensive strategy.
- New Allied military leadership:
  - Fr. Gen. Robert G. Nivelle & Br. Gen. Douglas Haig.
- Same old approach!
  - Series of Allied frontal assaults from Arras to Ypres intended to defeat Ger.

Allied 1917 Offensives

- Ger. withdrew from Noyon Salient to Hindenburg Line & instituted “elastic defense.”
  - Ger. most often on defense in West.
  - Used reverse slope & defense in depth.
  - Mutually supporting strong points covered by machine gun & artillery fire.
  - Design was to bend in attack but

Allied 1917 Offensives

- Br. launched limited offensive near Arras in Apr.
  - Canadians seized key terrain of Vimy Ridge.
  - Br. used cavalry to exploit breakthrough but failed.
  - Ger. elastic defense held.

Nivelle Offensive

- New Fr. commander Gen. Nivelle:
  - "The artillery conquers: the infantry occupies."
- Nivelle's plan:
  - Attack straight ahead with two armies in Champagne sector; exploit any breakthrough with a third army.

Nivelle Offensive

- Fr. pounded Ger. with artillery for nine days in mid-Apr.
  - Squandered surprise in the process.
- Fr. inf. broke through but soon halted by Ger. machine guns.
- Fighting continued for three days, but Ger. “elastic defense” held again!

Nivelle Offensive

- Offensive ended in early May 1917.
- Fr. gov't relieved Nivelle of command.
- Replaced with Gen. Henri Pétain.
  - End of Fr. attempt at "purely military" decision.
  - Pétain employed only limited offensives to seize key terrain

Nivelle Offensive

- Half of Fr. army mutinied in May.
  - Pétain worked to restore fighting spirit.
- Pétain launched offensive at Verdun in Aug 1917.
  - Used 14 tank companies & shorter arty. prep.
  - Fr. gained some ground, revived morale, & demonstrated viability of Pétain's tactical reforms.

Messines & Passchendaele

- Br. Gen. Haig launched limited offensive at Messines Ridge in May.
  - Intent was to occupy Ger. while Fr. recovered from army mutiny.
  - Offensive succeeded deceptively easily.
  - Inspired Br. to attempt larger offensive farther north at Ypres.

Messines & Passchendaele

- 3rd Battle of Ypres or "Passchendaele."
  - Br. intent was to seize Ger. sub bases still farther north along Belgian coast!
- Br. used very heavy arty. prep.
  - Disregarded effect of shellfire on terrain.
- Br. advanced quickly five miles to

Messines & Passchendaele

- Br. offensive ground to halt & became symbol to suffering & disappointment.
  - Rain turned former marsh into bog.
  - Ger. made initial use of mustard gas.
- Br. occupied Passchendaele on Dec 7 but Haig halted offensive.

Russia Collapsing

- Mar 1917 revolution overthrew Tsar.
- Provisional gov't launched disastrous Jul offensives.
  - Russian army began to disintegrate.
- Ger. launched final Eastern Front offensive in Sep.
- Bolsheviks seized power in Nov & shortly sued for peace.

Creating the AEF

- U.S. faced enormous mobilization challenge beginning 1917:
  - Regular & reserve strength at 380,000.
  - Increased in time to combined 3.8M via Selective Service Act of May!
  - Task of expanding, equipping, training, & transporting Army slowed by delays in manufacture &

Creating the AEF

- Pres. Wilson est. numerous boards to facilitate mobilization:
  - Fit “managed economy” philosophy of Progressives.
  - Examples included War Industries Board, Railroad Administration, etc.
- Many heavy weapons & equipment still came from the French.

Transporting AEF to Europe

- Coincided with war's highest rate of shipping loss in the Atlantic.
- Adm. William S. Sims, U.S. naval commander in European waters:
  - Arrived in Br. in Apr 1917 and recommended use of convoy system.
  - Shipping losses dropped 75% in six months and 80% by end of 1917.

Issue of Amalgamation

- Gen. John J. Pershing, AEF cmndr., arrived in Fr. in Jun 1917.
  - Br. & Fr. wanted to amalgamate U.S. forces into theirs.
  - Pershing steadfastly resisted & wanted U.S. forces to serve and fight together.
  - To placate Allies, Pershing assigned Afr.-Amer. 92nd Inf. Div. to the French.

Amer. Enter the Trenches

- AEF to occupy Allied right in Lorraine:
  - Combination political-military decision.
  - Connected by available RRs to Fr. Atlantic & Mediterranean ports.
- AEF Services of Supply prepared way:
  - 670,000 troops in logistical system.
  - Two fighting soldiers for every

Amer. Enter the Trenches

- Army's 1st Inf. Div. arrived in Fr. in Jun 1917 but needed much training in trench warfare.
  - Did not enter trenches until late Oct.
- Pershing forbade large deployment of U.S. forces to trenches until training completed & logistical support allowed independent ops.

Air Service of AEF

- Another difficult problem for Pershing.
  - Higher priority for land forces meant Air Service flew mostly Fr. fighters.
- AEF aviation officer, Col. Billy Mitchell, was long-range bombing advocate.
  - First air squadron operational Apr 1918 & pilots had flown earlier with Allies.

Cambrai

- End of 1917 brought many troubles:
  - Russian collapse meant flood of Ger. divisions redeployed to Western Front.
  - Austro-Ger. forces defeated Italians at Caporetto in Oct-Nov.
  - Ger. subs still gnawing at Atlantic shipping lifeline.

Cambrai

- Br. & Fr. decided to try again to cut off Ger. sub bases along Belgian coast.
- Br. plan was for full-scale offensive with inf. & tanks to break through Hindenburg Line near Cambrai.
- Br. tanks were Mark IVs.
  - Rolling rhombuses with numerous small- caliber cannons & machine

Cambrai

- Most of Br. assault force practiced coordinating infantry with tanks.
- Training developed several new techniques:
  - Royal Flying Corps to provide direct air support to ground forces.
  - Retention of element of surprise by eliminating prolonged arty. prep.

Cambrai

- Attack began Nov 20 & surprised Ger.
- Br. initially made deepest penetration yet of Ger. lines on Western Front.
- Ger. soon halted offensive, brought up reinforcements, counterattacked, & restored original line.


Results

- 1917 ended with Allies hoping for “Americans and the tanks.”
  - Much worry over redeploying Ger. forces from Eastern to Western Front.
- Russia out of war when Bolsheviks signed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in Mar 1918.
  - Treaty accelerated Ger. redeployment.

Results

- 1917 in particular widened the license of war:
  - End of “purely military” solution.
  - Extensive use of submarines.
  - Theorizing about strategic bombardment.
- Notion of “just war” yielding to repeated violations of principle of proportionality.

Check on Learning



1917: The Year of Desperation and Anticipation

Breaking the Hold of the Trenches,1918

Context

- Military balance seemed to favor Central Powers at end of 1917.
- German “infiltration tactics” seemed to restore mobility to battlefield.
- Allies and Central Powers racing against time early in

Context

- German's best hope for victory lay in 1918.
- Influence of military in Ger. gov't growing steadily.
- Ger. Nov 1917 strategy concluded:
  - To launch initial series of spring 1918 offensives codenamed "Michael."
  - To focus first on apparently weak Br. in area of Somme.

Infiltration Tactics

- 1914 “Massacre of the Innocents” caused Ger. to rethink entire tactical ops. and trench warfare.
  - Implemented change incrementally.
  - “Elastic defense” was one example.

Infiltration Tactics

- Nov 1917-Mar 1918, Ger. recast offensive tactical doctrine.
- Published in Jan 1918 as *The Attack in Position Warfare* and contained outline of “infiltration tactics.”
  - Bypass enemy centers of resistance & push forward as far and fast as possible.

Infiltration Tactics

- Follow-on units to neutralize bypassed strong points.
- Reserves to reinforce success & not attack unbroken enemy defenses.

- Reliance on effective arty. prep. to achieve greater inf.-arty. coord.
- Technique devised by Col. Georg Bruchmueller.

Infiltration Tactics

- Artillery to fire in depth throughout enemy positions and inf. to advance behind rolling barrage.

- Ger. emphasized tactical command from the front.
  - No “chateau generalship.”
- Ger. also emphasized training and physical fitness.

Spring Offensive

- Began Mar 21, 1918 with three numbered Ger. armies.
- Assault preceded by short arty. prep. of gas, smoke, & HE.
- Altogether 60 Ger. divs. in three numbered armies advanced!
  - Tremendous “force density” possible since collapse of

Spring Offensive

- Ger. struck Br. in Somme sector & advanced 35 miles, largest gain on Western Front since 1914.
  - Struck two Br. numbered armies.
- But Br. did not break & Fr. brought up ca. 13 divisions as reinforcements.
- First attempt to break Allied line failed!

Allied Unity of Command

- Br., Fr., & It. finally agreed to coord. strategy & ops. in Nov 1917.
  - Concerns over sovereignty stopped earlier efforts.
  - Collapse of Russia & near defeat of It. brought Allies together at last.
  - New unified command system called Supreme War Council.

Allied Unity of Command

- Council met in Fr. in Mar 1918.
  - Signed agreement in Apr for Fr. Gen. Ferdinand Foch to provide “strategic direction of military operations” of Fr., Br., & U.S.
  - Agreement was crisis-oriented but provided war’s first semblance of Allied unity of command.

Ger. Continue Offensive

- Ger. launched second assault north in Flanders in Apr & failed there, too.
- Ger. army starting to deteriorate.
  - Discipline broke down when Ger. troops captured Br. supply dumps.
- Unrestricted sub warfare also failing.
  - Allies launching ships faster than

Ger. Continue Offensive

- Ger. launched third assault against Chemin des Dames.
  - Scene of 1917 Fr. “Nivelle Offensive.”
  - Amer. entered combat as reserves & fought well at Chateau Thierry & Belleau Wood.
- Final Ger. assaults in Jun & Jul failed, ending Ger. offensive capability.

Amer. Enter Battle

- Moral and materiel Amer. support likely kept Fr. & Br. from being defeated in 1918.
- Pershing launched limited attack with 1st Inf. Div. against village of Cantigny in late May.
  - 1st ID reached objective & held it against Ger. counterattacks.

Amer. Enter Battle

- Following Pétain's appeal, Pershing used 2nd and 3rd Inf. Divs. to assist halting third Ger. offensive near Chateau Thierry.
- During fifth Ger. offensive, 3rd ID held firm along Marne River.
  - Div. earned nickname "Rock of the Marne."

Overwhelming the Ger.

- Allies seized initiative in summer 1918 & defeated Ger. through attrition.
- Three numbered Fr. armies attacked Marne salient in mid-July.
  - Nine U.S. divs. participated.
- Initiative on Western Front now clearly passing to Allies.

Overwhelming the Ger.

- Fr. & Br. attacked next in northern Somme with two numbered armies.
  - Fr. used >500 tanks in 12 battalions.
- Fr. attack marked turning point in the war:
  - Broke through Ger. lines & into the open.
  - Inaugurated mobile warfare in last months of fighting.

Overwhelming the Ger.

- Br. attack in Somme sector began Aug 8.
  - Used no arty. prep. & Canadians esp. advanced swiftly.
- Ger. forced to pull back to Hindenburg Line by end of Aug.
  - Beginning of end for Ger. & signaled failure of their 1918 “purely military” solution to the war.

St. Mihiel Salient

- Foch realized need to continue pressuring Ger.
- Pershing formed U.S. First Army in Jul 1918 & named himself cmndr.
- Pétain & Pershing compromised on attack plan:
  - U.S. First Army to attack St. Mihiel salient; then turn NW & participate in major offensive in Meuse-Argonne area.

St. Mihiel Salient

- Offensive against salient began Sep 12:
  - Four-hour arty. prep.
  - Four Fr. & and >8 U.S. divs. attacked.
  - Col. Billy Mitchell achieved largest concentration of aircraft during the war to assist ground offensive.
- Despite inclement weather, attack went as planned.

St. Mihiel Salient

- Ger. already in process of evacuating salient.
- Allied advance halted at salient's base.
- Preparations began immediately for Meuse-Argonne offensive.
- BG Douglas MacArthur, among others, believed great opportunity lost for complete breakthrough of Ger. lines.

Meuse-Argonne

- Foch directed U.S. First Army to:
  - Relieve Fr. Second Army.
  - Occupy eastern Argonne Forest to west bank of Meuse River.
- U.S. front was to cover 90 miles.
  - From eastern edge of St. Mihiel salient to western edge of Argonne Forest.

Meuse-Argonne

- Redeployment was Herculean task for inexperienced U.S. First Army.
  - Planning & execution accomplished brilliantly Col. George C. Marshall, Jr.
- Attack plan called for four-hour arty. prep. followed by advance of U.S. inf. & 189 light tanks of Fr.

Meuse-Argonne

- Offensive began Sep 26, 1918:
  - U.S. forces easily overwhelmed forward Ger. defenses to depth of ca. 4 miles.
  - Then pace slowed and casualties mounted as Ger. “elastic defense” held.
- Other Allied offensives farther west advanced more.

Meuse-Argonne

- Mid-Oct Pershing split U.S. forces into two armies, First and Second.
  - Attempt to achieve greater battlefield agility.
- U.S. forces attacked twice more in Oct but gained no more ground than planned for first day of offensive.
  - Three weeks of fighting cost ca. 55,000 Amer. casualties.

Meuse-Argonne

- U.S. forces reorganized again in late Oct.
- Resumed offensive Nov 1 with seven now-veteran divs.
  - Ger. began to withdraw & end of war in sight.
- Nov 11 Armistice ended offensive
  - >850,000 Amer. participated in combat.

Final Allied Offensives

- Other Allied offensives ongoing.
- Ger. began in late Sep 1918 to consider asking for armistice.
- Ger. & Aus. gov’ts approached U.S. Pres. Wilson for armistice based on his Fourteen Points.
  - No agreement because Allies had not reached own particulars for peace.

Final Allied Offensives

- Allied Nov 1 assaults convinced Ger. to conclude armistice.
- Ger. commission signed Armistice near Paris at Compiègne on Nov 11, 1918.
  - Document bore little resemblance to Fourteen Points.
  - Choice for Ger. was to sign or continue fighting.

The Great War

- Total military casualties were 28.5M!
- Application of immense resources & technology transformed war into seeming endless cycle of attrition.
- Was turning point in world history.
  - Ended several centuries of

The Great War


- Added new dimensions to “total war.”
  - “Nation in arms” esp. became reality.
- Fundamentally altered nature of land warfare.
  - Cost enormous casualties to effect.
  - Naval warfare less changed & air

The Great War

- Doctrinal changes included improved inf.-arty coord. and development of “elastic defense” & “infiltration tactics.”
- Unsolved was riddle of how to break through prepared defensive positions.
- New concepts & weapons to dominate 20th century warfare.
  - Esp. air power & submarines.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Breaking the Hold of the Trenches,1918

Germany Triumphant:

Restoring Mobility to War

Context

- World War II (WWII) was largest and deadliest conflict ever.
  - Not less than 50 million dead worldwide, half of them civilian!
  - 40% of fatalities from USSR.
- Whatever its shortcomings, WWII destroyed the tyrannies of Germany, Japan, & Italy.
  - Open question was USSR.

Context

- From military perspective, 1914-1945 was one continuum.
  - Developments begun during Great War were amplified during WWII.
- License of war widened still more.
  - Violence extended just as much to civilians and their possessions.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- Germans prepared the best to fight mobile battles of the future & avoid another stalemated Western Front.
- Published 1924 *Truppenführung*.
  - Distilled tactical and operational insights of Great War.
  - Became doctrinal basis for Ger. "way of war."

Ground War, 1918-1939

- Provided for decentralized, mission-oriented orders.
- Provided for commanders' taking the initiative, without direct orders to do so.
- Provided for combined arms tactics.
- Provided for troop leading from the "front."

Ground War, 1918-1939

- First *Reichswehr* cmndr., Gen. Hans von Seeckt, oriented army to offensive, limited war, & *Blitzkrieg*.
- Ger. army began massive rearmament after Hitler came to power in 1933.
  - *Wehrmacht* still an infantry-based force with much horse-drawn logistics.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- Ger. learned from experience.
  - After Poland, converted four existing divs. into Panzer divs.
- Ger. went beyond doctrine & materiel developments.
  - Used doctrine as guide, not formula.
  - Officers trained in *Auftragstaktik*, or following commander's intent & taking the initiative.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- British largely believed no large Eur. war ever likely to occur again.
- British still produced two original military thinkers:
  - J.F.C. Fuller, who wrote on potential of tank.
  - B.H. Liddell Hart, who extended Fuller's ideas to include tanks penetrating, exploiting, & disrupting enemy force.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- Despite theorists, Br. army not integrated under single doctrine.
  - Combat branches went their own way.
- Br. experimented with armored warfare in 1920s &'30s but failed to incorporate insights into development of armored forces.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- French developed & fielded large armored force.
  - Focused on firepower at expense of flexibility & maneuverability.
- Soviets vacillated between armored force using latest technology & ideas and traditional mass-conscript army.

Ground War, 1918-1939

- U.S. Army severely underfunded during 1920s & ‘30s.
  - Very unready period in Army history.
- Army officers continued schooling & professional development.
  - In and out of Army schools, studied strategy and logistics in theory & fact.

Interwar Developments

- Air war thoroughly explored during Great War despite limited use.
  - Air power theorists focused on "strategic" (long-range) bombing vs. "tactical" (most other) missions.
- Despite theoretical agreement, Br. & U.S. diverged sharply.
  - Br. focused on bombing civilians & U.S. on gaining air superiority as precondition.

Interwar Developments

- U.S. airman Gen. Billy Mitchell soured relations between upstart air arm and traditional services.
- During 1930s, Air Corps Tactical School abandoned precondition of air superiority & embraced Br.-like strategic bombing.
  - Founded on belief that industrial economies were fragile & that the bomber would always get through!

Interwar Developments

- Head of Ger. *Luftwaffe* was Hitler's crony, Hermann Göring
  - Aim was to make Ger. air force strongest in Europe.
  - Could not fully develop strategic capacity.
- Still, *Luftwaffe* best Eur. air force at balance between tactical & strategic missions.
  - Result of experience in Spanish CW.

Interwar Developments

- Naval war still largely beholden to A.T. Mahan's earlier theories.
- U.S. & Japan developed concepts for carrier ops. & amphibious capabilities that together altered naval war.
  - Ideas of U.S. & Japan focused on vast expanse of Pacific Ocean.

Outbreak of WWII

- Treaty of Versailles failed to curtail Ger. aggression.
- Nazis preyed on “stab in the back” myth of Ger. defeat in Great War.
- Hitler after Jan 1933 focused on Ger. rearmament & disrupting Eur. balance of power.

Outbreak of WWII

- From Mar 1938-Mar 1939, Hitler absorbed Austria & Czech. into *Reich*.
  - Br. & Fr. resorted to appeasement.
- Br. guaranteed Polish independence in Mar 1939.
  - Ger. began preparations for invasion.
  - Aug 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact concluded Ger. preparations.
- Nazi ideology to be racial

Poland

- Sep 1, 1939 Ger. invaded Poland.
  - Br. & Fr. promptly declared war
- Poles hopelessly outflanked by Ger. territory & forces.
  - Chose version of cordon defense, due to unwillingness to surrender territory.
- Ger. defeated Pol. piecemeal as result.

Poland

- *Luftwaffe* pounded Poles from air before mech. columns attacked.
  - Close air support not as effective during mobile ops. following breakthrough.
- *Wehrmacht* then tore through Poles in ca. one week!
- Soviets occupied E. Pol. beginning Sep 17 to “protect” local population.

Poland

- Ger. digested Pol. campaign quickly.
  - Through AARs & more tng., altered "TTPs" to fit apparent lessons learned.
- Ger. success founded solidly on:
  - Coherent, modern doctrine; speed, exploitation, & combined arms; and decentralized C2.

Poland

- Ger. soon began racial atrocities in Pol.
  - Harbinger of years of genocide.
- Western Europeans did little to help Pol.
- Months of “Phony War” over winter of 1939-1940 gave Ger. time to prepare for turn west in spring 1940.

Scand. Campaign

- Soviets used Phony War to occupy Baltic States & invade Finland.
  - Hardy Finns initially defeated Red Army.
  - Soviet 1937-1939 purges had decimated Red Army leadership.
- Ger. misled by Finnish Campaign & ignored skillful Soviet ops. against Japan in Aug 1939.

Scand. Campaign

- Hitler approved Scandinavian Campaign in spring 1940.
  - Ger. intent was to base U-Boats in Norway for Atlantic anti-shipping ops.
- *Weserübung* began Apr 1940.
  - Denmark fell quickly but Norway required intricately coordinated joint ops.

Scand. Campaign

- First Ger. attempt to run Oslo fiord on Apr 10 failed.
- Ger. landed troops at mouth of fiord after losing heavy cruiser *Blücher*.
- Two Allied landings in northern Norway to rescue situation failed.
- Landings at Trondheim & Narvik

Scand. Campaign

- Ger. eventually captured major ports & airfields and subdued Norway.
- Ger. *Kriegsmarine* suffered heavy losses.
  - By June 1940 only one heavy cruiser and four destroyers ready to support planned invasion of Br. Isles, Operation *Seelöwe*.
  - Inadequate to support landings.

French Campaign

- Ger. refined plans for attack on Western Europe during winter 1939-1940.
- No replay of Schlieffen Plan!
- Hitler settled on armored/mech. thrust through heavily-forested Ardennes.
  - Intent was to bypass Fr. Maginot Line & reach flat areas of western Belgium.

French Campaign

- Br. & Fr. plans focused on:
  - Holding along Maginot Line.
  - Advancing into Belgium & defending along Dyle River.
- Br., Fr., & Ger. armies fairly equally matched in 1940.
- Ger. intellectual preparation much better.

French Campaign

- Opening moves began with Ger. attack May 10, 1940.
  - Included wide-ranging *Luftwaffe* strikes.
  - *Luftwaffe* gained air superiority and supported ground forces.
- Ger. paratroopers captured key C2 locations in Holland.
- Ger. advance rolled on into Belgium.

French Campaign

- Belgian neutrality prevented Fr. from taking preventive measure re: Ardennes.
- Ger. crossed Meuse R. on May 13.
  - *Wehrmacht* was on right & rear of Fr. Dyle R. defense.
- Allied air power failed to cut off Ger. westward advance.

French Campaign

- Gen. Heinz Guderian's panzers now rolling westward.
- Nervous Ger. leadership ordered halt.
- Army Group A cmndr. worked out compromise:
  - Allowed Guderian's divs. to conduct "recon. in force" all the way to Fr. coast!

French Campaign

- Fr. collapse virtually assured when seven Ger. armored divs. pushed to English Channel.
- Ger. had cut off entire Allied left wing!
  - No one ordered Guderian to seize Channel ports!
- Ger. army high command issued “stop order” just as panzers closing in on Channel port of Dunkirk!

French Campaign

- Ger. senior leadership wanted to preserve panzers for final attack on Fr.
  - Armor needed for campaign of maneuver to the south, not siege of Channel ports!
- BEF used time to pull back to Dunkirk for Operation “Dynamo” evacuation.

French Campaign

- Cohesion of Ger. ops. began to decline.
  - May 30 before Ger. forces reorganized & ready to strike Dunkirk.
  - *Luftwaffe* lost control of airspace over port to Br. fighters from bases across Channel.
- By Jun 3, total of 340,000 Allied troops evacuated through Dunkirk.
  - Nearly all of BEF & some Fr. forces

French Campaign


- Ger. finished off Fr. late Jun 1940.
- Anglo-Fr. alliance collapsed under weight of defeat.
- Fr. surrendered in same RR car in Compiègne where Ger. had signed Armistice in 1918!
- Eur. balance of power now entirely upset.

Results

- In campaigns of 1939-1940, Ger. restored mobility to the battlefield!
- *Wehrmacht* was combined arms force with coherent doctrine, but:
  - Much of Ger. logistics horse-drawn.
  - Army remained hybrid of motorized, mechanized, & Great War-style infantry.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Germany Triumphant:

Restoring Mobility to War

Germany Arrested:

The Limits of Expansion

Context

- Germany:
  - Failed to bring the war to decision in 1941, esp. in regards to Br. & USSR.
  - Foolishly declared war on the U.S. in Dec 1941.
  - By spring 1942, had much of the world arrayed against it.

Battle of Britain

- After Fr., Ger. set its sights on Br.
- It. & Vichy Fr. entered war for Axis.
  - Complicated Br. naval security in Med. Sea.
- At Churchill's urging, FDR expressed support for Br. in summer 1940.
  - Not so the USSR!

Battle of Britain

- Herman Göring & *Luftwaffe* planned to defeat Br. alone by two approaches:
  - Op. “Sea Lion”: joint-service, amphib. landing on Br. coast.
  - Air offensive to gain air superiority & destroy Br. industrial capacity.
- RAF lost ca. 20% of fighters & *Luftwaffe* 30% of bombers in Fr.

Battle of Britain

- *Luftwaffe* was deployed in Fr. & Nor.
  - Combined strength of 2,900 fighters, bombers, & dive bombers.
- Br. defended by RAF Fighter Cmnd.
  - Doctrine & org. largely the creation of AM Sir Hugh Dowding.
  - Possessed ca. 900 fighters, about 550 operational daily.

Battle of Britain

- Faulty intel. led *Luftwaffe* to predict defeat of RAF & destruction of Br. aircraft industry in ca. five weeks.
- Dowding planned to use air superiority fighters to:
  - Keep force in being & fight sustained battle of attrition.
  - Prevent *Luftwaffe* from striking decisive economic or military blow to Br.

Battle of Britain

- Göring planned to use *Luftwaffe* to:
  - First attack Fighter Command & then Bomber Command.
  - Attack Br. imports.
  - Conduct “retaliatory” terror raids on Br. cities.
- Battle officially began mid-Aug 1941.

Battle of Britain

- *Luftwaffe* attacks lacked direction & suffered from shifting focus.
- Fighter Command focused on Ger. bombers and limited its ops. to skies directly over Br.
- In battle of attrition in the sky, Germans broke first.

Battle of Britain

- Early Sep 1941, Göring & Hitler shifted from air superiority strategy to strategic bombing.
  - Ger. intent was to destroy London & thereby break Br. civilian morale.
- Respite allowed Fighter Command to recover & defeat *Luftwaffe*.
  - By end of Sep, Battle of Britain was over!

Battle of Britain

- Ger. *Kriegsmarine* was in no condition to conduct amphib. ops. despite outcome of Battle of Britain!
- Ger. defeat over Britain signaled to world that Ger. were <u>not omnipotent</u>!
- In the *Blitz,* Ger. shifted to months of nighttime terror

Battle of Britain

- *Blitz* demonstrated:
  - Resilience of modern economies.
  - Air weapon was unwieldy & inaccurate.
  - Air power was not quick, cheap, & easy solution to dilemma of indecisive war.
  - Air weapon was extremely expensive in aircrews, aircraft, &

Mediterranean War

- Struggle taking shape between Br. & It. for control of the Mediterranean Sea.
  - Br. focused on Suez Canal & Gibraltar.
  - It. dreaming of new Roman Empire.
- It. at war with Allies in Jun 1940.
- Ger. & It. intervened between Hungary & Romania.
  - Ger. interested most in protecting Romanian oil from USSR.

Italian Collapse

- Mussolini viewed Ger. presence in Romania as threat to It. interests.
- Litany of It. woes:
  - Invaded Greece in Nov. 1940 & defeated.
  - Half of fleet sunk by Br. at Taranto.
  - Pushed back by Jan 1941 total of 400 miles in N. Africa to El Agheila.

Ger. Arrive in Med.

- It. disasters demanded Ger. action.
- Hitler's aims were limited:
  - Restore situation in Med. & prevent It. collapse.
  - Guard southern flank of Ger. forces gathering for invasion of USSR.
- Gen. Erwin Rommel disregarded instructions &

Ger. Arrive in Med.

- By end of Apr 1941 Ger. *Afrika Korps* had regained the 400 lost miles, except port of Tobruk.
- Ger. intervened further in Balkans to bail out It.
  - Conquered both Yug. & Greece.
  - Ger. faced years of partisan warfare.
- Br. evacuated Greece.
  - Reminiscent of Dunkirk the year before!

Fall of Crete

- Strategic prize in the Med. was Crete!
  - RAF could bomb Romanian oil fields from there.
- Ger. paratroopers, air force, and navy launched joint op. in May 1941.
- Intel. informed Br. of Ger. attack but defenders still ill prepared.

Fall of Crete

- Still, Ger. paid heavy price for capture of island.
  - Airborne forces never again used in doctrinal role.
- Br. evacuated island's defenders.
- Amer. & Br. derived airborne doctrine & equipment from Ger. Crete ops.

Libya & Egypt, 1941-42

- By late spring 1941, Ger. had achieved strategic goals in Med.
- Ger. could not exploit situation due to decision to invade USSR.
- Med. about to become strategic backwater as Ger. turned to operational planning for Russian Campaign

Rommel on the Defensive

- Br. had two advantages in N. Africa:
  - Polish cryptanalysts broke Ger. high-grade cipher transmissions, called Ultra.
  - More air power in theater.
- Br. held Tobruk & just inside Egyptian border.
  - After one failed start, Br. launched offensive in mid-Nov 1941.

Rommel on the Defensive

- Operation Crusader:
  - Br. enjoyed numerical superiority.
  - Ger. suffered from logistical constraints.
- Ger. fell back on logistical support in Libya & Br. extended their supply lines.
- Adopting offensive cost Br. more casualties than Ger.

Rommel Counterattacks

- Br. recovered 400 miles lost earlier.
  - Stopped in area of El Agheila & reoriented armor.
  - Ger. counterattacked Jan 1942 & drove nearly to Tobruk along Gazala Line.
- Ger. still possessed advantages of leadership, doctrine, & tactical

Rommel Counterattacks

- Rommel to encircle entire Gazala Line with late May counterattack.
- Br. now using U.S. M3 Grant tanks, but Ger. still drove deep into Egypt.
  - Br. held line in Jul 1942 at El Alamein between Med. Sea & Qattara Depression.
  - Alexandria & Nile delta only 60 miles away but beyond Rommel's

Operation Barbarossa

- In Jul 1940 Hitler resolved to destroy USSR.
- Ger. entered USSR as conquerors, not liberators.
  - Brought slavery to Slavs & extermination to Jews.
- Ger. behavior made Soviets defend even Stalin's malevolent regime.

Planning

- Ger. operational planning well underway by fall 1940.
- Logistical planning revealed potential trouble:
  - *Wehrmacht* would encounter trouble sustaining ops. beyond line from Estonia to Smolensk to Ukraine.
  - Bulk of Ger. logistics still horse-drawn.

Planning

- Ger. military focused on strategic objective of Moscow.
  - Antiquated, point-based strategy.
- Hitler focused on Soviet flanks:
  - Leningrad, cradle of Bolshevik Rev.
  - Ukraine, Soviet agricultural heartland.

Planning

- Ger. deployed three army groups:
  - Army Group North (AGN) to clear Baltic States.
  - Army Group Center (AGC) to advance to Smolensk.
  - Army Group South (AGS) to advance on Kiev & down Dniepr River bend.
  - Eleventh Army to cover Romania & oil.

Planning

- Ger. established no clear priority among strategic objectives & planned only for rapid Soviet collapse.
- *Wehrmacht* was tough & professional but plagued by faulty logistics & intel.
- Red Army largely unprepared.
  - Stalin's late 1930s purges devastated its leadership.

Opening of Barbarossa

- From Baltic Sea to Black Sea, Ger. attacked on Jun 22, 1941.
  - *Luftwaffe* destroyed 3,000 Soviet aircraft during first week.
  - Ger. armor penetrated into open quickly.
  - Ger. inf. covered up to 30 miles a day!
- Race was on for strategic objectives.

Opening of Barbarossa

- By mid-July:
  - AGN still not to Leningrad; AGS moving slowly due to fatigue from Balkan ops.; AGC racing toward Moscow.
- Overall Soviet losses in first two weeks:
  - Ca. 3,000 aircraft; ca. 7,000 tanks; ca. 5,500 artillery pieces; & ca. 750,000 troops!
- Soviet troop losses 1.3M by early

Ger. Difficulties

- Ger. advance ground to a halt.
- Ger. admitted they "underestimated the colossus of Russia."
- Overextended Ger. logistics failed:
  - Supply of rations to field troops ceased.
  - Soviet counterattacks consumed all

Ger. Difficulties

- Ger. intel. underestimated Red Army strength.
  - Soviets still had 5.3M soldiers!!
- Huge gap opening between pace of Ger. armor & Ger. “straight leg” inf.
- Despite losses, Stalin firmly at the helm of Soviet state.

Ger. Difficulties

- Ger. now engaged in strategic debate!
  - End of Aug Hitler forced mil. to adhere to his “double envelopment” scheme.
- By Sep 1941 Ger. losses ca. 400,000 & nearly all of reserves committed.
- Fall advance by Ger. flanks closed in on Kiev & Leningrad.

Battle of Moscow

- Ger. concluded that USSR about to collapse.
- Ger. supply situation worsening.
  - OPTEMPO consumed all fuel & ammunition & allowed no accumulation of winter equipment.
- Ger. renewed offensive in Oct.
  - Ripped through Soviet lines & captured another 600,000 soldiers.

Battle of Moscow

- Weather broke in Oct.
  - Autumn rains turned countryside into sea of mud.
- Increased drain on Ger. logistics virtually eliminated small stockpiles of fuel, ammo, & winter clothing.
- Ger. reduced to lighting fires under vehicle crankcases to warm engines!

Soviet Counterattack

- Stalin brought in Gen. Georgi Zhukov to defend Moscow.
  - One of few competent cmndrs. to survive earlier purges.
- Red Army counterattacked early Dec.
  - Temp. hovering around -25ºF.
  - Soviets prepared for winter conditions.

Soviet Counterattack

- Ger. had reached culminating point.
  - Lost strength, will, and initiative!
- Hitler committed two strategic errors:
  - Declared war on U.S. after Pearl Harbor.
  - Ordered *Wehrmacht* to stand firm!
- Third Reich now emerging as

Soviet Counterattack


- Ger. mil. services now conducting almost no joint planning or ops.
- Threads of Ger. strategy came together only in Hitler's mind.
  - Estrangement between *Führer* & officer corps now well along.
- Soviets had halted Ger. before Moscow by Jan 1942.
  - *Wehrmacht* critically wounded.

Results

- Fate of world turned on events of 1941.
- Ger. launched mid-year crusade against USSR.
- Year ended with world war largely against Third Reich.
- War evermore a clash of economic strength, which favored Allied powers.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Germany Arrested:

The Limits of Expansion

The Atlantic and the Pacific: Producing and Projecting Military Power

Context

- 1941 entry of U.S. and USSR into conflict turned it into a true world war.
  - Of altogether unprecedented scale, scope, and lethality.
- Long & difficult process of turning latent Allied manpower & industrial potential into military force to defeat Japan & Germany in particular.

Origins of Pacific War

- Pacific War deeply rooted in Jap. ambitions in East Asia.
  - Jap. “modernizing” since mid-1800s.
  - Looking initially to China for natural resources.
  - Looking to SE Asia for same after spring 1940 defeat of Fr.

Origins of Pacific War

- Jap. contrived 1937 incident to invade China proper from Manchuria.
  - Full-scale, undeclared war in N. China.
- U.S. did not intervene & underfunded defense of its Pacific possessions.
- Oct 41 Premier [Gen.] Tojo called

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Strategy & Plans

- Pre-war “Orange” plans envisaged an “offensive war primarily naval in character” in Pacific.
- “Rainbow 5” plan provided WWII strategy in outline:
  - Pacific from offensive to defensive.
  - Ger., Jap., & It. threat too much for offensive strategy East and West.

Strategy & Plans

- FDR recognized greatest danger came from Ger. & adopted "Germany-first" strategy as result.
  - Strategic "intent" but difficult to implement from very beginning.
- Despite Rainbow 5, some U.S. strategists hoped to operate offensively from Philippines.

Strategy & Plans

- Jap. Pacific strategy divided between Army & Navy.
  - Army oriented toward China & mainland.
  - Navy oriented toward SE Asia & islands.
- Adm. Yamamoto planned Pearl Harbor but recognized danger of long war with U.S.
- U.S. severely underestimated

Japan Triumphant

- Jap. attacked throughout western Pacific.
- At Pearl Harbor on Dec 7, 1941 achieved tactical success but failed at operational and strategic levels.
  - Operationally, did not complete job, esp. in not catching U.S. carriers in port.
  - Strategically, U.S. now openly in

Japan Triumphant

- Jap. sank two Br. capital ships off Malaya with air power.
  - Day of the battleship appeared over.
- Jap. landed in Malaya and captured fortress of Singapore from landward.
  - Jap. demonstrated particular skill at infiltration & exploitation.

Japan Triumphant

- Jap. landed in Philippines in mid-Dec 1941.
  - Quickly ran U.S. defenders back into Bataan Peninsula & island of Corregidor.
  - U.S. & Filipino defenders soon on half rations.
  - FDR ordered MacArthur to Australia.
  - Jap. accepted surrender in May

Japan Checked

- Contrary to strategy, Jap. decided to continue offensive & extend control over more of Pacific.
- Three crucial engagements between U.S./coalition forces and Jap. from May-Aug 1942.
  - Coral Sea, Midway, & Guadalcanal.

Japan Checked

- Jap. aiming for Port Moresby on south coast of New Guinea.
  - Starting point for invasion of Australia.
  - USN concentrated carriers *Lexington* & *Yorktown* in Coral Sea to block move.
  - May 4-8 Battle of Coral Sea was new type of sea battle involving air action only.
  - U.S. ship losses heavier but Jap.

Japan Checked

- Apr 1942 raid by USAAF bombers launched from carrier *Hornet* against Tokyo prompted Jap. to try to capture Midway.
- Jap. plan called for destruction of U.S. fleet and amphib. landing on Midway.
- U.S. reading “Magic” message traffic & deduced Jap. OPLAN.

Japan Checked

- Jap. suspected nothing.
- Battle ended with all four Jap. fleet carriers sunk!
  - Only one U.S. carrier, *Yorktown*, sunk.
- Even more critical Jap. loss was trained aircrews--some of world's best!
- Initiative in Pacific now passing to

Counteroffensive

- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had divided Pacific command in two:
  - Gen. MacArthur to command SW Pacific.
  - Adm. Nimitz to command Central Pacific.
- Time had arrived after Midway to conduct counteroffensive in Pacific.

Counteroffensive

- JCS decided on three-stage advance on Rabaul.
  - 1--Land in southern Solomons.
  - 2--Advance along New Guinea coast.
  - 3--Attack Rabaul directly.
- Op. began in Aug 1942 with landings on Guadalcanal in Solomon Islands.

Counteroffensive

- Through naval surface action, Jap. tried unsuccessfully to drive U.S. forces away.
  - USN tactical defeat was irrelevant.
  - U.S. aircraft soon flying from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.
- FDR & JCS balancing “Germany-first” with public cry for revenge in Pacific.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- U.S. caught in early mobilization by Pearl Harbor.
  - Opposition to war involvement dissolved.
- Fall of Fr. led U.S. Congress to pass first peacetime draft.
- Many U.S. women entered workforce & improved economic status.
  - Most exited workforce after war.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- U.S. mobilization crested in 1943-44.
- Despite accomplishments, industrial effort never produced enough landing craft.
  - Not possible to support all amphib. ops. in Pacific and Europe.
- Largest mobilization task was to turn citizens into combat-ready units.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- Americans in combat within 18 months of start of mobilization.
- U.S. Army expanded from 200,000 to 8.2 million officers and enlisted.
  - Program of training & fielding 90 divisions reached 89.
- Army tng. policy regarded individual soldier as interchangeable part.
  - Result was lower efficiency than

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- Br. mobilized more thoroughly than any belligerent.
  - Mortal threat of Third Reich was impetus.
- Still, Br. overall industrial plant and processes were antiquated.
  - Most evident in consistently low quality of Br. tanks and motorized vehicles.
  - Hampered Br. ops. throughout war.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- Ger. economic mobilization least successful of major belligerents.
  - Nazis never harnessed Eur. economic potential despite controlling most of it.
- Dec 1941 defeat in USSR was wakeup call to Ger. leadership but still did not fully mobilize.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- Ger. relied on Eur. slave labor from 1942 onward.
  - Still could not make up production losses from 1940-1941.
- Allied strategic bombing retarded, but did not halt, Ger. industrial prod.
  - By 1944 Ger. feeling effects in oil, aircraft, & transportation industries.

Mob. & Proj. Mil. Power

- After defeat at Stalingrad and in N. Africa in 1943, Hitler allowed extension of mobilization throughout Ger. society.
  - Carried out by heads of propaganda & industry.
  - Much too late for general mobilization.
  - Could not and did not alter catastrophic national defeat in spring 1945.

European War at Sea

- D&G: “The crucial campaign of WWII.”
- The price of failure in the Atlantic?
  - No Second Front in Europe.
  - No air campaign against the Third Reich.
  - Few supplies for hard-pressed

First Sea Battles

- Neither Br. nor Ger. was prepared for Battle of the Atlantic.
- Adm. Karl Dönitz moved Ger. subs to west coast of Fr. & launched anti-commerce campaign.
- Significant Ger. naval victory fall 1940.
  - Oct savaging of Convoys SC-7 & HX-79.

First Sea Battles

- May 1941 Ger. attempted to break capital ships into N. Atlantic.
  - Tried to effect concentration of *Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Prinz Eugen,* & esp. pocket battleship *Bismarck.*
  - Despite loss of battle cruiser *Hood,* Royal Navy scattered Ger. vessels and sank *Bismarck*.
  - Br. now dominant at sea.

Intelligence Intervenes

- During attempted breakout by *Bismarck*, Br. captured a Ger. U-boat.
  - Aboard discovered an Enigma cipher machine intact & read Ger. naval traffic for remainder of 1941.
  - Br. able to reduce shipping losses significantly over that period.
  - Ger. upgraded Enigma machine for 1942 & Br. lost capability.

German High Point

- Dec 1941 official entry of U.S. into war affected situation in Atlantic.
- Despite heavy losses, U.S. did not adopt convoy system till May 1942.
  - Easy war was then over for U-boats.
- Still, Ger. sank 8 million tons of Allied shipping in Atlantic in 1942!

Allied Victory

- Allies winning Battle of the Atlantic by mid-1943.
  - Use of escorts, radar, and Ultra intel. to guide convoys turned the tide!
  - Allied shipping losses in Jan 1943 down to 200,000 tons.
  - After mid-year Dönitz withdrew U-boats from N. Atlantic.

Allied Victory

- From mid-1943, U.S. shipyards launched many 10,000-ton *Liberty* ships.
  - Vital to projecting U.S. military & industrial strength worldwide.
- Ger. failed to block U.S. troops & materiel from Europe.
  - Like Great War, Ger. navy unable to deliver war-winning blow to Allies.

Air War Opening Moves

- 1940 Br. began long-range bombing.
- Mid-1941 Br. analyzed results of strategic bombing.
  - Only 1/3 of bombs landing within 5 miles of target!
  - Br. now labeled ops. “area bombing” & “dehousing” but results still disappointing.

Air War Opening Moves

- May 1942 Br. appointed AM Arthur T. Harris to head Bomber Command.
  - Staged 1,000-plane raid over Cologne & swamped Ger. night defenses.
- 1942 Bomber Command losses 233%!
  - Crews were statistically dead or disabled before completing tour of duty [50-55 missions].

Air War Opening Moves

- From 1941 Ger. fashioned effective nighttime air-defense system.
  - Composed of belts of radar, searchlights, antiaircraft guns, night fighters, & intruder missions against RAF bases.
  - Ger. did not develop system fully.
  - Still posed serious threat to Bomber Command ops.

Br. Air in Full Stride

- 1943 Bomber Command raised OPTEMPO.
- Jul 27-28 Hamburg raid typified.
  - 30,000-40,000 perished in 1,000°F firestorm with ca. 400 mph winds.
  - Ger. believed a few more such raids would spell defeat but Bomber Command unable to do so.

Br. Air in Full Stride

- Br. turned next to Berlin, but Ger. defense was too formidable.
- During winter of 1943-1944 Bomber Cmnd. losses reached staggering 80%!
  - AM Harris called off night area bombing.
- Ger. morale unbroken by

U.S. Air in Full Stride

- First U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) bombers arrived Eng. summer 1942.
- Ger. ball-bearing industry chosen as primary industrial target.
- Winter 1942-1943, U.S. & Br. decided on “combined bomber offensive.”
  - To be a relentless round-the-clock assault on Ger. industry &

U.S. Air in Full Stride

- 1943 U.S. Eighth AF raids focused on ball-bearing plants in Schweinfurt area.
  - Raids heaviest Aug-Oct, but losses unsustainable at 30% of crews per month!
  - Eighth AF called off deep raids by unescorted B-17s.
- Ger. admitted that more such raids would have halted economy.

U.S. Air in Full Stride

- Despite lack of war-winning results, Br. & U.S. air raids attrited *Luftwaffe.*
- Ger. responded with V-1 & V-2 rocket programs.
  - Diverted resources sufficient to produce 24,000 aircraft.
- Largest diversion of Ger. strength was 10,000 88mm Flak guns.
  - Mostly morale boost to urbanites.

Luftwaffe

- Yearly attrition of *Luftwaffe* was steady & considerable.
- 1942: ops. in Med. & USSR quickly consumed pilots & machines; Allied bombing from Eng. gathering force.
- 1943: summer air battles that year consumed 64% of Ger. force structure.

Luftwaffe


- By late summer 1943, Allies had won air superiority (not supremacy!) in Eur. skies.
  - Precondition for opening Second Front.
- *Luftwaffe* withdrawing to defend homeland's cities & industries.
- *Luftwaffe* to face three-front war of attrition in 1944.

Results

- Defeat of Fr. meant that U.S. & Br. could not engage Ger. on Continent until 1943 or 1944.
- Allies had to produce & project military power to win the war.
  - First required winning control of sea & air.
  - Simultaneous harnessing of men, women, machines, & raw materials.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Atlantic and the Pacific: Producing and Projecting Military Power

The Eastern and Mediterranean Fronts: Winning Battles of Men and Machines

Context

- Nazi expansion spent by early 1942.
- Grand Alliance 1943 ops. drove Ger. & It. back toward respective homelands.
- U.S. entered Eur. War on large scale.
- USSR demonstrated ever greater

To Stalingrad

- Ger. 1942 OPLAN designated southern USSR as offensive focus.
- Twofold AGS objective was Caucasus oil fields and city of Stalingrad.
- Ger. had to strip other formations of equipment & troops to prepare AGS.
- Op. capability had declined since

To Stalingrad

- Soviets launched spoiling attack toward Kharkov, AGC's log. base.
  - Attack became disaster when Ger. captured 240,000 Soviets & destroyed Soviet armored reserve.
- Ger. also captured Sevastopol on Crimean peninsula.

To Stalingrad

- Ger. launched offensive Jun 28.
- Ger. divided AGS into Army Groups A & B, and Jul 13 Hitler took command of offensive from E. Prussia HQ.
- In Aug Hitler shifted focus to Stalingrad.
  - Hand-to-hand close combat played to Soviet stoicism & determination.
  - MOUT deprived Ger. of tactical flexibility & mobility.

To Stalingrad

- AGS offensive:
  - Consumed massive logistical support.
  - Reduced *Wehrmacht* Eastern Front reserves.
- Stalingrad fighting settled into pointless battle of prestige.
- Ger. intel picked up Soviet Sep 1942 preparatory activity north of Stalingrad!

Disaster at Stalingrad

- Soviet counter-offensive of five tank armies attacked Sep 19-23, 1942:
  - Smashed through Romanians north of city & demonstrated considerable combined arms skill.
  - Spearheads north & south of city met 40 miles to the west & isolated Ger. Sixth Army in Stalingrad.

Disaster at Stalingrad

- Hitler ordered Ger. cmndr., Gen. Friederich von Paulus, to stand ground & not break out.
  - Hitler ignored air & ground commanders' recommendation to the contrary.
- Hitler created Army Group Don to break into Stalingrad pocket.

Disaster at Stalingrad

- Göring promised that *Luftwaffe* could supply Stalingrad by air but failed.
- Mid-Dec 1942 Army Group Don began attempt to break in but failed.
- Soviets meantime drove deeper toward Rostov & into Donets Basin.
- Stalingrad surrendered Feb 1943.

Germans Recover

- Ger. now falling back on supplies while Soviets outrunning theirs.
- AGS reformed mid-Feb 1943 from existing units & withdrew from Kharkov.
- AGS erupted in counteroffensive Feb 19 and caused overextended Soviet forces to collapse.

Battle of Kursk, Jul 1943

- Ger. OPLAN was limited in scale, scope, & intent and called for Op. Citadel to reduce Kursk salient.
- Soviet preparations extensive:
  - 100-mile deep fortification zone & 500,000 mines.
- Largest tank battle ever till 1973 & involved 7,000 combined tanks.

Battle of Kursk, Jul 1943

- Citadel began Jul 5.
  - Became “rolling battle of attrition.”
  - Ger. initially bogged down in Soviet fortification zone.
- Culminated in Jul 12 tank battle near Prokhorovka.
  - 1,800 total AFVs.
  - Largest tank engagement of WWII.

Battle of Kursk, Jul 1943

- Events elsewhere soon intervened:
  - Anglo-Americans invaded Sicily Jul 10.
  - Mussolini's regime about to collapse.
- Kursk consumed last of *Wehrmacht's* armored reserves.

Soviets Counterattack

- After Citadel, Soviets launched counterattacks across breadth of Eastern Front.
  - Used massive arty prep, ala Great War.
- Ger. in Ukraine unraveled & race on for Dniepr River.
- Soviets cut off Ger. in Crimea & Nazi grip on USSR started to collapse.

Soviets Counterattack

- Soviets using combined arms skills & partisan ops. to overwhelm Ger. front and rear.
- Hitler & Nazis tried to complete “racial cleansing” of E. Eur.
- Ger. not fighting “subhumans” but rather a gifted, resourceful, & skillful people.

El Alamein

- Br. Jun 1942 defeat at Gazala imperiled whole Middle East position.
- Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery assumed command of Br. Eighth Army Aug 13.
  - Concentrated on deficiencies in leadership, training, & equipment.
  - Cautiously, prudently prepared Eighth Army for taking offensive.

El Alamein

- Rommel & *Afrika Korps* attacked at Alam Halfa Aug-Sep 1942 but failed to break through.
- Montgomery's simple plan was to rely on firepower & numerical superiority.
  - After slow start, Br. attrited Ger. strength through "dog fight" & forced Rommel to withdraw to Tunisia.
  - Br. pursuit was slow but Montgomery was first to defeat Rommel!

Operation "Torch"

- Strategic debate on Allied Second Front in Eur. was ongoing.
  - Began as early as Dec 1941 Acadia Conf.
  - Soviets wanted 1942 cross-Channel invasion but shipping resources too low.
  - Emergency plan in place for cross-Channel invasion in case of Soviet collapse.

Operation "Torch"

- U.S. military leaders preferred Army Gen. Marshall's plan.
  - Open Second Front in Eur. in 1943.
- FDR preferred major "Eur." effort in 1942.
  - U.S. military to invade Algeria & Morocco and co-opt Vichy Fr.

Operation "Torch"

- Obscure U.S. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to command Torch.
  - Landings conducted Nov 8, 1942 & Vichy Fr. quickly concluded armistice.
- Hitler responded by occupying Vichy France & sending Ger. paratroopers to N. Africa to seize Tunisia.

Operation "Torch"

- Ger. presence in Med. for next six months worsened worldwide shipping shortages.
- Rommel attacked U.S. Army II Corps at Kasserine Pass Feb 1943.
  - Ger. scored early success but their disunity of command helped halt drive.
- Rommel now pressed from west by U.S. & from east by Br. forces

Operation "Torch"

- 250,000 Ger. & It. finally surrendered in Tunisia May 1943.
  - Lack of supplies critical.
  - Worst Ger. military disaster to date after Stalingrad.
- U.S. Army ground & air forces used experience to learn from & improve upon battlefield performance.

Sicily & Italy

- Jan 1943 Casablanca Conf.
  - Br. PM Winston Churchill convinced FDR to maintain Allied momentum in Med. & direct efforts toward It.
- May 1943 Trident Conf.
  - U.S. won decision to limit Med. ops. to forces already in theater.
  - Anglo-Amer. agreed to begin planning for May 1944 cross-Channel invasion.

Sicily & Italy

- Nov 1943 Teheran Conf.
  - Big Three--FDR, Churchill, & Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin--present.
  - Agreed to spring 1944 date for cross-Channel invasion.
  - In conjunction with Anglo-Amer. invasion of S. Fr. & major Soviet offensive.
- Final blueprint for Allied Eur. strategy.

Sicily & Italy

- Operation “Husky” began Jul 10, 1943.
  - Br. Eighth Army under Montgomery & U.S. Seventh Army under Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
  - Largest amphib. assault of WWII--more forces even than Overlord.
- Patton reached eastern tip of Sicily before Montgomery but not before Ger. had evacuated to It. mainland.

Sicily & Italy

- Husky forced Hitler to shut down Op. Citadel in USSR & shortly led to Mussolini's fall from power.
  - It. King Victor Emmanuel III dismissed Mussolini from office.
- Husky also consumed remainder of *Wehrmacht's* strategic reserves in Med.

Sicily & Italy

- Br. Eighth Army landed on toe of It. mainland Sep 3, 1943.
- Anglo-Amer. force under U.S. Gen. Mark Clark landed at Salerno in Op. “Avalanche” Sep 9.
  - It. accepted armistice.
- Ensuing 18-month campaign up “Italian boot” became near Great War-like stalemate!

Wehrmacht Disasters

- Fall and Winter 1943-1944.
- Soviets regained territory across entire Eastern Front.
- Soviets now more mechanized and mobile that Ger.
  - Pivotal was combination of Soviet tanks and Lend-Lease U.S. trucks.
- Soviets forced Ger. back from Leningrad & Crimea by spring 1944.

Operation Bagration

- Op. to be in conjunction with opening of Second Front.
- Op. to concentrate on AGC in area north of Pripet Marshes.
- 1.2M Soviets facing 700,000 unprepared Ger. due to faulty intel.
- AGC commanded by one of Hitler's toadies.

Operation Bagration

- Op. began Jun 22, 1944, third anniversary of Barbarossa.
  - Soviets focused on Ger. forces in Vitebsk & Bobruisk.
- Red Army penetrated 200 miles and began to outrun logistical support.
- Soviet forces now attacked flanks of AGC & approached Warsaw.

Operation Bagration

- Warsaw Poles rose in revolt to liberate capital.
  - Red Army halted in place till Ger. had systematically quelled revolt & destroyed city.
- Disenchanted Ger. officer corps attempted assassination of Hitler & failed.
- Ger. eastern defenses a patchwork.

Balkan Collapse


- Quiet Balkans erupted in late summer 1944.
- Romania & Bulgaria withdrew from Axis in Aug.
- Ger. pulling out of E. Eur. by fall.
- Red Army now drove relentlessly into region and toward Budapest.

Results

- Ger. suffered numerous disasters 1942-1944 on E. Front & in Med.
  - Soviet Op. Bagration virtually destroyed AGC's 28 divisions.
  - It. had been knocked out of war but much hard fighting remained there.
- WWII increasing still in scale & mech. and Allies more proficient in planning & executing complex campaigns.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Eastern and Mediterranean Fronts: Winning Battles of Men and Machines

Victory in Europe: Brute Force in the Air and on the Ground

Context

- Battles on periphery of Fortress Eur. wore down Ger. military.
- Grand Alliance east & west ready to overrun Third Reich to its very core.
- Anglo-Amer. campaigns in particular demonstrated high skill in joint & combined ops.

AAF Defeats Luftwaffe

- RAF Bomber Command about defeated by spring 1944.
  - Night bombing campaign near end.
- U.S. Eighth & Fifteenth AFs entered fray.
  - Result was battle of attrition in skies over Eur. till May 1944.

AAF Defeats Luftwaffe

- Losses heavy on both sides but Ger. succumbed first.
  - Ger. fighter force collapsed in May.
  - Ger. air defenses also destroyed in low-level attacks by U.S. Eighth AF.
- *Luftwaffe* fighter-pilot losses excessive.
  - From Jan-May 1944 Ger. pilot strength attrited 99%.

Supporting the Invasion

- After Apr 1944, Allies began air interdiction op. to isolate Normandy.
  - Esp. U.S. airmen objected & wanted to continue attacking Ger. aircraft industry.
  - Allied leadership promised return to airmen's preferred targets.
- Allied strategic & tactical air forces virtually stopped train traffic in W. Eur. by mid-Jun 1944.

Petroleum Industry Offensive

- Ger. worried about petroleum since 1939.
- Eisenhower released AAF to attack oil targets May 1944.
- Months of attacks all but shut down AVGAS production.
  - Romanian Ploesti complex very hard hit.

Petroleum Industry Offensive

- Strategic effect on Ger. was enormous.
  - *Luftwaffe* soon could not train new pilots.
  - *Wehrmacht* soon could not train forces or maintain OPTEMPO.
- *Luftwaffe* largely absent from Eur. skies 1944-1945.
  - Ger. soldiers pounded from air day & night and often deprived of supplies.

Italy, 1944

- Allied command reshuffled in It. late 1943.
  - Ike designated SCAEF & sent to Br.
- Jan 1944 Op. “Shingle” at Anzio.
  - Amphib. turning movement of stalemated It. front.
  - U.S. Army’s VI Corps to conduct landing.

Italy, 1944

- Shingle cmndr. had misgivings about prospect for success.
- Landing nearly duplicated Br. 1915 failure at Gallipoli.
- May 1944 balance of forces in favor of U.S./coalition.
  - Allied superiority in air power and ground forces sufficient to break deadlock.

Italy, 1944

- U.S. VI Corps captured Rome Jun 5.
  - Overshadowed next day by Overlord.
- Allies pushed Ger. northward to Gothic Line north of Florence.
- It. front served to expose Allies to combat and attrit Ger.
  - Ger. skill & tenacity and terrain & weather made It. a dismal theater.

Northern France

- Lessons of failed 1942 Dieppe raid.
  - Invasion of Fr. coast would require powerful landing force.
  - Fr. port could not be captured early on.
- Consequently, Overlord was thoroughly planned.
  - Required massive mobilization of manpower in U.S. and Br.
  - Demanded general air superiority.

Northern France

- Overlord planning underway summer 1943 and initial design approved Nov.
  - Logistic planning rested on expectation of slow advance once ashore.
  - Allies to land on five separate beaches.
  - Goal was to get maximum troops & equipment ashore before Ger.

Northern France

- Allied command in place Jan 1944.
  - Ike at SHAEF in overall command.
  - Monty as 21st Army Group cmndr. responsible for landing.
- Ger. suffered disunity of effort.
  - Hitler, FM Runstedt, & FM Rommel often worked at cross purposes.

Northern France

- Rommel org. skillful beach defense.
  - Beach obstacles below high-tide line.
  - Forced Allies to land at low tide between Jun 4-8 when dawn & low tide coincided.
- Weather did not cooperate.
  - May weather was excellent!

Normandy

- Allied paratroopers landed night Jun 5-6 & amphib. landings next day.
- Ger. defense stiffest on U.S. Omaha Beach.
- D+1 Allies had 177,000 troops ashore.
  - Four of five beaches secure & buildup underway.

Normandy

- Hitler's napping delayed release of Ger. armor.
- Br. & Canadians fought eastward into open terrain favorable for maneuver.
- Amer. fought westward across Cotentin Peninsula & into hedgerow country.
  - Cherbourg finally fell Jun 27.

Normandy

- By Jul 1 Allies held only small portion of territory planned.
- Allies drew Ger. armor into piecemeal battle of attrition during Jul.
- Ger. fought well relying on active defense, limited counterattacks, & local reserves of tanks.

Normandy

- Allies poured into Normandy.
- Damage to trans. system & road network hampered Ger. movement.
- Hitler replaced Runstedt with another toady, FM Hans Günther von Kluge.
  - Kluge had served on Eastern Front & little understood Allied air

The Breakout

- U.S. First Army launched Op. “Cobra” Jul 25 to break through at St. Lo.
  - Advance of 35 miles doubled Allied territory.
  - U.S. forces poured through Avranches bottleneck Aug 1.
- Allied forces broken into 12th AG under Gen. Omar N. Bradley & 21st AG under Monty.

The Breakout

- Ger. ordered Brittany ports defended to last man.
  - Siege of Brest wasted resources & port not operational by end of war.
- Bradley Aug 3 decided to turn U.S. forces from west to east.
- Hitler recognized threat & Ger. counterattacked at Mortain.

The Breakout

- Allies & Ger. now in *Kesselschlacht*.
  - Ger. in danger of encirclement.
- Allies unable to close Falaise-Argentan gap & Ger. escaped to fight again.
  - Still, Ger. lost 60,000 troops & much equipment in Falaise pocket.
  - Golden opportunity for Allies slipped

Toward the Rhine

- Ger. collapsed completely in Fr.
- Allied cmndrs. now overconfident.
- Eisenhower to Fr. & Sep 1 assumed command of ground campaign.
  - 21st & 12th AGs reported to Ike.
  - "Single Thrust" vs. "Broad Front" debate revealed Anglo-Amer.

Toward the Rhine

- Monty received bulk of log. support & drove deep into Belgium.
  - Terrain opposite Br. more favorable for maneuver.
  - Br. paused to reform before moving on.
  - Ger. 15th Army used pause to escape into Holland.

Toward the Rhine

- Monty talked Ike into single airborne-armored thrust into Holland toward Rhine R. and Ger.
  - In Op. “Market Garden” difficult task of capturing Arnhem Bridge to Br. 1st AB.
- Pause to prepare allowed Ger. to rest and refit in AO.
  - Br. ignored Ultra warnings of Ger. astride avenue of advance.

Toward the Rhine

- "Market Garden" began Sep 17.
  - Plans soon fell into Ger. hands.
  - Op. did not reach Rhine R. or Ger.
  - Ike ordered Bradley Sep 22 to support Monty with drive toward Cologne.
  - Fighting in direction of Ger. West Wall halted Allied offensive.

Toward the Rhine

- Anglo-Amer. forces had outrun supply system.
  - Antwerp port not operational till Nov 28.
- Weather also slowed Allied advance.
- Allied advance halted mid-Dec 1944 amid heavy fighting in Hürtgen Forest.

Air Contribution

- Allied strategic bombing returned to airmen Sep 1944.
- Allied air forces launched three-pronged offensive.
  - Br. & U.S. air power focused on transportation system, cities, and oil refineries.

Air Contribution

- Destruction of Ger. rail & road system was most effective use of air power in WWII.
  - Ger. feeling effects as early as Oct.
  - Attacks strangled Ger. war economy by cutting into production of weapons and munitions and ceasing flow of oil.
- General collapse of Ger. economy evident mid-winter

Battle of the Bulge

- Hitler thinking of counterattack in west by Sep 1944.
- Allies still confident of driving on into Ger.
- In bad weather, Ger. struck along 50-mile front in Ardennes Forest Dec 16.
  - Intent was to capture Antwerp & disrupt Allied logistics & pace of Allied advance.

Battle of the Bulge

- U.S. resistance proved effective.
  - On northern shoulder, U.S. forces held Elsenborn Ridge.
  - U.S. troops held key road junctions, such as St. Vith and Bastogne.
  - U.S. resistance altogether blunted Ger. offensive.

Battle of the Bulge

- On southern shoulder, Patton shifted axis of Third Army advance 90°N & counterattacked Ger.
- Lead Ger. elements nearly reached Meuse R. near Dinant but no farther!
  - Penetration reached depth of 65 miles.

Battle of the Bulge

- Weather cleared & Allied air power raked exposed Ger. units.
- Bulge was Hitler's last gamble:
  - Wasted *Wehrmacht*'s mobile reserves & Ger. casualties high at 100,000.
  - Allied logistics improving and Allied forces already on Ger. western frontier.

Collapse in the East

- Ardennes led Allies to request Soviet winter offensive.
- With First Ukranian Front's five armies, two tank armies, & >1,000 tanks, Red Army attacked along the Vistula R. Jan 12, 1945.
- By Jan 17 Soviets beyond Warsaw & nearing Cracow.

Collapse in the East

- By early Feb, Soviets 200 miles beyond Warsaw.
  - Red Army logistics developing problems.
- Soviet drive into Ger. cost upwards of 3M civilian lives!
  - Was Soviet repayment in kind for "crimes against humanity" of Ger. occupation?

Collapse in the West

- Ger. defenses collapsed Jan-Feb 1945.
- U.S. Third Army reached Rhine R. early Mar.
  - Patton then cleared left bank of river.
- U.S. First Army crossed Rhine suddenly at Remagen Bridge.
- Monty over Rhine in assault crossing.

Collapse in the West


- Politics shaped Allied advance.
  - Yalta placed Berlin in Soviet sphere, so U.S., Br., & Fr. forces stopped at Elbe R.
- Soviets launched offensive Apr 16.
  - Cleared Oder R. & captured Berlin by Apr 20.
  - Hitler, mistress, & entourage committed suicide and Eur. nightmare finally over!

Results

- Ger. fought three industrial powers & lost!
- Last year of war Allies' battlefield performance equaled Ger.'s best.
- Allies showed great capacity for combined arms warfare, including tactical air power.
- Allies also showed great skill in joint & combined ops.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Victory in Europe: Brute Force in the Air and on the Ground

Victory in the Pacific:

Naval and Amphibious War on the Operational Level

Context

- More focus on Pacific than "Germany first" strategy & resources implied.
  - One explanation was revenge motive.
  - Another explanation was Japan's relative "geographic accessibility."
- Despite its uniqueness, Pacific Theater featured unprecedented combined & joint ops.

South Pacific

- Aug 1942-Sep 1943:
- Allies moved against Guadalcanal Aug 1942 and New Guinea Oct-Nov 1942.
  - Driving consideration was protection of sea LOCs to Australia.
- No decisive battles and U.S. forces emerged stronger than before.

Guadalcanal

- Jap. believed they could recover all Guadalcanal without great effort.
- Jap. built up force on island to 6,000 but Sep 1942 counterattacks failed.
- Sep-Nov naval battles also indecisive.
  - Oct 11-12 Cape Esperance action featured U.S. radar & Jap. confusion

Guadalcanal

- Adm. Nimitz fired hesitant area commander & replaced with aggressive Adm. “Bull” Halsey.
- Jap. bombarding Henderson Field nightly with capital ships.
- Nov 1942 naval engagements cut off Jap. troops on Guadalcanal from resupply or reinforcement.

Guadalcanal

- Situation favored U.S. by Jan 1943.
- Jap. conceded defeat & skillfully withdrew 11,000 troops Feb 1943.
- Solomons Campaign to date costly for Jap.
  - Pilot & aircrew losses enormous.
  - Combined with Midway losses, rendered Jap. unable to fight naval air battle.

Papua

- Coral Sea & Port Moresby tentatively tilted initiative toward U.S./coalition.
- Jap. back on offensive in Papua Jul 1942.
  - MacArthur reacted by attacking with two divs., one U.S. & one Australian.
  - Gen. Eichelberger replaced U.S. Army's 32nd Div. cmndr.

Op. "Cartwheel"

- At Jan 1943 Casablanca Conf., CCS decided to retain Pacific initiative.
- Pacific cmndrs. met in DC soon after.
  - Accepted MacArthur's proposal for two-pronged drive on Rabaul, code-named "Cartwheel."
  - Halsey up the Solomons, while MacArthur along New Guinea to New Britain.

Op. "Cartwheel"

- MacArthur in overall command of Cartwheel.
- Op. provided model for Pacific War.
  - Air superiority to shield move forward.
  - Hit Jap. at weak points.
  - Seize existing airfields & ports.
  - From acquired bases, leap forward again.

Air Power

- Critical to Cartwheel & all Pacific ops.
- MacArthur's airman was Gen. George C. Kenney.
  - No ideologue & believed in fitting air arm to theater conditions & objectives.
  - Contribution was using med. bombers to attack Jap. log. shipping in SW Pacific.
- Jap. reacted to Pacific situation

Air Power

- Kenney used “Magic” intel. during spring 1943 Battle of Bismarck Sea.
  - Victory for land-based air power over naval forces.
- Jap. concentrated land-based air at Rabaul & Wewak but to no avail.
- Further Jap. air losses fall 1943 crippled capability but U.S. air resources plentiful.

Amphib. Campaign

- Cartwheel underway summer 1943.
- Halsey's first amphib. op. at Munda airfield threatening Guadalcanal.
- MacArthur's first amphib. op. along northern coast of New Guinea.
  - "Vertical" amphib. envelopment

Amphib. Campaign

- Halsey attacked Bougainville Nov 1943 & MacArthur New Britain in mid-Dec.
  - Rabaul effectively neutralized.
- Island-hopping campaign underway.
  - Avoid Jap. strongpoints; strike deep into Jap. island empire.
  - Cut off & isolated, Jap. strongpoints no threat & left to wither in place.

Submarine Campaign

- U.S. Pacific sub. campaign one of most effective of WWII.
  - Brought Jap. to brink of defeat.
- Jap. modernized merchant fleet but protected with only 8-destroyer “fleet” in Formosa!
- Faulty U.S. torpedoes curtailed ops. till Sep 1943 correction of problem.

Submarine Campaign

- Failure of early U.S. sub. campaign lulled Jap. into false security.
  - Jap. did not establish second escort fleet till Mar 1943.
- "Magic" revealed routing of Jap. merchant vessels & U.S. subs lay in wait.

Submarine Campaign

- U.S. results by end of 1944:
  - Half of Jap. merchant fleet sunk & two-thirds of Jap. tanker fleet sunk!
- By war's end, 1,113 Jap. merchant vessels sunk, for total of 5.3M tons!!
- Cost to U.S. submariners high at 22%.
  - Success repaid manpower & resource investment.

Central Pacific

- Nov 1943-Feb 1944:
- At May 1943 Trident Conf., CCS decided to maintain pressure on Jap.
- Allied Pacific ops. in three phases:
  - Cut Jap. off from SE Asia raw materials.
  - Launch strategic bombing against

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Central Pacific

- Starting Jan 1943 Adm. Ernest J. King pressed for Central Pacific drive toward Philippines by naval forces.
- MacArthur pressed for Army-dominated drive from South Pacific through New Guinea & toward Philippines.
- Both got their way

Sea Power

- New fleet carriers allowed USN to advance across Central Pacific.
- USN used underway replenishment to keep numbered fleets at sea in SW & Central Pacific.
  - Single ships returned for refit or repair.
  - HQs rotated in & out of theater.
- Jap. could not match such

Tarawa

- Gilberts were first target of Central Pacific drive.
- USMC Nov 21, 1943 assault on Tarawa atoll produced largest casualties in Marine history.
  - Killed and wounded totaled 3,000.
- Superior U.S. firepower destroyed Jap.
  - Only 17 of 5,000 Jap. troops survived!

Tarawa

- Tarawa was costly learning experience to refine amphib. doctrine.
- Fanatical Jap. resistance boded ill for remainder of war.
- Army troops took nearby Makin.
- With Gilberts in hand, next target was Marshalls.

Kwajalein & Eniwetok

- USN leadership debated which of Marshalls to assault.
- Jan 1944 carrier Task Force 58 & amphibians attacked Kwajalein atoll.
- U.S. had thoroughly studied Tarawa & overcame earlier difficulties.
  - Insights included recon. of beach & surf and naval fire support.

Kwajalein & Eniwetok

- 4th MARDIV and Army's 7th Div. captured Kwajalein after three-day bombardment.
  - Victory at fraction of Tarawa's losses.
- Followed by Feb 1944 capture of nearby Eniwetok atoll and destruction of Truk anchorage 750 miles west.
- Next were Marianas, from which aerial bombardment of Jap. could begin.

MacArthur's Advance

- <u>Dual Pacific Drive, 1944-1945</u>:
- JCS allowed dual drive to continue into 1944.
  - No priority given to Army or Navy.
- Br. worried lest U.S. dual drives would become competitive and waste

MacArthur's Advance

- MacArthur picking up speed as Central Pacific advance did so.
- Feb-Mar 1944 MacArthur secured Admiralties.
  - Completed isolation of Rabaul.
- MacArthur captured Hollandia halfway up New Guinea coast by mid-May.
  - Month of fighting forced Jap. back.

MacArthur's Advance

- Late May, MacArthur seized Wakde Is., farther up New Guinea coast.
- Jap. recognized threat of U.S. land-based bombers to southern flank.
- Adm. Raymond A. Spruance attacked Marianas before Jap. could react to MacArthur.
  - MacArthur was extended & vulnerable.

Saipan

- Next objective in Central Pacific was Saipan, largest of Marianas.
  - Saipan was 1,000 miles from Eniwetok & only 1,200 miles from Jap.
  - U.S. B-29 Superfortresses could bomb Home Islands from Saipan.
- Jap. defenses incomplete due to pace of U.S. advance.

Saipan

- Invasion began Jun 15, 1944 with two Marine divs. followed by one Army.
- Army's 27th ID did not perform well and overall cmndr., a Marine, relieved the 27th's cmndr.
  - Caused temporary storm between Army & USMC.
- Still, Marine & Army divs. steadily improving performance in Pacific.

Saipan

- Early Jul Jap. driven to north end of island.
  - Launched war's largest banzai attack but still defeated.
- One Marine div. attacked nearby Tinian Jul 24.
  - Soon captured island's airfields.
- By fall, B-29s ready to bomb Japan!

Philippine Sea

- U.S. move against Marianas caused Jap. to move into Central Pacific for decisive battle.
  - First Mobile Fleet consisted of >60 ships & 400 aircraft (included nine carriers).
- Spruance held his fleet west of Marianas & shielded U.S. ops. there.

Philippine Sea

- Battle of Philippine Sea also called “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”
  - U.S. pilot losses 29; Jap. 300 (of 400)!
- Jap. fleet survived but carriers combat ineffective without trained pilots.
- U.S. carrier aviation ops

Philippines Invasion

- Summer 1944 King & MacArthur argued over next major target.
  - King favored “island hopping” to Mindanao & then long leap to Formosa & Chinese coast.
  - MacArthur favored capturing all of Philippines & liberating Filipino people.

Philippines Invasion

- Sep 1944 Central Pacific forces attacked Peleliu to secure southern flank of Philippine invasion force.
- Took till Nov to secure island at cost of 6,000 total killed and wounded.
- Peleliu proved of little use & was Nimitz's worst wartime

Leyte

- U.S. planning focused on:
  - Landing in central Philippines on Leyte.
  - Followed by landing on main island of Luzon.
- Oct 1944 carrier aviation engagement north of Philippines completed devastation of Jap. naval aircrews.

Leyte

- Jap. naval OPLAN called for sorties north & south of Leyte.
- U.S. forces landed on Leyte Oct 20, 1944 & fought their way inland.
- Battle of Leyte Gulf began Oct 24 with Jap. sortie north into San Bernardino Strait.

Leyte

- U.S. naval forces under Adm. Halsey defeated only lead elements of northern force.
- Halsey then took all carriers & fast battleships to chase Jap. naval force farther north of Leyte.
  - Halsey believed invasion force off Leyte was safe.

Leyte

- Jap. naval force through Suriago Strait south of Leyte night of Oct 24-25.
- U.S. battleships crossed Jap. “T” & sank all, save one destroyer.
- Main Jap. naval force now through San Bernardino Strait after Halsey had left.
  - Harried & forced to retreat by light U.S. vessels guarding invasion force.

Leyte

- Leyte damaged Halsey's reputation.
- Jap. first used *kamikaze* (divine wind) attacks at Leyte Gulf.
- U.S. Sixth Army took port of Ormoc early Dec 1944 & Jap. resistance ended.
- Leyte campaign cost Jap. five divs. & severe naval and air losses.

Luzon

- Early Jan 1945, U.S. invasion fleet sailed for Luzon.
  - To be largest campaign in Pacific with 10 divs. & 5 RCTs.
  - MacArthur to redeem pledge to return.
- Jap. cmndr. favored defense in mountainous northern Luzon.

Luzon

- Kamikazes savagely attacked U.S. invasion fleet from beginning.
  - Ca. 25 U.S. ships sunk or damaged!
- U.S. invasion force landed at Lingayen Gulf Jan 9, 1945.
- Landings Jan 29 and 31 farther south to keep Jap. off balance.

Luzon

- Jap. marines conducted month-long battle for Manila, Philippine capital.
  - Virtually destroyed city in process & killed 100,000 Filipino civilians.
- MacArthur liberated Bataan & Corregidor!
- Jap. held out in mountains till war's end but fighting quickly

Final Campaigns

- Iwo Jima:
- B-29s bombing Japan by fall 1944 from Marianas bases.
  - Suffering heavy losses but achieving few results.
- Jap. radar sites on Iwo Jima provided early warning.
  - Iwo halfway from Marianas to Jap.

Final Campaigns

- Expecting U.S. attack, Jap. augmented Iwo defenses from Jun 1944.
- U.S. V Amphibious Corps stormed ashore Feb 19, 1945.
  - Followed four-day bombardment.
  - Incorporated three Marine divs., largest such force to date in USMC history.

Final Campaigns

- Fighting on Iwo was among most bitter of the war anywhere & Jap. resistance lasted till Mar 1945.
- Butcher's bill was horrendous:
  - >26,000 total U.S. casualties.
  - Few of Jap. garrison of 21,000 survived.
- Suggested worse to come as U.S. forces approached Jap. Home Islands.

Final Campaigns

- Okinawa:
- Island was in the Ryukyus, just south of the Home Islands.
- U.S. armada began landing ca. 50,000 soldiers & marines Apr 1, 1945.
  - Jap. offered little initial resistance.
- Invasion fleet struck hard by *kamikazes* beginning Apr 6.
  - Sank or damaged ca. 400 ships!

Final Campaigns

- Marines cleared northern half of island in two weeks.
- Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., to conduct frontal assault against Jap. prepared lines of defense.
  - Shuri Line was strongest defensive position of entire Pacific War.

Final Campaigns

- Fighting ended Jun 1945 & casualties were staggering!
  - ca. 70,000 Jap. military casualties.
  - ca. 80,000 Jap. civilians died in fighting.
  - 65,631 total U.S. ground & naval casualties.
- Frightening forecast of coming invasion of Home Islands.

Strategic Bombing

- B-29 raids from China Jun 1944.
  - Logistical problems made raids unsustainable.
  - Himalayan Mountains too difficult a logistical obstacle to cross.
- Initial Marianas B-29 raids followed AAF doctrine of precision bombing.

Strategic Bombing

- Feb 1945 new AAF cmndr. in Marianas, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay.
  - Adopted incendiary raids on Jap. cities.
  - Indistinguishable from RAF Bomber Command's "area bombing" fire raids over Ger.
  - Losses still high & LeMay chose low-altitude, nighttime incendiary raids.

Strategic Bombing

- AAF destroyed Jap. cities one by one.
  - Jap. prostrate by summer 1945 but would not surrender.
- Jap. approached U.S. diplomatically through USSR.
  - Stalin was coy due to Soviet designs on East Asian territory.

Strategic Bombing

- Jap. continued preparations to resist invasion of Home Islands.
  - Included 10,000-plane *kamikaze* force.
- U.S. Operation "Olympic" to land on southern Kyushu.
  - Planners predicted ca. 700,000 casualties.
  - Potential Jap. casualties almost unimaginable.

Strategic Bombing

- Atomic bomb made its appearance.
  - Under development since early 1940s in Army's top-secret Manhattan Project.
  - Tested White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico desert Jul 1945.
  - Test turned immediate desert surface to glass & revealed

Strategic Bombing

- New U.S. Pres., Harry S. Truman, decided to use the bomb.
  - Influenced by potential carnage of invasion of Home Islands.
- First bomb dropped Aug 6, 1945 over Hiroshima.
  - Consumed 90,000 people in a flash!

Strategic Bombing

- Second bomb dropped Aug 9 over Nagasaki.
  - Consumed another 35,000 in a flash!
- Jap. cabinet deadlocked & Emperor Hirohito intervened.
  - Surrender to be on U.S. terms if emperor could retain ceremonial position.
- Jap. surrendered aboard *U.S.S. Missouri* in Tokyo Bay Sep 2, 1945

World War II

- Most destructive conflict in human history finally over!
  - Damage spanned the globe.
- Onset of Cold War & atomic threat ended possibility of enduring peace.
- Destruction of three manifestations of palpable evil justified the war.

World War II

- WWII restored much mobility to land warfare, even if not decisiveness.
- Ever more complex combined & joint ops. became standard in European & Pacific theaters.
- Atomic bomb was only truly revolutionary aspect of the war.
  - Most developments were <u>evolutionary</u> changes from Great War innovations.

World War II

- Most unique non-technical aspect was unparalleled death to & destruction of civilians & their property.
  - License of war widened still further.
  - Clausewitz's "true" war nearly equated to his "real" war.
- Atomic bomb opened possibility of humankind's self annihilation!

World War II


- Destructive power of atomic bomb ironically ushered in age of limited war.
- End of war largely set postwar global boundaries between U.S. & USSR.
- War ended Western political domination of East Asia.
  - Dismantling of Eur. colonial empires accelerated.

World War II

- WWII settlement proved remarkably durable despite Cold War.
- Settlement also proved to be enormous political & strategic success for victors.
  - U.S. & USSR were war's only real "victors."

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Victory in the Pacific: Naval and Amphibious War on the Operational Level

Military History

and the

Conduct of Battle

Military History & the Conduct of Battle

What is Book Review and Analysis?

Military History & the Conduct of Battle

Book Review and Analysis Steps

The Operational Art and the Army's Leadership Performance Indicators

Historical Context for the Bulge


Actions of the American and German Armies and Leaders at the Bulge

Historical Results of the Bulge

The Bulge, the Operational Art, and the Army's Leadership Performance Indicators

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Military History and the Conduct of Battle

Military History and PC-Based Simulations

Military History & PC-Based Simulations

What is PC-Based Military History Simulation?

- Historical mindedness
  - *Case Study*
- Decision-making
  - *Chain of Command*
- Terrain-sense
  - *Time-distance and Spatial*

PC-Based Military History Simulation Steps

- Review ways and rules.
- Digital Simulation Methodology:
  - *Preliminary Study Phase.*
  - *Simulation Study Phase.*

Military History & PC-Based Simulations

Selecting and Running a Bulge Scenario

- Move
- Shoot
- Communicate


Comparing Simulated and Historical Results

Military History & PC-Based Simulations

The Operational Art and Analyzing the Simulation Scenario

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



Military History and PC-Based Simulations

The Cold War and the Nuclear Era:

Adjusting to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Context

- Cold War was 45-year clash of ideas & interests.
  - Communist powers sought to expand & U.S. and its allies sought to “contain.”
- Soviet 1949 explosion of nuclear device began four-decade arms race.
- Nuclear weapons created possibility of Armageddon.

Context

- Nuclear weapons revolutionized strategy & imposed limitations on war.
- Value of nuclear weapons lay in not using them (or conventional weapons).
- Cold War unlike any period in history of warfare.

Atomic Arms Race

- Scientists worked out theoretical foundations of atomic bomb before WWII.
- U.S. Army directed top-secret project to produce bomb during WWII.
  - Commanded highest priority for scarce resources & employed leading scientists and mathematicians.

Atomic Arms Race

- Bomb tested in New Mexico Jul 1945.
- Surrender of Ger. seemed to obviate use of the bomb but U.S. pol. & mil. leaders believed use on Jap. would:
  - Shorten the war.
  - Save U.S. lives.
  - Influence postwar Soviet

Amer. Adapt to Bomb

- Pres. Truman laid groundwork for U.S. atomic policy.
  - He regarded bomb as fundamentally different military arm.
- U.S. role in Cold War coming into focus by 1947.
  - Marshall Plan for rebuilding Eur. was early manifestation.

Amer. Adapt to Bomb

- Core of new "containment policy" in George F. Kennan's 1947 article.
  - "...long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."
- U.S. preparations included war plans.
  - "Broiler" called for "air-atomic campaign" against Soviet

Amer. Adapt to Bomb

- 1948 Berlin Blockade also involved atomic weapons.
  - 60 “nuclear capable” B-29s deployed to Br. airbases.
- U.S. atomic stockpile of 100 weapons by 1948.
- Late 1940s war plans emphasized sudden air attack & nuclear response.

Amer. Adapt to Bomb

- 1949 war plan "Offtackle" focused even more on atomic weapons.
- Air-power advocates relegated Army to post-nuclear occupation force & Navy to second line of defense.
  - Caused late 1940s "Admirals' Revolt" in response esp. to new B-36 bomber

Soviet/Therm. Bomb & NSC-68

- Dual shocks in 1949:
  - Communist victory in China.
  - USSR's explosion of first atomic device.
- In response, Truman in Jan 1950 authorized building of thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb.
  - Despite fact that Soviets not expected to be nuclear-capable for several years.

Soviet/Therm. Bomb & NSC-68

- U.S. State Dept. Policy Planning Staff produced NSC-68 memo.
  - Truman approved in Apr 1950.
  - Recommended rejuvenation of U.S. conventional defense to deter Soviets.
  - Recommended threat to & fear of use atomic weapons as form of deterrence.
  - Ambitious & expensive program.

Korea & Rearmament

- North Korean 1950 attack on South Korea shocked U.S. & provided catalyst to implement NSC-68.
- Most U.S. leaders believed Korea was diversion for attack on W. Eur.
  - Atomic weapons deployed to Eur. & Med. but none to western Pacific.
  - Truman hinted about possible

Relying on the Bomb

- Truman left 1,000 atomic weapons to Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower.
- Ike campaigned on promises to end Korean War & reduce federal budget.
- Ike adm. crafted 1953 “New Look” national security policy.
  - Greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

Relying on the Bomb

- New policy embodied in Oct 1953 NSC 162/2.
  - "...the U.S. will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions."
- Sec of State John F. Dulles Jan 1954 imparted label "massive retaliation."
  - Vague but suggested nuclear response.

Limited Nuclear War

- After NSC 162/2 concept of "limited nuclear war" emerged.
  - Linked to Robert Osgood's Limited War and notion of tactical nukes & limited nuclear war at tolerable cost.
  - U.S. Army soon developed capabilities with 280mm "atomic cannon" & smaller, more dispersed "Pentomic" Division.

Technological Advances

- Ike adm. & revolution in technology and delivery of nukes.
- Air Force:
  - All-jet B-52 Stratofortress strategic manned bomber.
  - Smaller, more powerful nuclear devices with yields measured in megatons.
  - Nuclear-capable ICBMs with ranges up to 6,250 miles.

Technological Advances

- Army:
  - Nuclear-capable IRBMs with ranges up to 1,500 miles sparked debate with USAF over areas of responsibility.
- Navy:
  - Invested in nuke sub. propulsion with *U.S.S. George Washington* & launched first SLBM in 1960.

Technological Advances

- U.S. in 1956 first used high-altitude U-2 recon. aircraft. for intel. gathering.
- U.S. announced “bomber gap” mid-1950s.
  - Actually favored U.S., not USSR.
- Soviet 1957 launch of *Sputnik*, world’s first satellite, signaled apparent “missile gap.”

Technological Advances

- Soviets styled 1953-1960 revamping of forces as revolution in military affairs.
  - Strategic Rocket Forces emerged as primary armed force.
  - Soviets shifting focus from conventional land warfare to global nuclear warfare.
- No one anywhere likely to escape direct or indirect effects of nuclear

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Defense Intellectuals

- 1950s saw rise of civilian intellectuals writing about nuclear warfare & policy.
  - Best represented by Bernard Brodie's The Absolute Weapon.
- Colleagues included Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, etc.
- Main point was that value of nuclear weapons lay in threat of use!

Defense Intellectuals

- Brodie:
  - "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."
  - Intellectual end of the American way of war as the use of (or the preference for?) the strategy of annihilation/incapacitation?

Nuclear Saber Rattling

- Ike chose not to invoke nuclear weapons during the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis.
- Ike invoked them during the Quemoy & Matsu crisis the same year.
  - Ike hinted that tactical nukes were a usable weapon just like a bullet!
  - These & similar hints likely dissuaded Chinese from invading the islands.

Nuclear Saber Rattling

- Soviet premier, Nikita Krushchev, also hinted during 1956 Suez crisis that nukes could land on London & Paris.
- Still uncertain whether nuclear threat defused each crisis.
- Clear though that superpowers, mainly U.S. & USSR, could rattle nuke saber.

Strategic Parity

- Likely success of Massive Retaliation diminished with growing Soviet capability.
- Pres. John F. Kennedy dumped Ike's policy & adopted "Flexible Response."
  - Involved multiple options tailored to Soviet challenge.
  - Led Army to disband Pentomic divisions & return to conventional warfare.

Strategic Parity

- Nukes still imp. as evidenced by SECDEF Robert S. McNamara's "Counterforce" strategy.
  - Expensive focus on "powerful & well-protected" U.S. nuclear forces.
  - Embodied in triad of Polaris SLBMs, ICBMs, and manned bombers.
  - Soviet first strike would have to

Cuban Missile Crisis

- Oct 1962 U-2 flight over Cuba revealed Soviet MRBMs & LRBMs capable of reaching much of cont. U.S.
- Kennedy responded with U.S. naval quarantine & blockade of Cuba.
- In event of U.S. invasion, Soviet commanders in Cuba had permission to fire missiles!!

Cuban Missile Crisis

- Kennedy & Krushchev negotiated settlement.
  - Both sides backed away from nuclear brink.
  - Closest brush with nuclear Armageddon.
- Apparent U.S. nuclear advantage led Soviets to modernize nuclear arsenal.

Mutual Assured Destruction

- By 1970, Soviets led in number of operational ICBMs & had acquired assured second-strike capability.
- U.S. in 1967 modified counterforce strategy to "mutual assured destruction" (MAD).
  - Unfortunate acronym suggested madness of nuclear

Nuclear Proliferation

- By 1975, “nuclear club” included U.S., USSR, Br., Fr., China, & India.
  - Chinese & Soviets in open nuclear cooperation beginning 1957.
- Nuclear proliferation a growing concern to all, but “nuclear genie” irretrievably out of the bottle.

Nuclear Arms Control

- Little or no arms control till 1960s.
- Cuban crisis gave rise to 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.
- Approaching nuclear parity gave rise to 1967 Nonproliferation Treaty.
- Verification of number of opponents' warheads remained

Nuclear Arms Control

- Whole issue of arms control complicated by U.S. MRVs & MIRVs.
  - MRVs on Polaris subs & MIRVs on Minuteman III missiles.
- Soviets responded 1968-1974 with SS-9 MRV and later MIRV.
- First-strike success now possible for U.S. & USSR!!

Nuclear Arms Control

- Both sides now dreaded another round of nuclear improvements.
- SALT I completed 1971.
  - Freeze on building more ICBMs.
  - Two ABM sites each for U.S. & USSR.
- SALT II signed 1979 & capped delivery systems & MIRVs.

Nuclear Arms Control

- U.S. now planned to field enhanced radiation, or "neutron," bomb.
  - Critics charged it made nuclear war more likely by blurring distinctions between nuclear & conventional war and strategic & theater targets.
- Soviet 1979 invasion of Afghanistan derailed SALT II

Nuclear Innovation

- By end of 1970s U.S. concluded it needed more nuclear options.
- Pres. Jimmy Carter signed 1980 Presidential Directive 59.
  - Endorsed “countervailing” nuclear strategy or fighting nuclear war at “any level of intensity.”
  - Equivalent to nuclear flexible response.

Nuclear Innovation

- Pres. Ronald Reagan in 1981 decided to strengthen U.S. nuclear arsenal.
  - Most dramatic step was SDI, strategic missile defense in space using lasers.
  - Initiated under Carter but pushed by Reagan.
  - Soviets considered very expensive program to be form of economic

Nuclear Innovation

- Mikhail Gorbachev, head of Soviet state, moved in late 1980s to curb nuclear weapons.
  - Two treaties signed with Pres. George H.W. Bush.
  - 1988 INF Treaty followed by 1991 START.

Nuclear Innovation

- Strategic arms limitation continued after 1991 dissolution of USSR.
  - Pres. Bush & Russian Pres. Boris N. Yeltsin signed 1993 START II to limit U.S. and Russian warheads.
  - START II also limited long-range missiles & multiple warheads.

Nuclear Innovation

- START II did not include Chinese and Eur. weapons.
- End of Cold War did not end worldwide worry over nuclear proliferation.
- U.S. GPALS strategy signaled growing worry over small-state terrorism.

Results


- Nuclear weapons effected U.S. international security, strategy, & force structure.
- From late 1940s till 1970, U.S. nuclear strategy evolved from containment all the way to Mutual Assured Destruction.
- U.S. finally resolved to destroy much of Soviet society in nuclear war.

Results

- Soviets gained nuclear parity in 1970s.
- U.S. then shifted strategic focus from retaliation to defense against nuclear attack.
- Use of atomic weapons only during WWII made nuclear war concepts mostly theoretical.
- Still, and ironically, nuclear weapons largely produced an era of limited war.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Cold War and the Nuclear Era: Adjusting to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Korea:

Limiting War to Avoid Armageddon

Context

- First major Cold War conflict.
- After year-long maneuver phase, became stalemated, ala Great War.
- Pointed to “limited war” as principal method for gaining national objectives in atomic era.
- Korean War proceeded from political goals to strategy & operations to achieve those goals.

Unpreparedness

- U.S.-Soviet antagonism growing following WWII.
- From Greek civil war, Truman issued 1947 geopolitical doctrine:
  - U.S. would support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”
- Truman Doctrine marked “official” beginning of Cold War.

Unpreparedness

- Cold War rounded out by 1950.
  - Berlin Blockade; first Soviet atomic device; communist takeover in China; George Kennan's "containment."
- At Truman's urging, DOD & DOS produced NSC-68.
  - Policy statement that U.S. should be able to wage general or limited war & not rely on atomic weapons.

Unpreparedness

- Post-WWII demobilization effected U.S. Army the most.
- Cold War focused on Europe first.
  - Asia & Korea in strategic backwater.
- North Koreans & Soviets did not expect U.S. to oppose Communists with military

War Begins

- North Korea invaded South Korea Jun 25, 1950.
- ROK forces along 38th Parallel quickly fell back.
- Truman concluded to send U.S. forces to Korea as part of UN effort.
  - No Munich-style appeasement.

War Begins

- UN Security Council voted resolution to help South Korea:
  - "repel the armed attack and. . . restore international peace & security in the area."
  - Russians absent; Chinese not members.
- Gen. MacArthur to be CINC UN Cmnd.

War Begins

- Task Force Smith
  - Ca. 1/2 of 1st Btn., 21st Inf. was initial U.S. force sent to Korea.
  - Commanded by LTC Charles B. Smith.
- TF Smith first attacked by North Koreans Jul 5.
  - With heavy casualties, conducted fighting withdrawal toward Taejon.
  - North Koreans unfazed by U.S. troops.

Pusan Perimeter

- MacArthur formulated broad, three-part OPLAN:
  - Delay the enemy to buy time for reinforcements.
  - Defend toehold at port of Pusan & allow buildup of UN forces.
  - Conduct amphibious turning movement at Inchon & thereby trap North Koreans.

Pusan Perimeter

- UN forces possessed air superiority throughout.
- Ground forces buttressed by other UN ground elements.
- U.S. Eighth Army held Pusan perimeter along Naktong R. while forces gathered in Jap. for Inchon landing.
  - 25th ID reinforced 24th ID.

Pusan Perimeter

- Balance of forces beginning to favor UN forces at Pusan.
  - Amphib. assault now planned for Sep.
- North Koreans attacked perimeter early Aug.
  - Easily countered by UN forces.
  - Concentrated N. Koreans at Pusan.
- Time now for the turning movement.

Inchon Landing

- U.S. forces landed at Inchon Sep 15.
  - Physical characteristics of harbor made any landing hazardous.
- MacArthur was arrogantly confident of success.
  - Confidence based partly on strategy & methods worked out during WWII Pacific campaign.

Inchon Landing

- Capture of Seoul would be psychological victory & provide access to most of S. Korea's trans. network.
  - Would force N. Koreans to surrender or scatter into the mountains & abandon heavy equipment.
- Under heavy air cover, landing succeeded & Seoul captured Sep 0

Inchon Landing

- Due to enemy concentration, U.S. Eighth Army had trouble breaking out of Pusan.
- N. Koreans began late Sep. withdrawal which soon became rout.
- S. Korea cleared of invaders by Oct 1.
  - Truman & UN converted MacArthur's mission to unifying

Changing War & Aims

- Truman put restraints on MacArthur.
  - No UN troops in Manchuria or USSR.
  - Only S. Koreans to operate along international border.
  - If Chinese or Soviets intervened before 38th Parallel crossed, all ops. canceled.
- Purpose of restraints was to

Changing War & Aims

- UN on Oct 7 called for reunification of peninsula.
- MacArthur's forces soon crossed 38th.
- Building toward Chinese intervention.
  - Chinese warned in Sep not to cross 38th.
  - By Nov, intel. data warned of CCF intervention.
  - From Oct-Nov, 180,000 Chinese had massed opposite UN Command

Changing War & Aims

- MacArthur minimized late Oct CCF attack.
- Chinese struck Nov 25.
  - U.S. & S. Korean troops in long retreat till Jan 1951.
  - Close air support allowed retreating troops to escape.
- Chinese intervention caused UN reevaluation of war aims.

Changing War & Aims

- Truman & Br. PM Clement R. Attlee in Dec 1950 reaffirmed "Europe first" orientation of Cold War.
- Negotiated settlement was now new war aim in Korea.
- Sub-task was to prevent MacArthur from exacting revenge on N. Koreans for his defeat.

Ridgway's War

- U.S. ground commander, Gen. Walton H. Walker, killed in jeep accident & replaced by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.
- Ridgway pulled forces back to line south of Seoul by early Jan 1951.
- Chinese pursuit reached culminating point & Ridgway went back over to limited offensive

Ridgway's War

- UN offensive became general Feb 21 with attack by IX and X Corps in Op. “Killer.”
  - Ridgway wanted ground offensive of short, methodical steps toward phase lines aided by massive air & arty. fire.
  - Offensive began on schedule but pace slowed by onset of warm weather & softening of ground.

Ridgway's War

- Ridgway reached Line Arizona by early Mar but unable to bring enemy to decisive action.
  - N. Koreans & CCF left delaying forces to impede UN advance.
- Ridgway reached all objectives by Mar 6 & preparing to advance again when shocked by Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur.

MacArthur's Relief

- MacArthur had been difficult subordinate.
  - Had chafed under earlier restrictions placed by Truman on his freedom to operate.
- As Ridgway neared 38th Parallel in moment of UN strength, Truman invited Communists to negotiate cease-fire.

MacArthur's Relief

- Afterwards, MacArthur broadcast bellicose ultimatum to Chinese & N. Koreans.
  - Effect was to undercut Truman's plan.
- Truman was furious.
  - MacArthur had challenged president's authority as CINC of U.S. military.

MacArthur's Relief

- MacArthur’s challenge potentially upset constitutional balance of civil-military relations.
- MacArthur broke recent restriction on clearing public statements on foreign & military policy.
- MacArthur also criticized Truman in letter to U.S. Congressman.
- Truman relieved MacArthur of command Apr 11, 1951.

Politics as War

- Ridgway succeeded MacArthur as CINC Far East and CINCUNC.
- Shortly 500,000 Chinese drove UN troops below 38th Parallel & nearly to Seoul.
  - Chinese concentrated & attacked again May 1951.

Politics as War

- UN forces pushed communists back across 38th Parallel by mid-Jun.
- Year-long mobile phase of war at end.
- Fighting stalemated in vicinity of parallel for next two years.
  - Became “outpost war” for control of terrain & fortified positions.
  - Comparable to Great War’s Western Front.

Negotiations & Stalemate

- Both sides agreed to cease-fire negotiations late Jun 1951.
  - Process proved long & slow.
  - Fighting continued all the while.
- U.S. Eighth Army conducted limited attack early summer to keep pressure on Communists.
  - Ridgway adopted “active defense.”

Negotiations & Stalemate

- Cease-fire negotiations from Nov 17-Dec 27, 1951 focused on current line of contact as demarcation line.
  - Communists used time to dig in more deeply and impose tactical stalemate.
- From May 1952 on air power became UN trump card.
  - USAF Op. “Strangle” focused on communist roads & railroads.
  - Air did not drive communists from

Achieving Cease-Fire

- After 1951-52 winter, Korean War was succession of violent fire fights.
  - Pork Chop Hill, T-Bone, etc.
- Tactical warfare appeared to regress.
- Firefights were all about keeping pressure on Communists during negotiations, not about military

Achieving Cease-Fire

- Ridgway left May 1952 for command in Eur. & was replaced by Gen. Mark Clark.
- Clark's first issue was Koje-do POW uprising.
  - U.S. forces violently suppressed it.
  - Koje-do & POWs became obstacle to negotiations, and Clark ordered UN delegation to walk out in Oct 1952.

Achieving Cease-Fire

- Pres. Eisenhower in 1953 increased pressure on Communists.
  - Deployed atomic-capable aircraft to East Asia & announced that U.S. prepared to take the war to higher level.
- Stalin's Mar 1953 death distracted Soviets.
- Chinese & N. Koreans at same time announced willingness to

Achieving Cease-Fire

- S. Korean pres. Syngman Rhee tried to obstruct process, esp. over POWs, but Ike convinced him otherwise.
- Communists attacked one last time Jun 1953 to gain some ground & give appearance of victory.
- Clark signed armistice Jul 27,

Results

- "Limited" war in Korea exacted huge human toll.
  - Total casualties, all sides, military & civilian, were 3.5M!
- Transformed Cold War.
  - Had been psychological, economic, & political struggle.
  - Led to NATO & Warsaw Pact countries girding themselves for likely war.


Results

- Changed military policy of U.S.
  - U.S. & allies rearmed.
  - Fostered peacetime selective service.
  - Fostered largest standing military force in U.S. history.
  - Fostered unprecedented military-scientific-industrial-academic alliance.
  - Fostered "go to war now"

Results

- Korean War became model for limited war to attain national & alliance objectives without resort to atomic war.
  - Direct effect on Vietnam War!
- Also object lesson in difficulty & complexity of attaining political goals through use of military force.

Check on Learning



Korea: Limiting War to Avoid Armageddon

The Vietnam War, 1961-1975:

Revolutionary and Conventional Warfare in an Era of Limited War

Context

- Opposed different types of warfare:
  - Revolutionary war of N. Vietnam (DRV) & Vietcong (NLF) vs. limited war and high-tech conventional forces of U.S. & S. Vietnam.
- Became prolonged & bloody stalemate in which political dimension was paramount.

Context

- Essential conundrum for U.S. & S. Vietnam:
  - As long as DRV & NLF did not lose, they won!
  - Their “protracted war” took advantage of historical American impatience.
- DRV & NLF practiced 30-year-long “People’s War.”
  - Integration of mil., pol., & dip. means.

Martial Tradition

- Vietnamese military tradition was centuries old & included three defeats of legendary Mongols.
- Tran Hang Dao pioneered Viet. guerrilla warfare in his Essential Summary of Military Arts.
  - Avoid head-on engagements.
  - Employ hit-and-run tactics.

Martial Tradition

- After Mongols & others, the Americans did not scare the Vietnamese!
- DRV drew heavily of Chinese models of warfare, esp. those of Mao Zedong.
  - People's War with goal of national liberation.
  - Equality of pol. & mil. struggle.
  - Protracted war to exhaust strong

Martial Tradition

- Also inspired by Mao's On Protracted War and 3-stages of rev. warfare.
  - 1. Defensive stage: hide, hit-and-run tactics, survival.
  - 2. Equilibrium: boldness & the offensive.
  - 3. Counteroffensive: mil. ops. & full-scale conventional warfare to achieve final defeat of the enemy.

1st Indochina War

- Nationalist leader, Ho Chi Minh, declared Viet. independent Sep 2, 1945.
  - Had est. Vietminh in 1940.
  - Modified Maoist doctrine to suit situation.
- Communist 1949 victory in China provided material aid & sanctuaries to Vietminh.

1st Indochina War

- 1954 victory over Fr. at Dien Bien Phu was incomplete.
- At 1954 Geneva Convention:
  - Vietminh accepted temporary partition of country at 17th Parallel, with Vietminh controlling area north of parallel.
  - National elections to be in 1956.

1st Indochina War

- South of parallel, gov't headed by Ngo Dinh Diem.
  - Backed by U.S. & launched ruthless campaign to eliminate Vietminh in south.
  - Used two-year interval to est. separate S. Vietnam.
  - Contrary to Geneva Accords, ignored 1956 call for elections.

2nd Indochina War

- Almost eliminated by 1957, southern Vietminh launched rebellion.
  - Grew into 2nd Indochina War.
- Southern communists formed NLF (Vietcong) in 1960.
  - Sought sweeping reforms & genuine independence.

2nd Indochina War

- N. Vietnam supported NLF via new Ho Chi Minh Trail.
- Victory for NLF seemed imminent by 1965.
  - People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN or NVA) ready for battle in south.
  - U.S. decided to intervene before S. Vietnam fell!

NLF, PAVN, & Rev. War

- NLF combined mil. & pol. struggle.
  - Used “agitprop” (agitation & propaganda) to undermine S. Vietnamese gov’t.
  - Highly disciplined & motivated.
  - Used ambush & sabotage.
  - Supported & in places supplanted by PAVN by 1965.

NLF, PAVN, & Rev. War

- PAVN was one of world's best light infantry forces by 1965.
  - Emphasized troops over weapons.
  - Highly disciplined, tactically superior, & prepared carefully for battle.
  - Focused on mobility & small-unit maneuver.
  - Preferred hand-to-hand combat (or "hugging") to minimize enemy firepower.

Counterinsurgency & Limited War

- During 1950s U.S. provided mil. aid to Fr. to suppress Vietminh insurgents.
- U.S. convinced that Ho Chi Minh was instrument of Moscow.
- During 1960s Vietnam became focus of U.S. foreign relations.

Counterinsurgency & Limited War

- With JFK adm. Vietnam became test case for “whole new kind of strategy” of counterinsurgency.
- From 1961 JFK adm. built up conventional force to implement “flexible response.”
  - Centerpiece was counterinsurgency doctrine & elite Army Green Berets.

Counterinsurgency & Limited War

- 1961-1963 U.S. greatly increased counterinsurgency program in S. Vietnam.
  - U.S. advisers up to 16,000.
  - Strategic Hamlet program implemented.
- Program went too far too fast, alienated people, & ultimately failed.

Ap Bac, 1963

- ARVN cmndrs. & units unwilling to risk battle.
  - Relied more and more on air power.
- U.S. advisor, COL John Paul Vann, pressured his ARVN div. to attack village of Ap Bac Jan 1963.
  - Div. defeated but Diem gov't claimed victory & clung to "conventional" war.

Ap Bac, 1963

- Major turning point reached by 1965.
  - Corrupt ARVN appeared near defeat!
- Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson decided to escalate U.S. commitment.
  - Regular bombing raids began Feb 1965 but only marginal effect on war.
  - LBJ decided Jul to commit large-

Limited War

- LBJ deeply influenced by limited war theory.
  - Way of conducting war without running risk of igniting nuclear war.
  - Objective was to hurt enemy, persuade to stop conflict, & back down.
  - Use of force to be orchestrated by civilian leadership & to be a controllable instrument of national policy.

Limited War

- Limited war was flawed.
  - Ran counter to American “way of war.”
  - LBJ worried constantly about MacArthur-like challenge to civilian authority.
  - Limited war had a way of becoming less limited (if not unlimited).
  - By 1967, 500,000 U.S. service personnel, 30% of naval strength, & two billion dollars monthly going into

Military Machine

- U.S. military in Vietnam was best that money & technology could provide.
- Gen. William Westmoreland, U.S. MACV cmndr., tried to use technology to cope with dilemma of guerrilla war.
  - B-52s were most feared U.S. weapon of war.
  - APCs and troop-carrying helos altered nature of inf. ops.

Military Machine

- Air & naval ops. significant despite land nature of war.
- Major org. innovation was Army's air cav. division.
  - Concept validated in early 1960s operational tests.
  - 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) activated Jun 1965.
  - Made large-scale airmobile ops. in Vietnam possible.

Escalation & Stalemate, 1965-68

- LBJ's 1965 escalation of war and commitment of U.S. forces had <u>well-defined objective</u>:
  - Preserve an independent, stable, non-Communist S. Vietnam.
  - However clear, objective may well have been unachievable from the start!

Escalation & Stalemate, 1965-68

- Basic U.S. OPLAN had three parts:
  - 1. Op. Rolling Thunder bombing, begun Mar 1965, was to interdict flow of troops & materiel into S. Vietnam.
  - 2. After bombing, U.S. units to conduct “search and destroy” missions to defeat NVA forces in south.
  - 3. ARVN to conduct “pacification” of NLF & its support in the

Ia Drang, 1965

- First major clash of armies came in late 1965 in Central Highlands.
- U.S. & ARVN forces counterattacked NVA forces besieging Plei Mei.
  - Employed massive arty. fire, tactical air power, & general firepower superiority.
  - Broke siege & forced NVA ambush to withdraw.

Ia Drang, 1965

- Westmoreland sent 1st Cav to search for & destroy retreating NVA forces.
  - Inconclusive battles at LZs X-Ray & Albany left 3,000 NVA & 300 U.S. dead.
  - DRV decided that guerrilla op. was best *modus operandi* & reoriented accordingly.
  - U.S. decided to employ ever-larger search-and-destroy missions, won

Ia Drang, 1965

- War continued to escalate 1966-1967.
  - Much fighting, often conventional, in many places but only stalemate resulted.
  - DRV now settled in for “protracted war” against stronger enemy.
  - DRV focused on weak S. Vietnamese gov’t & keeping U.S. casualties high.

Ia Drang, 1965

- Despite air war, NVA infiltration into south increased.
  - By 1967, NVA four times larger than in 1965.
- U.S. pursuit of controlled strategy of attrition could not destroy NVA or NLF.
- War settled into "state of irresolution."

Ia Drang, 1965

- Military stalemate focused all attention on political aspects.
  - Fundamental problem of Saigon gov't proved insoluble.
  - Indecision eroded U.S. political support & polarized Amer. public.
  - Public support & LBJ's approval rating reached nadir in late 1967 to early 1968.

Tet Offensive, 1968

- DRV decided mid-1967 to break deadlock.
  - Objective was to secure settlement.
  - Minimum acceptable elements would be coalition gov't & U.S. withdrawal.
- First phase in 1967 was local attacks.
  - USMC Khe Sanh garrison was one place attacked but Marines held

Tet Offensive, 1968

- Second phase during Jan 1968 Tet holiday was series of attacks across all of S. Vietnam.
  - Scale & scope surprised U.S. & S. Vietnamese, but they recovered quickly.
- NLF launched more attacks in Feb.
  - Mostly limited mortar & rocket barrages against military

Battle for Hue

- Exception to pattern was fight for Hue, cultural & religious center of S. Vietnam.
- Large number of NVA, NLF, U.S., & ARVN forces fought there Jan 31-Mar 2.
  - Some of war's most bitter fighting.
- NVA & NLF forces infiltrated prior to fighting & stockpiled weapons &

Battle for Hue

- ARVN & U.S. forces used massive firepower & full-scale attack to retake.
  - Tear gas & gas masks used often.
- NVA & NLF resisted from dug-in positions & with snipers.
- Hue fight decimated NLF main force units, which never recovered.

Battle for Hue

- Hue finally liberated Mar 2, but U.S. & S. Vietnam won hollow victory.
  - ARVN withdrawn from countryside to defend cities & pacification program suffered setback.
- No clear-cut winner, but Tet sapped remaining public support from U.S. war effort!

Battle for Hue

- LBJ now rejected advice to escalate war further & took three dramatic steps.
  - Cut back bombing to area just north of 17th Parallel & DMZ.
  - Indicated willingness to negotiate.
  - Withdrew from 1968 presidential race.
- Tet & LBJ's reaction often cited as war's major turning point.
  - Signaled end of gradual escalation.

Battle for Hue

- No immediate goals changed.
  - All sides still determined to maintain maximum pressure.
- War now became more stalemated.
  - Military activity increased throughout S. Vietnam.
  - B-52 attacks tripled & exceeded one million tons dropped on S. Vietnam.

Fighting & Negotiating

- New U.S. Pres. Richard M. Nixon adopted “Vietnamization” strategy.
  - Designed to hold line in S. Vietnam & ease tensions in U.S.
- DRV adopted classic “fighting while negotiating.”
  - Coordination of all elements of war & designed to divide S. Vietnam from U.S.

Fighting & Negotiating

- Nixon & nat'l sec. adviser Henry Kissinger combined threats of "massive retaliation" with diplomacy.
  - Nixon believed situation similar to that in Korea facing Ike in 1953.
  - Nixon relied on reputation as hard-line anti-communist.
- Nothing worked & DRV reverted to defensive & adopted guerrilla tactics.

"Vietnamization"

- Nixon adopted Vietnamization from frustration.
  - Process began on small scale under LBJ.
  - Involved phased withdrawal of U.S. troops & transfer of primary military responsibility to S. Vietnamese.
- Nixon authorized 1970 invasion of Cambodia to keep pressure on DRV.

"Vietnamization"

- Opposition to war grew across U.S. from Congress to campuses.
- DRV & NLF boycotted Paris peace talks.
  - Only increased stalemate.
- Murkier war & homefront opposition demoralized U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Easter Offensive

- U.S. & DRV each tried in 1972 to break deadlock.
  - Nixon & Kissinger sought improved relations with USSR & China.
  - Intent was to isolate DRV & force it to come to terms.
  - DRV conserved resources for final, war-winning offensive.

Easter Offensive

- Mar 1972 DRV launched massive, <u>conventional</u> offensive into S. Vietnam.
- Nixon responded by escalating air war.
  - Approved massive B-52 strikes across DMZ in Op. “Linebacker.”
  - Approved aerial mining of Haiphong harbor & naval blockade of DRV.
- DRV hurt but poised for sustained

Peace & More War

- Nixon authorized yet more bombing around Christmas 1972 in Op. “Linebacker II.”
- By fall 1972 both sides interested in compromise & signed Paris peace agreements in Jan 1973.
  - Provided U.S. “decent interval” to exit war rather than “peace with honor” that Nixon heralded.

Peace & More War

- Peace agreements left NVA intact in S. Vietnam.
- Spring 1975 DRV launched massive, conventional offensive & quickly toppled S. Vietnam.
- New Pres. Gerald R. Ford powerless.
  - U.S. in no mood or condition to support again a country that never could stand alone without U.S. military support.

Results


- "Lessons" of Vietnam were & remain murky & ambiguous.
- Helicopter, "smart" bombs, & general U.S. technological prowess irrelevant.
- U.S. engaged in extended, agonizing soul-searching since defeat in Vietnam.
- Vietnam War seemed to discredit 1950s-1960s limited war

Results

- U.S. defeat in Vietnam appears still to be product of unique circumstances there.
- DRV claimed victory of people over technology.
- DRV victory also appears to be product of unique circumstances & local balance of forces.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Vietnam War, 1961-1975: Revolutionary and Conventional Warfare in an Era of Limited War

War in the Middle East:

Violence Across the Spectrum of Conflict

Context

- Cold War-era conflicts tended to be more frequent & last longer than earlier in 20th century.
- Middle East & Southwest Asia witnessed several of these wars.
  - Challenge was to geographically confine them & avoid superpower confrontation.
  - Advanced weapons & methods often used.

Context

- Regional wars were crucibles for testing advanced weapons & methods.
- Advanced weapons included precision-guided munitions, medium-range missiles, & chemicals.
- Both Iraqis and Soviets used chemicals.
- Wars tended to be total, despite occurring in era of limited wars.

Arab-Israeli Wars

- Arab-Israeli conflict has origins long pre-dating Cold War.
- Following World War I, League of Nations dismantled Ottoman Empire.
  - League gave British control of Palestine.
- Following World War II, British relinquished control.
  - UN voted 1947 to partition Palestine.

Arab-Israeli Wars

- Jews proclaimed nation of Israel in 1948 from portion of Palestine.
- 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
  - Quickly Arab forces from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, & Saudi Arabia attacked Israel.
  - In one month all sides accepted UN cease-fire.
  - Arab military performance was inept.

Arab-Israeli Wars

- Gamal Abdel Nasser to control Egypt in 1954.
  - Caused increase in regional tensions.
- 1956 Arab-Israeli War.
  - Nasser nationalized Suez Canal in July.
  - British & French intervened militarily.
  - Israelis joined in with airborne landing east of Mitla Pass, deep inside Sinai Peninsula.

Arab-Israeli Wars

- British, French, & Israelis achieved quick and decisive victory.
- U.S. & USSR demanded Egyptian territory be relinquished.
  - Only time Americans sided with Soviets in region.
  - Israelis withdrew and British & French lost much regional influence.

Arab-Israeli Wars

- Israelis had developed effective military force 1948-1956.
  - Achieved high state of readiness.
  - Used Universal Military Training (UMT).
  - Included women in the military.
- Israelis still clarifying combined arms warfare.
  - Refining armor-inf. ops. & C2.

1967: Six-Day War

- Egyptians preemptively occupied Sinai.
  - Action based on inaccurate Soviet info. regarding massing of Israelis in area.
  - Included seizure of Sharm el-Sheikh at mouth of Gulf of Aqaba.
- Egypt joined with Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, & Algeria to attack Israel.
  - Arab forces nominally under

1967: Six-Day War

- Israel mobilized & enjoyed advantages of central position, centralized C2, effective intelligence, and quickly-won air superiority.
  - Israeli intent was to use advantages--especially central position--to defeat Arabs piecemeal.
- Israelis reached Suez Canal early Jun.
- Israel next defeated Jordan in only days in vicinity of Jerusalem & West Bank.

1967: Six-Day War

- Israel quickly defeated Syria to end war.
- UN cease-fire in effect Jun 10, 1967.
- Decisive Israeli victory changed Middle East strategic situation.
  - Israel controlled Golan Heights, West Bank, & Sinai Peninsula.
  - Israel's defense now had geographic depth.
  - Israeli military exhibited effective

1967: Six-Day War

- Superpower involvement in Middle East now growing.
  - U.S. & USSR sending arms to both sides.
- Arabs refused to accept loss of more territory to Israelis.
  - Three-year “War of Attrition” ensued.
  - Stalemate & casualties led to 1970 cease-fire.

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Anwar Sadat president of Egypt in 1970.
  - Sought to end aura of Israeli invincibility, not decisive victory.
  - Coordinated actions with Syria & Jordan to impose simultaneous two-front war of attrition on Israelis.
  - Improved readiness of Egyptian army, especially with sophisticated weapons.
  - Prepared Egyptian army to fight set-piece battle intended to deny Israeli

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Israelis overconfident after 1967 victory.
  - Committed to static defense of Bar Lev Line along east bank of Suez Canal.
  - Believed line would be Egyptian army's graveyard.
- Egyptians achieved surprise in 1973.
  - Attacked along entire front of canal Oct 6, Jewish Sabbath & Day of Atonement.

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Israeli combined-arms team unbalanced in 1973.
  - Egyptian Russian-made SAMs established wide & deep air barrier along canal.
  - Egyptian Russian-made SAGGER anti-tank missiles savaged Israeli tanks.
  - Israeli armor attacks only loosely coordinated with infantry & artillery ops.

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Egyptians charged out of bridgeheads over canal mid-Oct in six major thrusts.
- Subsequent armor battle pitted 2K tanks on each side.
  - Largest such battle since Kursk in 1943.
- Egyptians moved beyond air-defense umbrella & mauled by Israeli air strikes.
- Israelis counterattacked to west

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Israelis destroyed Egyptian air defense sites.
  - Allowed Israeli air force greater freedom of action along canal.
- Critical fighting along Golan Heights.
  - Israel had little space to trade for time.
  - Israelis defeated Syrians & drove them back to 1967 truce line by mid Oct.

1973: Yom Kippur War

- U.S. & USSR called for end to fighting.
  - Israeli skill in combined arms warfare again apparent.
  - Fighting continued despite Israeli victory.
- Cease-fire did not override Arab belief in psychological victory over Israel.
- Met Egyptian President Sadat's

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Shortly Arab OPEC members shut off oil to U.S.
  - Arab countries demonstrated powerful influence of oil.
- 1978 Camp David Accords.
  - Normalized relations between Israel & Egypt and led to 1979 peace treaty between the two nations.

1973: Yom Kippur War

- Warfare changed much in Middle East from 1948-1973.
  - 1967 Israelis demonstrated skill in combined arms warfare reminiscent of best of German *blitzkrieg* of World War II.
  - Despite initial 1973 setback, Israelis again showed mastery of combined-arms team.
- Arab-Israeli Wars studied for evolution of warfare & readiness

Iran-Iraq War

- Overview:
  - Eight-year total war in miniature, lacking only nuclear weapons.
  - Odd mixture of high-tech weapons and gruesomely bloody infantry assaults.
  - First widespread use since world wars of chemicals & aerial attacks on cities.
  - Professionalism of ops, and quality of generalship both inferior.

Iran-Iraq War

- War rooted in centuries of religious (Sunni vs. Shi'ite) and ethnic (Persian vs. Arab) conflict.
- Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attacked Iran to:
  - Curtail spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
  - Seize key geographic areas and thereby enhance Iraq's pol. & econ. power.

Iran-Iraq War

- Iraq expected short, limited war.
  - Expectation based on Iran's recent pol., econ., & military turmoil.
- War turned into late 20th century example of years-long "grinding attrition."
  - Death toll ca. 600-970K over eight years.
- Iraq began war with Sep 1980 attack on Iranian airfields & ground attack into Iran along four axes.

Iran-Iraq War

- Iran used Iraqi ground attacks to rally its people for mobilization.
- Fears of world community:
  - That Iranian revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini would increase its regional influence.
  - That Saddam Hussein's long record of aggression & human rights abuses would continue.

Iran-Iraq War

- Sep 1981-May 1982 Iran seized initiative and conducted series of poorly coordinated & executed attacks.
- Often featured human-wave attacks:
  - In religious fervor, children & old men advanced through minefields.
  - Second wave of poorly trained militia advanced & attempted to cut barbed wire.
  - Over bodies of initial waves,

Iran-Iraq War

- Gruesome tactical prescription could not overcome organizational & operational weaknesses.
- Iran eventually more adept at combined arms warfare.
  - Focus shifted from driving Iraq out of Iran to defeating Iraq outright & deposing Saddam Hussein.
  - Iranians launched Jul 1982 offensive to capture Basra.

Iran-Iraq War

- Beginning Dec 1982, Iraq started to use mustard & nerve gases to counter Iranian human-wave attacks.
  - Iraqi general referred to practice as using “pesticides” against “insects.”
- War entered new phase in 1984:
  - Iraqis sought to break stalemate by using air power to halt Iranian oil shipments.
  - Iranian retribution called “Tanker

Iran-Iraq War

- Mar-Jun 1985: “War of the Cities.”
  - Both sides fired Soviet-designed SS-1 “Scud” missiles at each other’s cities.
- Iran launched two simultaneous offensives in early 1986.
  - First time in the war and due to improved quality of Iranian commanders & staffs.
  - Captured and held Fao Peninsula, cutting Iraq’s access to Persian Gulf.

Iran-Iraq War

- Greater U.S. involvement in 1987.
  - In May Iraqi aircraft damaged *USS Stark* with Exocet missiles, killing 37 crewmen.
  - U.S. warship total in Persian Gulf up to 30.
- Strategic situation favored Iraq in 1988.
  - U.S. Navy increased attacks against Iranian frigates.
  - Iraqis launched new offensives in May

Iran-Iraq War

- Iran accepted truce as Ayatollah Khomeini's tight control began to crack.
- War witnessed few innovations.
  - Iraqis used rudimentary airborne & amphibious ops. toward end.
- Conflict rightly known more for mindless human-wave attacks than any high-tech weapon or sophisticated operation.
- Revealed little about evolution of

War in Afghanistan

- Different from other Middle Eastern & Southwest Asian wars.
  - 1979-1988 conflict pitting Afghan guerrillas against Soviets.
  - More nearly resembled Vietnam War.
- Background:
  - 1973 ouster of monarchy by Mahammed Daoud.
  - 1978 seizure of power by People's Dem. Rep. of Afghanistan.

War in Afghanistan

- 1979 Soviet-supported coup.
  - Soviets occupied country, neutralized Afghan armed forces, & installed Babrak Karmal as president of Dem. Rep. of Afghanistan (DRA).
- Soviet actions sparked war pitting regular troops & advanced technology against fractious guerrilla bands.
  - Guerrillas generally known as Mujahideen & operated from

War in Afghanistan

- Soviets controlled only urban centers.
- USSR & DRA shifted from mechanized warfare suitable to Europe to airmobile tactics resembling Vietnam War.
  - Soviets modified tactics & units.
- Mujahideen responded with attrition and hand-held air defense weapons.

War in Afghanistan

- Mujahideen strategy of attrition.
  - Employed from sanctuaries in Iran and Pakistan.
  - Intended solely to kill Soviet soldiers & supporters and wear down their collective will to resist.
- By 1986, clear to Soviets that larger forces and more killing could not break guerrilla resistance.

War in Afghanistan

- By mid-1987 Soviets losing one aircraft per day.
  - Altered tactics back to emphasize ground attacks with less heliborne support.
- 1986-87:
  - Replacement of Karmal with more publicly Islamic Mohammed Najibullah not effective.
  - Raids on Mujahideen bases outside Afghanistan also not effective.

War in Afghanistan

- Soviet situation deteriorating markedly.
  - Military morale & discipline dwindled.
  - Drug use on the increase.
- Afghans turned now to fighting one another as Cold War was ending.
  - Najibullah surrendered power.
  - 1992 factional fighting in Kabul brought Taliban fundamentalists to power.

War in Afghanistan

- Despite facing defeat, Russians kept forces in Afghanistan to ca. 132K.
  - Could never stop flow of weapons & supplies to guerrillas nor extend their own influence beyond urban centers.
  - Restricted role of air power was critical.
- Soviets limited forces & objectives, exercised self-

Cold War in Retrospect

- Nuclear weapons were most unique aspect and nuclear deterrence became crucially important.
  - Especially after Soviets exploded atomic devices and joined nuclear "club."
- Nuclear weapons influenced policies and strategies all around, including those for conventional forces.

Cold War in Retrospect

- Communist Chinese Mao Zedong placed equal emphasis on military and political aspects of conflict.
  - Adopted protracted war to exhaust an enemy's will to resist.
- Limited war & protracted war co-existed despite seeming contradiction.
- U.S. in Vietnam & USSR in Afghanistan learned hard lessons about guerrilla war.

Cold War in Retrospect


- Terrorism ebbed & flowed into 1990s.
- Chemicals became “poor man’s nuclear weapon.”
  - Used by U.S., USSR, and Iraq.
  - Reflected general widening of license of war and erosion of restraints on violence against civilians.
- Advances in science/tech. affected ops.

Cold War in Retrospect

- Battles became truly 3-D as weapons & capabilities far exceeded those of WWII.
- Combat more lethal, while ops. more mobile & linked to air power.
- So much variety in Cold War ops. that era defies simple classification.
- Innovation & change constantly imposed new ideas & challenges on all military leaders.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



War in the Middle East: Violence Across the Spectrum of Conflict

The Age of Interventions:

Projecting Power and Maintaining Peace

Context

- U.S. “force projection” capability well advanced by end of Cold War.
  - Br. & Fr. also similarly capable.
- End of Cold War did not lessen projection likelihood or needs.
- First post-Cold War intervention surprisingly in SW Asia 1990-1991.

Context

- UN moved in direction of "peace enforcement."
  - Involved multi-national forces intervening in conflicts with variable levels of force to restore peace.
- Use of force anywhere complicated by nationalistic, ethnic, & religious divisions among peoples.

Cold War Interventions

- Military powers often used armed forces to support foreign policy.
  - U.S. used USN & USMC most.
- After WWII, advances in long-distance air transport allowed airborne & light ground units to:
  - Respond to emergency, fight in small war, reinforce larger war.

Cold War Interventions

- Early example was U.S. 1965 Dom. Rep. intervention.
  - Communist takeover seemed imminent.
  - Apr-May op. involved >24,000 USMC & Army troops.
- Br., Fr., & Belgians similarly capable.
  - Fr. intervened most, 12 times in Africa from 1962-1994.

The Falklands

- Crisis there predated Cold War.
  - Br. claimed sovereignty over islands for more than 150 years.
  - Most of 2,000 inhabitants of Br. origin.
- Argentina seized islands Apr 1982.
  - Quickly boosted ground & air forces.
- Br. faced war 12,000 km away with little knowledge of enemy & little preparation.

The Falklands

- Br. sea power & air power key to effort to isolate Argentines on islands.
- Br. est. first “maritime,” then “total” exclusion zone around islands.
  - Complicated by Br. sub’s sinking of Argentine vessel, *Belgrano*, outside zone.
- Br. used midway point of

The Falklands

- Br. ops. against islands began early May 1982.
- Argentine aircraft attacked Br. ships often.
  - Sank 6, damaged 18 others.
  - Greatest weapon was Fr.-built Exocet anti-ship missile.

The Falklands

- Br. by mid-May had pushed ops. far.
  - Argentine forces isolated on Falklands.
  - South Georgia recaptured.
  - Preparatory ops. completed for amphib. landing.
- Br. landed May 21 at two locations on East Falkland Island.

The Falklands

- On orders from London, captured Darwin & Goose Green to the south.
- Br. turned attention next to Port Stanley, the Argentine stronghold.
- Argentine cmndr. lacked confidence in conscripts.
  - Decided to wage passive campaign from static defenses.

The Falklands

- Br. finally assembled two brigades & captured key terrain west of Port Stanley.
- Argentines chose to surrender Jun 14.
- Br. defeated numerically superior foe in difficult weather & terrain conditions over 12,000 km LOC!

The Falklands

- Br. victory demonstrated:
  - Value of well-trained force.
  - Importance of joint ops.
  - Effect of high tech weapons, esp. Argentine Exocet & Br. Sidewinder missiles.
- Br. excelled at projecting power over great distances & mastery of basic military skills.

Op. "Urgent Fury"

- Occurred on Caribbean island of Grenada in Oct 1983.
  - Involved apparently straightforward rescue of U.S. medical students from island where Cubans & communist Grenadans were building major air base.
  - Pres. Ronald Reagan feared spread of communism to island.

Op. "Urgent Fury"

- JCS issued formal order for op. Oct 22.
  - USMC units to rely on naval transport & Army units on air transport.
  - Involved limited planning time, great distances, variety of forces, & lack of adequate intel.
- Grenada 200 km off Venezuelan coast & apparently home to 4,000-7,000 Cubans & local communists.

Op. "Urgent Fury"

- 75th Rangers landed first on Oct 25, secured Port Salines airfield, & rescued students.
- Followed soon by 82nd Airborne Div.
- Marines landed St. George's harbor Oct 25-26.
- Took till Oct 27 to finally secure island.

Op. "Urgent Fury"

- Despite victory, many problems:
  - Op. was hastily cobbled together & time lacking to coordinate between services.
  - Long LOC, C2, and lack of direct radio comm. between elements of op. created confusion.
  - Poor service interoperability most controversial.

Op. "Urgent Fury"

- Difficult relations with press over access to people & information marked a low point between U.S. armed forces & news media.
- Strained relations with press only heightened criticism of operation.

Op. "Just Cause"

- Occurred in Latin American nation of Panama in December 1989.
- Since Grenada, U.S. had improved joint ops. and procedures for rapid interventions.
- U.S.-Panamanian relations tense in late 1980s.
  - Panamanian leader, Gen. Manuel Noriega, declared "state of war" with U.S.

Op. "Just Cause"

- U.S. Pres. George H.W. Bush decided to intervene in mid-Dec 1989 to:
  - Safeguard Amer. lives.
  - Defend democracy in Panama.
  - Combat drug trafficking.
  - Protect integrity of Panama Canal Treaty.

Op. "Just Cause"

- Just Cause executed much more smoothly than Urgent Fury.
  - Relied on existing command relationships.
  - Sufficient time available for planning & preparation.
  - U.S.-controlled airbase nearby with 13,000 troops immediately available.

Op. "Just Cause"

- U.S. forces subdued Panamanian Defense Force in hours.
- U.S. power projection capability developing well by end of Cold War.
- Method relied on offensive, surprise, & overwhelming force.
  - “More violence sooner” in part an insight gained from Vietnam

The Persian Gulf

- As Cold War ended, “rogues states” seemed greatest threat worldwide.
- Persian Gulf War as much surprise as Korean War.
- U.S. forces much better prepared this time.
  - “Power projection” capability available to reinforce Europe or elsewhere.
  - Cold War forces & doctrine ideal to fight Soviet-inspired Iraqis.

The Persian Gulf

- War began with Iraqi Aug 1990 invasion of neighboring Kuwait.
  - Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein now controlled 20% of world's oil reserves.
  - Another 20% in neighboring Saudi Arabia.
- UN authorized use of force.
  - 36 countries sent forces to Gulf.
- Much of world arrayed against Iraq.

The Persian Gulf

- Iraqi army large & experienced but ironically incapable.
  - Most tanks older Soviet models save 500 T-72s.
  - Stock of Soviet SA-2 and -4 SAMs suggested capable air defense.
  - Iraqi chemical weapons plentiful.
  - Scud surface-to-surface missiles capable of delivering chem-bio agents.

U.S. to the Gulf

- UN coalition nominally under U.S. CENTCOM cmndr. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf.
  - All air forces under his C2.
  - Arab ground forces under Arab C2.
- Most forces from U.S.
  - Army's 82nd Airborne arrived first.
  - USMC followed.

U.S. to the Gulf

- U.S. Pres. G.H.W. Bush announced Nov 1991 shift to offensive ops. prep.
  - Ground forces increased with Army's VII Corps from Ger.
  - More reserves called to active duty.
- VII Corps took 3 months to re-deploy.
  - 1970s & '80s weapons in abundance.
- U.S. training & doctrine superior.

Planning UN Ops.

- Prewar plans viewed Persian Gulf as secondary to Europe.
  - Iraqi invasion changed planning calculus.
- Initial UN offensive action was air.
  - Air planners promised decisive victory in 6-9 days.
  - Shades of strategy of annihilation.
  - U.S. JCS Chairman Gen. Colin Powell refocused air campaign partly on Iraqi army.

Planning UN Ops.

- Schwarzkopf settled on 4-phase joint and combined campaign:
  - Phase I: “strategic” air attack on Iraq.
  - Phase II: air superiority over Kuwait.
  - Phase III: air interdiction of Iraqi forces and their chemical weapons.
  - Phase IV: joint & combined “airland” attack on Iraqi field forces in KTO.
- Powell: “First we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it.”

Planning UN Ops.

- Evolving timetable:
  - Aug: defensive ops.
  - Sep: Schwarzkopf & staff began offensive planning.
  - Oct: Schwarzkopf approved envelopment of Iraqi field forces.
  - Nov: Pres. Bush announced movement of VII Corps to KTO.
  - Jan: Offensive to begin mid-month.

Coalition Air Camp.

- UN preponderant in air power.
  - 2,614 aircraft (1,990 from U.S.).
- Air Campaign began Jan 17, 1991.
- Multitude of long-range strikes.
  - Took Iraqis by surprise, especially stealth-technology aircraft.
  - Needed only hours to suppress entire Iraqi air-defense system.

Coalition Air Camp.

- UN achieved air supremacy over Iraq in one day.
  - Iraqis swept from the skies at loss of one coalition aircraft.
- Initial targets included NBC weapons program and electrical grid.
- Coalition air forces' intent was to win war quickly & solely with air power.
  - Another attempted Douhetian

Air Camp. Continues

- In desperation, Iraqis flew most remaining aircraft to Iran.
  - Action eliminated Iraqi air force from war.
- Jan 18 Iraqis began to launch modified Soviet Scud missiles.
  - 93 total launched at Saudi Arabia & Israel.
  - Intent was to terrorize population centers, bring Israelis into conflict, & shatter coalition.

Air Camp. Continues

- Coalition response to Scuds was U.S. Army's Patriot air-defense missile.
  - Originally anti-aircraft missile modified to anti-missile capability.
  - Intercepted 70% of missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and 40% of those at Israel.
  - First combat use of anti-missile missile.
  - Computer software problem led to Feb 25 Scud hit on Dhahran barracks

Air Camp. Continues

- Jan 29 Khafji raid.
  - Conducted by reinforced Iraqi mech. div. in vicinity of Saudi border town of Khafji.
  - Intent was to gather intel. & compel beginning of coalition ground attack.
  - Iraqi armored brigades stuck in minefield & annihilated by coalition aircraft.
  - Proved inability of Iraqi mech. forces to concentrate in the open, day or

Air Camp. Continues

- Coalition air attacks disrupted Iraqi C2.
- Feb 12-13: al Firdos bunker episode.
  - Night raid on Baghdad by F-117A Stealth fighters.
  - Munitions penetrated bunker, which also housed families of governmental elite.
  - Civilians killed & Saddam Hussein

Air Camp. Continues

- As ground attack approached, air camp. shifted to operational ground targets.
  - Intent was to prepare & isolate battlefield and damage will of Iraqi forces.
  - Included LOCs & Republican Guard divs. in KTO.
  - U.S. F-111Fs used infrared sensors to spot “warm” Iraqi AFVs against “cool” desert.
  - Many Iraqi vehicles

100-Hour Ground Battle

- Iraqis had 350K personnel in KTO.
  - 12 armored divs. & 30 inf. divs. in Kuwait and southern Iraq.
  - Organized into three-zone defense.
  - Expecting coalition amphibious assault, Iraqis kept six inf. divs. in strong defensive positions along Kuwaiti coast.
  - Saddam Hussein ignored inland flank, which remained “in the air.”

100-Hour Ground Battle

- Schwarzkopf maintained elaborate deception plan.
  - Hinged on convincing Iraqis that UN main attack would occur along or into Saudi-Kuwaiti coastline.
  - Iraqi defenses altogether leaning east and concentrated there.
  - Provided opportunity for coalition to strike decisive blow to Iraqi western flank.

100-Hour Ground Battle

- Schwarzkopf's OPLAN:
  - Often described as "one-two punch" of "right jab" followed by knockout "left hook."
  - Also resembled classical "fix" and "flank" turning movement.
  - 270K coalition forces shifted secretly west under cover of air campaign to LDs.
  - Intent was to sweep west around Iraqi fortifications & drive deep into

Attack Begins

- G-day delayed by Russian peace initiative.
- 0400, Feb 24, “right jab” began.
  - Engineer troops cleared paths through minefields.
  - Coalition forces advanced into eastern Kuwait.
  - Encountered only sporadic resistance & captured thousands of Iraqi POWs.
  - POWs slowed pace of advance.

Attack Begins

- "Left hook" executed primarily by U.S. VII Corps & XVIII Airborne Corps.
  - VII Corps to drive 100 km into Iraq, wheel right, & attack flank of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
  - XVIII Corps to drive 275 km into Iraq, protect coalition left flank, secure Euphrates River and main road to Baghdad, & cut off Iraqi escape from Kuwait.

Attack Begins

- XVIII Corps air assault was largest in U.S. experience since Vietnam War.
  - Only Iraqi escape route was north toward Basra on Tigris River.
- VII Corps to deliver knockout blow to Iraqi Republican Guard.
  - Corps strength was 145K soldiers and 48K vehicles & aircraft.
  - Corps logistical train of hundreds of trucks carrying fuel, ammo, & water.

Ground Combat

- VII Corps passed easily through Iraqi border defenses.
- Corps began right wheel to east on Feb 25.
- LTG Fred Franks, Jr., corps cmndr., concentrated divs. to destroy Republican Guard.
  - Franks used analogy of closing fist.

Ground Combat

- Republican Guard reoriented westward to face threat.
- Heaviest fighting occurred Feb 26 in snowstorm.
- Coalition air & ground forces pounded Iraqis.
  - Only 700 Iraqi tanks survived fight.
- XVIII Corps helped close off Iraqi escape & snuff out resistance.

Assessing Victory

- Washington proposed “cessation of offensive operations.”
  - Schwarzkopf accepted, effective 0800, Feb 27.
- Sizeable Iraqi forces escaped north toward Basra.
  - Schwarzkopf & Franks criticized as result.
- Still, coalition achieved mandate to liberate Kuwait.

Assessing Victory

- Destroying Saddam Hussein's government was not part of mandate.
- Relations between military & media strained throughout conflict.
  - Ability to broadcast live heightened struggle between control & access.
- Schwarzkopf's campaign strategy & coalition's superiority of forces were keys to victory.

Assessing Victory

- Saddam Hussein foolishly placed Iraqi forces in vulnerable position.
- Iraqis had no response to coalition's "left hook."
  - Played to American military's strength of maneuver warfare.
- Saddam Hussein offered challenge to international community that UN and U.S. could not ignore.

Peacekeeping/enforcement

- During Cold War, UN conducted peacekeeping military ops.
  - Involved former combatants "inviting in" UN to maintain peace by est. cease-fire between opposing forces.
  - Serve as buffer between belligerents.
  - Oversee implementation of peace plans.

Peacekeeping/enforcement

- Peacekeeping occurred where some semblance of peace existed!
- UN averaged about 3-4 peacekeeping ops. per year during Cold War.
  - Some missions lasted decades.
- After Cold War numbers increased dramatically.
  - 13 such ops. in Dec 1992 alone!

Peacekeeping/enforcement

- UN Sec. Gen. Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized principle of "universal sovereignty" & UN involvement in issues affecting whole world.
- Served as basis for "peace enforcement" through UN military intervention.
  - Involved multi-national ops. to end hostilities to allow negotiation of peace.

Peacekeeping/enforcement

- Two ops. exemplify UN enforcement of peace & going beyond providing observers for cease-fire.
- Operation “Provide Comfort.”
  - Soon after Gulf War, Kurds in northern Iraq revolted against Saddam Hussein.
  - UN authorized humanitarian relief & forbade Iraqis to interfere.

Peacekeeping/enforcement

- Operation “Southern Watch.”
  - U.S. & other aircraft to prevent Iraqis from using air power against rebellious Shiites in southern Iraq.
- Essential difference in UN or other interventions was between being invited in by belligerents & barging in despite belligerents!

Somalia

- Prolonged drought, overpopulation, & warfare turned Somalia into scene of much human suffering.
- Central gov't collapsed 1991, banditry increased, & UN decided to intervene.
  - Pres. Bush decided to participate in UN intervention to create secure environment for continued

Somalia

- Op. “Restore Hope” started Dec 1992 as result.
  - U.S. forces to land, secure Mogadishu in particular, & then withdraw while handing mission over to other UN forces.
  - USMC landed Dec 9 & U.S. military began withdrawing Jan 1993.
  - Occurred during change between Pres. Bush & successor, Pres. Bill Clinton.

Somalia

- "Mission Creep."
  - May 1993 UN forces under command of Turkish LTG Cevik Bir.
  - U.S. forces remained focused on humanitarian relief.
  - Efforts to disarm Somalis escalated to low-level urban guerrilla warfare.
  - Culminated in Jun 1993 Somali ambush of Pakistani unit.

Somalia

- Result was UN Security Council condemnation & call for arrest of assailants.
- Aug 1993 U.S. sent Army's Delta Force & 75th Ranger Regiment.
- Oct mission to "snatch" warlord Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid went terribly wrong.
  - Rangers & Delta Force suffered heavy casualties

Somalia

- Pres. Clinton withdrew U.S. forces by early 1994.
- Most of UN followed suit & left Somalis to “solve their own problems.”
  - Somalia considered no longer threat to international peace & security.
- Perhaps U.S. had crossed “Vietnam threshold.”

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- Crisis began Feb 1991 when republics of Slovenia & Croatia began to pull out of greater Yugoslavia.
- Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina followed suit early 1992.
- Large-scale violence began April 1992 with Serbian militia & guerrillas in Bosnia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- Serbs eventually occupied 70% of Bosnia.
  - 1M Muslims & Croats became refugees.
- UN imposed economic sanctions & arms embargo on Serbia but did not use force.
  - Violence continued & soon included genocide or “ethnic cleansing.”

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- Feb 1993 UN approved USAF effort to parachute food & medicines to Muslim towns besieged by Serbs.
- Feb-Apr 1994 NATO began using aircraft to enforce “no-fly” zone over Bosnia.
  - Led to first NATO combat in shooting down Serbian planes.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- Muslim forces attacked out of safe areas around Bihac Nov 1994 & drove Serbs back.
- Serbs regained much ground early in 1995 & seized UN troops as “human shields.”
- UN increased presence to several brigades to separate combatants & continue flow of humanitarian relief.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- UN peace enforcement thwarted by vulnerability of ground forces & inability of air forces to achieve decisive results.
- UN unwilling to be drawn into wider war to reach decision.
- UN experience in Somalia & Bosnia suggested need for “standing” UN army but opposed by most member states.

Results


- Post-Cold War offered not peace but military interventions in regional conflicts.
  - World plagued by multiple antagonisms.
- UN defeat of Iraq in 1991 suggested new age of warfare.
  - Relatively small, professional forces armed with microchip-based technologies fighting intense wars of short duration vice grinding attrition.

Results

- Persian Gulf War looks now more like anomaly.
  - Only appeared to return decision to warmaking.
- Interventions since then have proved indecisive & not prone to technological solutions.
  - Opponents most often paramilitary forces, militias, and quasi-gangsters.

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Age of Interventions: Projecting Power and Maintaining Peace

U.S. Military History

The Cadet, the Museum, and U.S. Military History and Heritage

Museum Visit

Military Objects and Connecting Self to U.S. Military History and Heritage

Museum Visit

Reasons Behind
Establishing the Museum

Museum Visit


Museum Galleries and Instruction in U.S. Military History and Heritage

Museum Visit

Connecting the Museum's Objects and Galleries to the Cadet's Understanding of U.S. Military History and Heritage

U.S. Military History

Check on Learning



The Cadet, the Museum, and U.S. Military History and Heritage

U.S. Military History

Integrate the Basic Knowledge of Military History into Your Education as a Future Officer

U.S. Military History

Terminal Learning Objective:

- **Action:** Apply knowledge of U.S. military history to the education of officers.

- **Conditions:** Given the textbook, a book and a computer simulation each on the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg and the 1944-1945 Battle of the Bulge, student handouts, and personal notes taken during this lesson.

U.S. Military History

Terminal Learning Objective:

- **<u>Standard:</u>**

* Demonstrates mastery of U.S. military history sufficient to pass the test with a score of eighty percent.

* Develops a critical analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the Book Review and Analysis Evaluation Checklist.

U.S. Military History

- **Standard:**

* Conducts a computer simulation and develops a critical analysis of a portion of the Battle of Gettysburg that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the PC-Based Military History Simulation Evaluation Checklist.

* Develops a critical analysis of the Battle of the Bulge that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the Book Review and Analysis Evaluation Checklist.

U.S. Military History

Standard:

* Conducts a computer simulation and develops a critical analysis of a portion of the Battle of the Bulge that meets one-hundred percent of criteria listed on the PC-Based Military History Simulation Evaluation Checklist.

* Identifies the purpose for visiting a military museum.